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Objective: The present study explored Dangerous Offender (DO) judicial sentencing decisions 
in Canada by examining judicial decision maker’s written comments regarding a) experts’ 
ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community, b) partisanship, c) 
experts’ discussion of static, dynamic, and protective factors, d) the effect of the 2008 legislation 
change, e) ethnicity, and f) jurisdictional differences. Method: The study was archival and 
retrospective. There were 140 written sentencing decisions identified in four Canadian provinces 
(BC, AB, SK, and MB) via CanLII (publicly accessible) between July 2, 2008 and July 2, 2018. 
Results: Results indicate that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of 
risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community were strongly associated 
with and significantly contributed to penalty outcomes. Generally, the trend that appeared was 
that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of lower risk ratings, higher ratings of treatment 
amenability, and higher risk manageability in the community resulted in a much lower likelihood 
a Defendant would receive an indeterminate sentence. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
judicial makers’ note a substantial amount of agreement on all three assessment areas when 
multiple experts are present. The judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ 
discussion of static, dynamic, or protective factors was not influential on outcomes. The 2008 
legislation change appears to contribute little in terms of the designation stage but has influenced 
the penalty stage. Further, Defendants with an Indigenous heritage now have a 50% chance of 
receiving an indeterminate sentence compared to 84% prior to the legislation change. 
Saskatchewan continues to have not only a disproportionate number of DOs but also DOs of 
Indigenous heritage. The results indicate that BC, AB, and MB have not changed their penalty 
patterns significantly since the 2008 legislation change, but Saskatchewan has. Discussion: 
Results generally supported previous research indicating that the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of expert risk assessments influence preventative detention hearings and that 
partisanship continues to exist even though legislation changes have attempted to reduce it. 
Results also indicated that the 2008 legislation change has had an impact on penalty outcomes 
but not designation outcomes. Moreover, although Indigenous peoples are disproportionately 
represented, under the 2008 legislation change, they are as likely to receive a determinate 
sentence with an LTSO as an indeterminate sentence. Implications of the results are discussed in 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 General Overview 
Generally, it has been found that a small number of people are responsible for a 
significant proportion of violent crime. Hence, Canada introduced preventative detention 
legislation in an attempt to address individuals who committed chronic violent offences that 
posed a threat to the public (Bonta et al., 1998). Forms of this legislation have been in place 
since the late 1940s and currently involves individuals involved in the criminal justice system 
meeting particular criteria to receive special sentencing designations, either as a dangerous 
offender (DO) or a long-term offender (LTO) (Valiquet, 2008). As of the end of the fiscal year 
2018-2019, statistics show that the number of DOs in Canada continues to rise (Public Safety 
Canada, 2020). 
However, evidence also indicates that the DO population is not significantly different 
regarding its risk level compared to released correctional populations not carrying a special 
sentencing designation (Koopman, 1985; Nicholaichuk et al., 2013) or carrying a long-term 
sexual offender designation (Trevethan et al., 2002). Moreover, when measuring six primary 
clinical factors, there was no significant difference between DOs and others who committed 
violent and sexual offences (Thompson, 2016). 
Risk assessment is now a standard tool in both pre-sentence and post-sentence reports, 
and are implicitly or overtly presented as factual data to be measured by legal-sentencing criteria 
in judicial decision making (Bloomenfeld, 2007). Both legal professionals and academics have 
consistently voiced skepticism with current risk assessment practices which, it is said, do not 
adequately capture the realities of risk-management and future rehabilitation. Instead, they focus 
on the individual’s history and past conduct (Thompson, 2016). Risk assessment plays a dual 
role in the context of a DO hearing – such evidence can be presented to both establish risk at the 
designation stage, and also to interpret the reasonable expectation of control at the penalty stage 
(Thompson, 2016). 
Assessment of risk largely depends on expert witnesses who may utilize different types 
of risk assessment tools to predict the risk of recidivism and the extent to which it can be 
managed (Thompson, 2016). There is a significant amount of research that suggests actuarial 
assessment tools (utilizing static risk factors only) cannot adequately determine the management 
of an individual’s risk under a long-term supervision order (LTSO), or other community 
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initiatives (Thompson, 2016). An equally substantial body of research exists suggesting experts 
have improved their accuracy and consistency in assessing risk, most times to the point of 
finding significant correlations (Thompson, 2016).  
Preventative detention legislation in Canada specifies that an expert risk assessment is 
required in making preventative detention recommendations. Moreover, although the field of risk 
assessment has improved dramatically within the last few decades, limitations regarding how 
risk information is presented and interpreted still exists. Despite these limitations, assessments 
provided by experts are the primary source of information available to judicial decision makers 
when assessing the risk and possible management of individuals undergoing a preventative 
detention hearing. Evaluating judicial decision makers’ reliance on experts is particularly 
important given that recent research has questioned the reliability of risk assessment scores 
presented within real-world contexts. 
1.2 Theoretical Underpinning 
Over the past 20 years, significant changes in the theoretical frameworks that are 
prominent in the fields of criminal justice and criminology evidence a shift towards a better 
understanding of the criminal conduct of individuals (Andrews & Bonta, 1998; Andrews et al., 
1990; Andrews et al., 2006). A shift is also occurring from theories that aim to explain 
differences between individuals to those that explain within-individual differences. Theories that 
focus on between individual differences try to explain why some individuals commit crime and 
others do not. However, these explanations tend to be static, or unchanging. In contrast, theories 
looking at within-individual variation look at changes over time in the criminal behavior of 
individuals within the criminal justice system and are more dynamic (Farrington, 2003). 
The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (PCC) is a validated framework that attempts, 
amongst other things, to identify individual dynamic (or changeable) factors that correlate with 
criminal behavior, which could act as potential targets for treatment or intervention (Bonta & 
Andrews, 2017). The dynamic factors become relevant for assessing areas of need and risk for 
recidivism. The PCC and the development of risk assessment tools utilizes a General Personality 
and Cognitive Social Learning (GPCSL) theory, which speaks to the eight major psycho-social-
biological factors that influence and maintain criminal behaviour (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). The 
Central Eight factors are criminal history, pro-criminal attitudes, pro-criminal associates, 
antisocial personality patterns, family/marital, school/work, substance abuse, and 
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leisure/recreation (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Of importance, seven of the eight factors are 
dynamic (or changeable over time), which is crucial as it speaks to an individual’s ability to 
change (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). From the GPCSL theory came the Risk Need Responsivity 
(RNR) model, which has become the dominant model of offender assessment and treatment in 
the world (Cullen, 2012, Polaschek, 2012; Taxman et al., 2014; Ward et al., 2007). 
The Risk Principle identifies “who” should be the focus of supervision and treatment 
services. It states that the assessed level of risk should be an indicator of the amount of 
supervision or treatment an individual receives (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Individuals assessed 
as high risk should receive more intensive services (Andrews et al., 1990). Also, research has 
shown that the relationship between risk and treatment intensity (e.g., minimal or intensive) 
challenge the perspective that any treatment is better than no treatment (Bonta & Andrews, 
2017). The Need Principle states that the targets of correctional intervention should be those 
areas of need that are related to recidivism, or that have some relationship to criminal behavior, 
also called criminogenic needs (Andrews et al., 1990; Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Criminogenic 
needs are attributes of an individual that, when changed, are associated with changes in the odds 
of recidivating. Also, not all needs are criminogenic and targeting non-criminogenic needs 
should not be expected to impact criminal behavior. The Responsivity Principle refers to the 
responsiveness of the individual to different service options. It recognizes that the impact of 
various treatment approaches may vary across individuals. The style and mode of service an 
individual receives should be matched to the learning style of the individual so that their 
criminogenic needs are targeted in a way that they will benefit from (Andrews et al., 1990; Bonta 
& Andrews, 2017). 
Studies demonstrate that adherence to the principles of the RNR model leads to improved 
criminal justice outcomes and reduced recidivism (Andrews & Dowden, 2006; Bonta & 
Andrews, 2017; Lovins et al., 2007; Lowenkamp et al., 2006). Service delivery to individuals 
who are at higher risk produces more substantial decreases in recidivism than for individuals 
who are lower risk, as long as the treatment focuses on criminogenic needs and adheres to 
effective treatment strategies. When imposing conditions of supervision, it is appropriate that the 
conditions reflect the targeting of criminogenic needs and specific responsivity factors in the 
individual case (Andrews & Dowden, 2007). 
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1.3 Sentencing in Canada 
 A definition of sentencing includes the imposition of a legal sanction on persons 
convicted of a criminal offence (Pozzulo et al., 2009; Roberts, 2004). There is no single purpose 
or objective to sentencing individuals within the criminal justice system. When sentencing an 
individual, a judicial decision maker has to consider the overall objective and decide which is 
most appropriate in each specific case. Section 718 of the Criminal Code (1985) states, amongst 
other objectives, that “[T]he fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society…” (p. 886). 
Moreover, the “fundamental principle” of sentencing guides judicial decision makers, by stating 
that “a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender” (Criminal Code, 1985, p. 887). 
Beyond the fundamental principle, the Criminal Code (1985) also consists of other 
sentencing principles under Section 718.2, including but not lmited to, “(d) an offender should 
not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate…, and (e) all available 
sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with 
the harm [done]…should be considered for all offenders...” (Criminal Code, 1985, pp. 887-9). In 
addition to deciding which purpose is most important, judicial decision makers are required to 
select a specific sentence that will fulfil the sentencing objective. Canadian judicial decision 
makers have a wide range of sentencing options available to them (Roberts, 2004). 
1.4 Preventative Detention in Canada 
1.4.1 Early Legislation and Calls for Reform 
The idea of indefinitely incarcerating individuals was conceptualized more than 70 years 
ago, and the first enactment of legislation (i.e., habitual offender (HO) legislation) in 1947 
occurred on the recommendation on the Archambault Commission (Valiquet, 2008). The 
purpose of the HO legislation was to remove individuals who committed persistent, chronic 
offences from society for a significant period (Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969). If 
designated a HO, individuals were subject to an indeterminate sentence and reviewed annually. 
The enactment of Section 662 of the Criminal Code (1985) in 1948 added a category of 
designation – the dangerous sexual offender (DSO) section. This section targeted individuals 
who behaved sexually, showing a failure to control their sexual impulses and thereby likely to 
cause injury, pain, or other evil to any other person or is likely to commit a further sexual offence 
(Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969). Just as an HO, the DSO could receive a 
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preventative indeterminate sentence. The new provisions required that any DSO application had 
to be supplemented with testimony from a minimum of two psychiatrists; one approved by the 
Attorney General and the other by the Defendant (Canadian Committee on Corrections, 1969).  
For more than a decade, the HO and DSO regimes remained unchanged but were the 
subject of considerable criticism. In 1960, in response to difficulties around meeting the legal 
standard of proof and a lack of clear direction regarding the definition of a DSO (Petrunik, 
1994), the provisions were amended. Changes to the legislation included eliminating the 
determinate component of sentencing that had been permitted under Section 660 of the Criminal 
Code (1985) and also allowed for an individual to be designated as a DSO after only one 
conviction (MacAlister, 2005). 
Despite the 1960 amendments, concern about the HO and DSO provisions continued into 
the 1980s. In particular, attention was drawn to the errors made by mental health experts in 
accurately diagnosing mental disorders (in particular, psychopathy) (Petrunik, 2002). During this 
period, two federal government committee reports were generated. First, the Canadian 
Committee on Corrections (Ouimet Report) (1969) found that the HO legislation had not been 
applied uniformly in a rational manner across the country. The committee stated that because the 
legislation had not been applied consistently, the deterrent effect of the HO and DSO legislation 
was “insignificant.” It was recommended that the legislation be repealed as it was too broad in 
scope and was being applied to non-DOs. 
 Second, The Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Goldenberg 
Report) (1974) was released five years after the Ouimet Report (1969). The committee’s 
mandate involved a complete examination of the parole system in Canada. The Goldenberg 
Report (1974) recognized the conclusion that the HO and DSO legislation was capable of being 
applied against individuals who were not dangerous. One recommendation suggested that the 
legislation should be repealed and replaced by a more general DO legislation, which would 
explicitly set out criteria for the identification of DOs and a mechanism for the assessment. The 
Goldenberg Report (1974) also recommended that any new DO legislation should allow for 
indeterminate sentences (as did the HO and DSO legislation).  
The revised DO scheme first came into force in 1977 and has undergone significant 
amendments on two occasions. The first was in 1997 and then again in 2008. Ultimately, these 
amendments have resulted in the broadening of the application of the DO provisions. 
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1.4.2 1977: Laying the Framework of Part XXIV 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977 continued to form the basis of the current DO 
scheme used by Courts. Applications were initiated by the Crown after obtaining the consent of 
the Attorney General, at which time the application was filed with the Court. As in 1960, two 
psychiatrists were required to give evidence, while a criminologist was optional (MacAlister, 
2005). As long as all the criteria in the statute were met, the Court would declare the individual 
as a DO, and the Court then had to provide an indeterminate sentence (MacAlister, 2005). All 
indeterminate sentences were subject to review after three years from the date of sentence and, if 
the individual was not released after the initial three years, their imprisonment was subject to 
review by the Parole Board of Canada every two years after that (Connelly & Williamson, 2000).  
1.4.3 1997: Introduction of the Long-Term Offender Regime 
The DO legislation remained the same for 20 years until significant amendments 
occurred in 1997. Although the framework was not entirely overhauled, the amendments resulted 
in very significant changes, including the introduction of a new designation – the LTO (Manson, 
2001). Changes were also made to the provisions involving psychiatric testimony, wherein only 
one assessment would be required (MacAlister, 2005). This change was based on a 
recommendation of the Task Force on High-Risk Violent Offenders, which recommended one 
multi-disciplinary neutral assessment team, with the aim of avoiding partisanship. However, 
Manson (2001) notes two problems with this approach; first, it cannot be said that there is a 
comparable multi-disciplinary clinic in every Canadian jurisdiction, and second, psychiatrists 
and psychologists with institutional positions were known to exhibit guarded and conservative 
responses.  
1.4.4 2008: Broadening DO Legislation to Protect the Public 
For another decade, the DO and LTO provisions remained unchanged. However, further 
amendments took place in 2008, with the primary objective of public protection from individuals 
who commit serious violent or sexual offences (except murder) who continue to pose a threat to 
society (Valiquet, 2008). The new provisions further adjusted the requirements for DO 
applications and, thus applications became much more prevalent. Section 752.01 of the Criminal 
Code (1985) speaks to the Crown’s duty to advise the Court as follows: 
If the prosecutor is of the opinion that an offence for which an offender is convicted is a 
serious personal injury offence that is a designated offence and that the offender was 
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convicted previously at least twice of a designated offence and was sentenced to at least 
two years of imprisonment for each of those convictions, the prosecutor shall advise the 
court, as soon as feasible after the finding of guilt and in any event before sentence is 
imposed, whether the prosecutor intends to make an application under subsection 
752.1(1) (Criminal Code, 1985, p. 964). 
Although the information gathering process and decision to apply for a preventative 
detention hearing can occur upon the charging of an individual, the commencement of the formal 
process does not occur until after the individual has been convicted of a “serious personal injury 
offence” (Public Safety Canada, 2009). A “serious personal injury offence” (Criminal Code, 
1985, p. 963) is defined generally as an indictable offence (other than treason or murder) 
involving the use or attempted use of violence, or endangerment of the life and safety of, another 
person (including psychological damage), or an offence or attempt to commit a sexual offence 
under sections 271, 272, or 273 of the Criminal Code (1985). 
The revisions also turned the onus onto the Defendant to prove on a balance of 
probability that he or she is not dangerous (section 757). However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has since weighed in on this provision and have explictly stated “To obtain a designation of 
dangerousness resulting from violent behavioiur, the Crown must demonstrate beyond a 
reasonable doubt, inter alia, that the offender represents a threat to the life, safety or physical or 
mental well-being of other persons” (R. v. Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). 
The 2008 amendments also limited judicial discretion around findings of dangerousness 
and sentencing as follows: 
Application for finding that an offender is a dangerous offender 
753(1) On application made under this Part after an assessment report is filed under 
subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is 
satisfied 
(a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious 
personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that 
expression in section 752 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or 




(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the 
offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a 
failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or 
injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other 
persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour, 
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of 
which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, 
showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender 
respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his 
or her behaviour, or 
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for 
which he or she has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to 
compel the conclusion that the offender’s behaviour in the future is 
unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint; or 
(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious 
personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition of that 
expression in section 752 and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual 
matter including that involved in the  commission of the offence for which he or 
she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses 
and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through 
failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses. (Criminal Code, 1985, 
p. 965) 
 Under these new provisions, upon the criteria being met, the judicial decision maker must 
find the individual to be a DO. Past legislation allowed the judicial decision maker to use their 
discretion at this stage depending on their assessment of risk management and treatment 
amenability in the community (e.g., designate the individual as a LTO and impose a determinate 
sentence and LTSO). The SCC has explicitly stated “[t]he proposition that a court is under a duty 
to declare an offender dangerous every time the statutory criteria are satisified would introduce 
an unnecessary rigidity into the process and overwshoot the public protection purpose.” (R. v. 
Johnson, 2003, p. 358). However, these new revisions could possibly lead to a significant 
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increase in DO designations as the judicial decision makers may now feel they have a limited 
alternative under the law. 
 Where the new provisions did provide judicial discretion was with respect to the sentence 
that could be levied. In the past, once an individual met the criteria for a DO they had to receive 
an indeterminate sentence. However, the 2008 amendment states as follows regarding the penalty 
stage for DOs: 
Sentence for dangerous offender 
(4) If the court finds an offender to be a dangerous offender, it shall 
 (a) impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate 
period; or 
 (b) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been 
convicted – which must be a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 
two years – and order that the offender be subject to long-term supervision for a 
period that does not exceed 10 years; or 
 (c) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been 
convicted (Criminal Code, 1985, p. 966). 
Sentence of indeterminate detention 
(4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for  an 
indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of 
the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under 
paragraph (4)(b) or (c) will adequately protect the public against the commission by the 
offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence (Criminal Code, 1985, p. 967). 
However, if the individual is not found to be a DO (i.e., the criteria set out are not 
met), then the Criminal Code (1985) sets out the following: 
(5) If the court does not find an offender to be a dangerous offender, 
 (a) the court may treat the application as an application to find the offender to 
be a long-term offender, section 753.1 applies to the application and the court 
may either find that the offender is a long-term offender or hold another hearing 
for that purpose; or 
 (b) the court may impose sentence for the offence for which the offender has 
been convicted (Criminal Code, 1985, p. 967). 
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Individuals with no prior criminal history do not commonly face a preventative detention 
hearing or receive a special sentencing designation, but can be found to be a DO under Section 
753(1)(a)(iii) (i.e., if the index offence was sexual and particularly brutal). Proving this particular 
criterion can be difficult as the term ‘brutal’ is subjective and not uniformly agreed upon 
amongst relevant parties. Typically, individuals have to show a persistent and aggressive pattern 
of behavior (sexual or non-sexual) to be eligible for a special sentence designation. Decisions by 
the Crown on which cases to proceed with a preventative detention application and what type of 
application to bring are said to occur on a case-by-case basis. However, if a DO application is 
pursued, the legislation requires the judicial decision maker to consider whether the individual 
meets the criteria for an LTO as well (R. v. Johnson, 2003, p. 358). 
A DO sentenced to an indeterminate sentence is eligible for day parole after four years 
and for regular parole after seven years; they are also reviewed by the Parole Board of Canada 
every two years thereafter (John Howard Society of Alberta, 1999; Valiquet, 2008). If ever 
paroled (in the case of DOs with indeterminate sentences), DOs remain under supervision for the 
rest of their lives, but they will remain imprisoned if they continue to present an unacceptable 
risk to society (Valiquet, 2008). Should DOs under supervision violate the conditions of the 
Parole Board of Canada, they may be imprisoned indefinitely (Valiquet, 2008). 
If the law fails to incapacitate an individual who gave indications of potential danger who 
then go on to harm more people, then the justice system fails its mandate to protect the public 
(Milward, 2014). On the other hand, there is the competing concern of subjecting someone to 
indefinite detention based on future crimes yet to be committed, but whose potential risk could 
be managed short of calling upon such an extreme measure (Milward, 2014). 
1.4.5 National Flagging System for High-Risk Offenders 
Individuals are identified as potentially eligible for preventative detention applications 
through several means, one of which is a database created in 1995 called the National Flagging 
System for High-Risk Offenders (Public Safety Canada, 2009). According to Public Safety 
Canada (2009), the core protocols establish that its goals and purpose are to assist the Crown to 
more effectively prosecute individuals who commit high-risk violent offences, as well as prevent 
individuals who commit high-risk violent offences from falling through jurisdictional gaps in the 
criminal justice system. Ultimately, the system was set in place to encourage the Crown to make 
LTO and DO applications in appropriate cases. 
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The primary concern when the flagging system was introduced was that individuals could 
evade the system by merely relocating to another province or territory to avoid attracting 
attention (Public Safety Canada, 2009). These individuals were committing serious crimes, but 
crimes not yet severe enough to warrant an LTO or DO application. Now there are coordinators 
in place to share information amongst relevant parties regarding individuals who are high-risk 
(Public Safety Canada, 2009). Once identified, the Crown will review the case to determine 
whether the Criminal Code (1985) criteria for a preventative detention application is relevant. In 
conducting a review, the Crown will gather a variety of criminal justice and related information 
to support their application (see Public Safety Canada, 2009 for more detailed information 
regarding the application process). 
Research has confirmed the utility of the National Flagging System for High-Risk 
Offenders (Blais & Bonta, 2015; Yessine & Bonta, 2006); however, there are comments that the 
coordinators of the database would benefit from utilizing structured risk assessment when 
making flagging decisions (Blais & Bonta, 2015). Further, research notes that flagged 
individuals were much more likely to be subject to a DO or LTO designation on reconviction 
compared with individuals who committed violent offences who were not flagged, but were 
equally high in risk (Yessine & Bonta, 2006). Moreover, it was found that 14% of flagged 
offenders included in the Blais and Bonta (2015) study were provided a special sentencing 
designation compared to 1% of Canadian violent recidivists. 
During their attempt to better understand the risk of recidivism of DOs, Alexander and 
Wong (2000) found that the earlier DO designation process seldom included systematic analyses 
of criminal behavior or scores on actuarial risk measures of risk of recidivism. Therefore, it is 
very likely that there are non-DOs who fit the DO criteria (as the criteria are too broad) but never 
underwent DO proceedings (Alexander & Wong, 2000). Recent research has shown that DOs 
score comparably to non-DOs on actuarial measures of risk (Witte et al., 2001) and are not 
fundamentally different from each other (Koopman, 1985; Nicholaichuk et al., 2013; Trevethan 
et al., 2002). This makes the National Flagging System and application for preventative detention 
hearings arbitrary. Moreover, it has been noted that the legislative criteria for preventative 
detention applications is “vague” (Public Safety Canada, 2017, p. 16). 
An evaluation of the National Flagging System occurred by Public Safety Canada in 
2017 and studied the system between 2012 and 2017 for relevance and performance, including 
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continued need, alignment with federal government priorities, alignment with federal roles and 
responsibilities, progress towards achievement of intended outcomes, and efficiency and 
economy (Public Safety Canada, 2017). It was found, amongst other things, that the system 
continues to be required, it is serving its purpose, it is being inconsistently used across 
jurisdictions, and revisions to the system are required. Examples of revisions include an aim to 
increase consistent use across jurisdictions and improve the timeliness and ease of access to 
information from other parties (e.g., RCMP, Correctional Service Canada) (Public Safety 
Canada, 2017). Coordinators within the evaluation stated that further research required included: 
1) research on the prediction of risk, especially with respect to Indigenous offenders, in order to 
validate tools and criteria, 2) outcomes of DO applications and a comparison of DO rates across 
jurisdictions, and 3) an assessment of the effectiveness of s. 810 orders (Public Safety Canada, 
2017). These topics for future research appear to show that the coordinators who use the system 
are interested to learn more about and focus the approach of the system; however, no further 
research was planned at the time (Public Safety Canada, 2017). 
1.4.6 Criticisms of the Current Legislation 
 Preventative detention legislation makes several assumptions: a) that there is a subset of 
individuals who are high-risk and who are not able to inhibit their violent (including sexual) 
criminal behavior, b) that prolonged incarceration (or supervision) to ensure public safety is 
necessary, and c) that this subset of individuals can accurately (and consistently) be identified. 
The second assumption (i.e., prolonged incarceration is necessary to ensure public safety) has 
been criticized given that lengthy sentences are already in place for dealing with individuals who 
commit violent and/or sexual offences (Greenland, 1984; Koopman, 1985; Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, 1975; Webster et al., 1985; Zanatta, 1996). Shortly after the preventative 
detention legislation was enacted, Webster et al. (1985) conducted a review wherein it was 
estimated that half of the DOs at the time were eligible for a life sentence based on their offences 
and the rest of the sample would have qualified for a term of incarceration of at least 10 years. 
This criticism, of course, ignores the first assumption that there is a subgroup of individuals who 
are high-risk and whose public risk cannot be controlled by existing sentencing options. That is, 
if the legislation fails to identify individuals who are the highest risk for which the designation is 
meant, then the legislation’s validity as a necessary sanction for the protection of the public 
comes into question. 
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The third assumption (i.e., accurate and consistent identification of individuals who are 
the highest risk) has been criticized in that the selective and arbitrary application of the 
legislation may violate individuals’ rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(e.g., R. v. Lyons, 1987). To date, the Courts have rejected constitutional challenges to 
preventative detention and upheld the discretionary power of prosecutors. In that regard, Bonta, 
Harris et al. (1996) interviewed 21 prosecutors experienced with DO applications in order to 
determine what factors are considered in bringing forth an application. Consensus amongst the 
respondents were limited with the most common factors listed as: an index offence that was 
sexual, an offence with a child victim, the presence of antisocial personality disorder, and the 
severity of the individual’s criminal record. It appeared that these factors were considered to 
heighten an individual’s risk to public safety, even those these criteria could apply to a large 
proportion of individuals. More research is required on the decision-making process given that 
there are no universal criteria in deciding to bring forth a preventative detention application. 
1.6 Dangerous Offender Population 
1.6.1 Breakdown of Dangerous Offender Population 
The DO population is generally increasing year-on-year and remains of interest to 
researchers, lawyers, and criminologists alike. By the end of the fiscal year 2018-2019, there 
were 967 individuals designated as DOs since 1978, and 67.6% had at least one current 
conviction for a sexual offence (Public Safety Canada, 2020). According to Public Safety 
Canada (2020), there were 39 new DO designations in 2018-2019 which is the lowest amount 
since the 2010-2011 fiscal year. Of the 967 DOs, 826 remain under the responsibility of CSC, 
and of those, 655 (79.3%) had indeterminate sentences and 171 (20.7%) had determinate 
sentences with LTSOs. 
Of the 826 DOs, 726 (87.9%) were in custody (representing 5.1% of the total in-custody 
population) and 100 (12.1%) were in the community under supervision. Of the 100 in the 
community under supervision, 25 (25%) were DOs with indeterminate sentences (including 
DSOs, HOs, and individuals also serving a life sentence) which represents 3.8% of the DOs with 
indeterminate sentences. By the end of the fiscal year 2018-2019, there were ten females with a 
DO designation. Individuals with Indigenous heritage accounted for 35.5% of DOs and 25.2% of 
the total federal correctional population (Public Safety Canada, 2020). In addition to the DOs, 
there remained within federal jurisdiction 14 DSOs and two HOs (Public Safety Canada, 2020). 
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1.6.2 Jurisdictional Breakdown of Dangerous Offenders 
Jurisdictionally, as of the fiscal year end 2018-2019, the breakdown of DO designations 
by province/territory ranges from 0 (Prince Edward Island) to 411 (Ontario) since 1978 (Public 
Safety Canada, 2020). Twelve of the 13 provinces/territories have active DOs with indeterminate 
sentences and 10 of the 13 provinces/territories have active DOs with determinate sentences and 
LTSOs. Moreover, Saskatchewan has a disproportionately high rate of DOs (indeterminate and 
determinate) compared to its overall population. Table 1 sets out the number of active DOs per 
100,000 population for provinces with a population of at least one million. 
 
Table 1 
Jurisdictional Breakdown of Active Dangerous Offenders 
Province 
 
Population Estimate (2021) Number of Active DOs Number per 100,000 
QC 8.59 million 114 1.33 
AB 4.44 million 55 1.24 
MB 1.38 million 27 1.95 
ON 14.79 million 352 2.38 
BC 5.17 million 134 2.59 
SK 1.18 million 94 7.97 
Note: As at the fiscal year end 2018-2019 (Public Safety Canada, 2020). DO = Dangerous 
Offender. 
 
 The above-noted six provinces account for 776 of the 826 active DOs (or 94%) as of the 
end of the fiscal year 2018-2019. As can be seen from Table 1, Saskatchewan has 7.97 active 
DOs (indeterminate and determinate with an LTSO) per 100,000 population, which is over three 
times as many as any other province/territory, and represents approximately 11.4% of all active 
DOs in Canada. Along with the highest rate of DOs per 100,000 population, it is noted that 
Saskatchewan also has the highest percentage of Indigenous peoples at 16.3%, followed by 
Manitoba at 15.5%, Alberta at 6.5%, British Columbia at 5.9%, Ontario at 2.8%, and Quebec at 
1.8%. Identification of the ethnic background of the active DOs according to each province and 
year was not available. Overall, this data speaks to the findings that the number of preventative 
detention applications have not only increased over time (MacAlister, 2005), but also that the 
provisions and treatment are being applied arbitrarily across jurisdictions, which appears to be 
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resulting in discrimination against specific groups of individuals (Bonta, Harris et al., 1996; 
Grant, 1985). 
1.6.3 Dangerous Offender Research 
Early research on the DO population was primarily focused on descriptive information 
(Berzins, 1983; Koopman, 1985; Mackay, 1983), however future studies commenced comparing 
DOs to other known high-risk individuals (e.g., Bonta et al., 1998; Zanatta, 1996). Several 
comparison groups have been studied including individuals who committed serious personal 
injury offences not designated as DOs (Zanatta, 1996), individuals with detention failures (i.e., 
individuals held in custody until warrant expiry and who subsequently reoffended violently; 
Bonta, et al., 1998), and demographically matched individuals who committed sexual offences 
(Zanatta, 2005). Overall, these three studies have demonstrated that, compared to non-DO, DOs 
are more likely to have index sexual offences (Bonta et al., 1998; Zanatta, 1996) and a history of 
convictions for sexual offences (Bonta et al., 1998; Zanatta, 1996, 2005). As well, DOs overall 
risk profile (as determined by valid and reliable risk assessment measures) was similar to the 
various comparison groups (Bonta et al., 1998; Zanatta, 1996). Moreover, of released individuals 
serving indeterminate sentences, almost three-quarters remained free of new convictions after 
four to seven years, evidencing a lower recidivism rate than individuals serving determinate 
sentences (Johnson & Grant, 2004). This leaves one wondering if these individuals are in fact a 
higher risk to recidivate than other individuals within the criminal justice system without special 
sentencing designations. 
However, two areas that Zanatta (2005) reported DOs scored significantly higher in than 
the group of matched individuals who committed sexual offences were: a) psychopathy, and b) 
sexual offender risk measures. Compared to previous studies and in an effort to improve the 
comparability of both groups, this particular study had 164 participants and ensured that an equal 
number of each type of sexual offender (e.g., child molester, rapist, etc.) was present in both 
designated and non-designated individuals. 
In an effort to assess the actual recidivism risk posed by a sample of DOs, Nicholaichuk 
et al. (2013) created a group of “pseudo-DOs” by matching a group of 100 non-designated 
individuals who committed sexual offences taken from an earlier study (Gu et al., 2004) to a 
group of 100 DOs on age (current age for DOs and age at release for pseudo-DOs) and actuarial 
risk (scores on the Brief Actuarial Risk Scale; Olver et al., 2013). Matching in this way is 
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required to assess recidivism risk given that so few DOs are ever released into the community. It 
was found that sexual recidivism rates after an average follow-up of 10 years for the pseudo-DOs 
matched the average rate of recidivism for non-designated individuals who committed sexual 
offences (i.e., approximately 10%). These results indicate that the risk posed by DOs is no 
different than the average individuals who commit sexual offences. Overall, the Nicholaichuk et 
al. (2013) results support the criticism that DOs are not necessarily a distinctive subset of 
individuals who are high-risk and whether there are existing sentencing options (e.g., a lengthy 
period of incarceration) that may be more appropriate compared to an indeterminate sentence. 
Research suggests that decisions have been made to legislation without substantial 
clinical research to determine what distinguishes DOs from other individuals who are not 
declared DOs (Langevin & Curnoe, 2014). Langevin and Curnoe (2014) reported that only one 
empirical clinical study of Canadian DOs with a comparison group is known (Bonta et al., 1998). 
Bonta et al. (1998) stated that DOs appeared to be a random selection of individuals who commit 
violent sexual offences and noted that the clinical profile of DOs was not unique among 
individuals who commit sexual and violent offences, just more extreme in some of their features 
(Langevin & Curnoe, 2014). 
1.7 Role of the Expert 
For years, psychiatrists and psychologists have actively contributed to knowledge in the 
area of the judicial system (Roberts, 2004). Commonly, these experts have provided assessment 
and treatment services to assist the Courts with judicial decisions. Expert assessments influence 
sentencing or disposition decisions and DO determinations (Hemphill & Hart, 2004) and are 
most useful to the judicial decision makers if they address the relevant legal or psychological 
issues for which the referrals were made (Roesch et al., 1998). Expert testimony has always 
played a pivotal role in preventative detention hearings and some have argued that preventative 
detention hearings are “virtually dependent on psychiatric testimony” (Rogers & Lynett, 1991, p. 
79). Experts can provide the judicial decision maker with information concerning the offences, 
the degree of harm committed against victim(s), the risks posed to the public, and the 
characteristics of the individual, all of which are considered during sentencing (Statistics Canada, 
1998). 
Even though judicial decision makers are not bound by the recommendations provided in 
expert assessments, they frequently implement recommendations considered reasonable and 
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feasible for referral questions (Hemphill & Hart, 2004; Jaffe et al., 1985). Jaffe et al. (1985) 
found that judicial decision makers accepted and implemented experts’ intervention 
recommendations in more than 80% of cases. Therefore, it is useful for experts to be familiar 
with community resources available to address the social, emotional, and educational needs of 
individuals and their families (Hemphill & Hart, 2004). 
Given that preventative detention legislation requires that a forensic clinical assessment 
be completed, it is important to evaluate the quality and content of the assessments being 
provided to the Court. This is particularly important considering the evidence speaks to the 
importance of clinical opinions in the decision-making process. For example, studies examining 
review board decisions for individuals who have mental health diagnoses have found that the 
clinical opinion of the expert was the most predictive of the final decision compared to other 
potential variables (Hilton & Simmons, 2001; McKee et al., 2007). When conducting studies 
with potential jurors, it has also been found that both student and community mock jurors are 
influenced by expert evidence (Krauss et al., 2012; Krauss & Sales, 2001; McCabe et al., 2010). 
That said, there does appear to be a preference among jurors for clinical judgment as opposed to 
actuarial risk estimates (Krauss et al., 2012; McCabe et al., 2010). Moreover, research on 
psychopathy has shown that a diagnosis of psychopathy (as presented by an expert) influenced 
mock jurors and judges to assign higher risk ratings (Boccaccini et al., 2008; Chauhan et al., 
2007; Jones & Cauffman, 2008). 
1.8 Risk Assessment 
1.8.1 Utility and Purpose of Risk Assessment 
Substantial advances have taken place in the development of risk assessment over the last 
50 years. Today there is a recognition that risk assessment is a critical element of evidence-based 
practices and correctional intervention. Many of the prominent predictors of recidivism and 
combined factors into risk assessment tools are now consistent with and guided by the PCC 
framework and RNR model. There is general agreement that formal, statistical approaches to 
assessment are more accurate predictors of criminal behavior than unstructured clinical judgment 
(e.g., Grove et al., 2000). As the purpose of risk assessment has expanded beyond risk prediction 
to include risk management, contemporary assessment tools should incorporate both static and 
dynamic risk factors (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Some researchers dispute the utility of risk 
assessments as they indicate that actuarial risk assessment instruments have large 95% 
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confidence intervals for risk estimates at a group level, but at an individual level, the confidence 
intervals were so wide that it renders risk estimates practically worthless (Hart et al., 2007). In 
essence, some researchers are saying that actuarial risk instruments cannot be used to estimate an 
individual’s risk for future violence with any reasonable degree of certainty and should be used 
with great caution or not at all (Hart et al., 2007). 
Some researchers also note that after controlling for time at risk, the rate of violence in 
individuals identified as high-risk by structured risk assessment instruments shows considerable 
variation (Singh et al., 2014). Without information on local base rates, assigning predetermined 
probabilities to future violence risk via a structured risk assessment is unsupported by the current 
evidence base (Singh et al., 2014). This significant finding emphasizes the requirement for 
caution when such risk estimates are utilized to affect decisions connected to public safety and 
individual liberty (Singh et al., 2014), such as preventative detention hearings. Research also 
notes that the results of individual risk assessments should explicitly report acknowledgement of 
all probable sources of error related to their use (Singh et al., 2014). 
1.8.2 Generations of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessments have a substantial history, and development in the area of risk 
assessment now have different approaches. Risk assessments initially used unstructured clinical 
judgment, which have been identified as first-generation assessments (Bonta, 1996). The 
unstructured clinical judgment includes few constraints on the decision-making process as 
evaluators are free to choose which information to review and how much to analyze, interpret, 
and report those data (Lyon et al., 2004). The second-generation of assessments represented a 
shift from professional judgment to more structured and standardized assessments wherein 
statistically relevant factors were selected for inclusion. Actuarial decision making improves 
predictive accuracy by demonstrating a marked improvement over chance probabilities and they 
tend to be more accurate than unstructured clinical judgment (Gardner et al., 1996; Harris et al., 
1993; Menzies & Webster, 1995; Mossman, 1994). Development of a variety of static, actuarial 
measures generally demonstrates good predictive validity; for example, Campbell et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that the Statistical Information on Recidivism (SIR; Nuffield, 1982) (Bonta, 
Harman et al., 1996) and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG; Quinsey et al., 2006) both 
show strong predictive validity for future violent recidivism. However, despite static actuarial 
measures’ strong predictive validity, they are quite limited in their utility as they cannot inform 
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changes in an individual’s risk and they provide little information about an individual’s problem 
areas and treatment needs (Wong & Gordon, 2006; Wong et al., 2009).  
Third-generation risk assessments incorporate dynamic risk factors, which have the 
potential to change from treatment or other change agents, as do the risk appraisals incorporating 
such measures. Third generation approaches also extend to a number of structured professional 
judgment (SPJ) tools, which involve the establishment of clinical guidelines (Borum, 1996; 
Douglas et al.,1999; Hart, 1998). If properly used, third-generation risk assessments should lead 
assessors towards sensible, balanced, and practical conclusions (Lyon et al., 2004). However, the 
final decision or recommendation regarding the perceived risk of violence and appropriate case 
management remains with the evaluator (Lyon et al., 2004). SPJ ameliorates problems with 
consistency and predictive validity while at the same time allowing the evaluator some flexibility 
in adapting the assessment process appropriately to each specific case (Hart, 1998). 
At this point, assessment research saw one of the most significant advances over the past 
20 years when there was recognition of criminogenic needs as dynamic risk factors and that the 
incorporation of these factors into a single assessment instrument is crucial (Hanson, 2005; Loza 
& Dhaliwal, 2005). Dynamic risk factors, as noted above, contribute information about risk that 
is not captured by purely static, historical risk factors. Third generation instruments, dynamic 
risk factors, and file review plus interview methods had the advantage in predicting violent 
recidivism (Campbell et al., 2009). Salient examples of this approach include the Level of 
Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R; Andews & Bonta, 1995) or the Historical Clinical Risk-20 
version 2 (HCR-20; Webster et al., 1997). 
Currently, fourth-generation assessments are gaining popularity as they integrate the 
assessment of risk, need, and responsivity with planned intervention and have broad applicability 
across age, race, and gender (Bonta & Andrews, 2017; Campbell et al., 2009). Fourth-generation 
assessments incorporate assessments of potential targets of change, assessments of strengths and 
specific responsivity concerns, as well as the structuring of service plans and delivery (Andrews 
& Dowden, 2007). Examples of fourth generation risk measures include the Level of 
Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI; Andrews et al., 2004), the Violence Risk Scale 
(VRS; Wong, & Gordon, 2006), and the third edition of the Historical Clinical Risk-20 (HCR-
20v3; Douglas et al., 2013). 
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The evolution of risk assessment from clinical judgment to structured assessments has led 
to questions about the accuracy of assessments conducted with each approach. Several studies 
have been conducted comparing the two approaches and in virtually all of the studies, the 
actuarial method outperformed the clinical method (Dawes et al., 1989). Further, a meta-analysis 
of studies was conducted comparing the accuracy of clinical and mechanical (formal or 
statistical) methods for making judgments or decisions about health or human behavior (Grove et 
al., 2000). Grove et al. (2000) concluded that, on average, mechanical predictions are 10% more 
accurate than clinical predictions and that there was a distinct advantage for mechanical 
prediction in the areas of medicine and forensic settings (those that predict criminal behavior). 
However, three other meta-analytic studies (Campbell et al., 2009; Gendreau et al., 2002; Yang 
et al., 2010) have shown that risk assessments that include dynamic variables (e.g., Level of 
Service instruments) predict as well as violence-specific risk scales (i.e., those based on static 
factors) (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). These meta-analytic findings are not surprising as Gendreau, 
Little et al. (1996) conducted a meta-analysis showing that dynamic factors are as good as or 
better than static factors. 
1.8.3 Predictors of Recidivism 
Developing a useful risk/needs assessment tool requires identifying the factors associated 
with recidivism. Identifying predictors of recidivism or criminal behavior have been the focus of 
considerable research attention. Prior research on probationers has identified nine factors 
consistently associated with probation outcome. These include gender, age, marital status, 
education level, race, employment, prior criminal history, offence (being a property offender) 
and sentence length (Morgan, 1993; 1994; Sims & Jones, 1997). Other factors noted as robust 
predictors of recidivism include early family factors and criminal associates (Gendreau, Goggin 
et al., 1996; Gendreau, Little et al., 1996). However, the debate remains about the relative 
importance of other predictors such as the social class of origin, intelligence and personal 
distress. 
Gendreau, Little et al. (1996) conducted a meta-analysis to identify the best predictors of 
adult offender recidivism. They identified 131 studies that produced 1,141 correlations with 
recidivism and sorted the predictors into 18 different domains, including ten static domains, 
seven dynamic domains, and one composite measure. Included were age, adult criminal history, 
pre-adult history of antisocial behavior, family criminality, family rearing practices, family 
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structure, gender, intellectual functioning, race, socioeconomic status, antisocial personality, 
companions, criminogenic needs (also considered criminal attitudes), interpersonal conflict, 
personal distress, social achievement, and substance abuse. They found that all of the predictor 
domains were found to have a statistically significant relationship to recidivism. However, 
specific predictors were stronger than others. Gendreau, Little et al. (1996) found that the 
strongest static predictors were adult criminal history and a history of antisocial behavior as a 
juvenile. The strongest dynamic predictors were companions, criminogenic needs, and antisocial 
personality. 
Previously, the conventional approach was to focus mostly (or only) on static factors as 
predictors of recidivism. The Gendreau, Little et al. (1996) meta-analysis highlighted that 
dynamic risk factors are as significant as static factors as the dynamic domains had a stronger 
relationship to recidivism. The research also challenged common beliefs by highlighting the 
strength of the relationship between each predictor and outcome. For example, while substance 
abuse is a significant predictor, it does not have the most robust relationship to recidivism. 
Overall, the meta-analysis highlighted that dynamic factors are as important as predictors of 
recidivism as static factors, and that risk scales, which combine multiple factors, are better 
predictors than any single factor alone. In regards to the PCC, the Central Eight Risk/Need 
factors are supported by research. 
1.8.4 Risk Assessment Measures 
It now seems that professionals are utilizing over 400 instruments in violence risk 
assessment (Singh et al., 2014). Approximately half of those 400 are actuarial, and half are SPJ 
(Mills, 2017). Generally, risk assessment tools assist in the identification and management of 
individuals at risk of harmful behaviour, but no single risk assessment tool has been consistently 
shown to have superior ability to predict offending (Campbell et al., 2009; Gendreau et al., 2002; 
Walters, 2003). Yang et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis examining the predictive accuracy 
of violence risk assessment tools. The results on predictors of adults who engage in criminal 
behavior provide support for the generation of general risk/needs assessment tools that comprise 
both static and dynamic risk factors. The researchers concluded that all nine tools and their 
subscales predicted violence at about the same moderate level of predictive efficacy except 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991) Factor 1, which predicted violence only at 
a chance level among men. The moderate level of predictive accuracy of these tools suggests that 
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they should not be used solely for some criminal justice decision making that requires a very 
high level of accuracy such as preventative detention. Yang et al. (2010) concluded that it 
follows that predicting who and under what conditions violence is more likely to occur, followed 
by effective management or intervention for those identified as high risk for violence, could be 
an effective violence prevention strategy. 
In terms of the PCL-R specifically, a recent series of papers debated the utility of the 
instrument to predict serious institutional violence, particularly in the context of capital 
sentencing decisions in the United States (DeMatteo et al., 2020a; DeMatteo et al., 2020b; Hare 
et al., 2020; Olver et al., 2020). Some researchers expressed the belief that the PCL-R could not 
accurately predict an individual’s risk for committing serious violence in high-security custodial 
settings and thus should not be utilized for same (particularly since the outcome could be a death 
sentence) (DeMatteo et al., 2020a; 2020b). However, other researchers expressed the opposite 
opinion; that is, that the PCL-R has both predictive validity and field reliability and remains a 
relevant tool for institutional risk assessment and management (Hare et al., 2020; Olver et al., 
2020). Overall, it was believed that if the PCL-R was utilized ethnically and appropriately, then 
it remains a valid risk assessment instrument, even in the context of high-stakes contexts (e.g., 
capital sentencing, preventative detention) (Hare et al., 2020; Olver et al., 2020). The debate 
concludes that additional real-life research would be helpful in furthering any conclusions drawn. 
In another meta-analysis, a comparison of some instruments was undertaken by Campbell 
et al. (2009), wherein 88 studies were examined and found that the effect sizes related to various 
instruments generally did not differ significantly. Further, in a systematic review, Singh et al. 
(2011) reported that many of the commonly used risk instruments demonstrated predictive 
accuracy in the moderate to high range (as operationalized per Rice & Harris, 2005). Another 
meta-analysis by Fazel et al. (2012) included 73 samples and found that measures explicitly 
designed to predict violence were more accurate in their predictions than instruments designed to 
predict general or sexual reoffending. Together, these meta-analyses indicate that the predictive 
accuracy for most instruments are generally in the moderate to high range and are similar across 
instruments and samples (Mills, 2017). 
Furthermore, according to what the risk instruments were designed to predict, outcomes 
for recidivism in all of the risk assessment instruments were found (i.e., the VRAG; Sex 
Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG; Quinsey et al., 1998), Rapid Risk Assessment of 
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Sexual Offence Recidivism (RRASOR; Hanson, 1997), STATIC-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 
1999), STATIC-2002 (Hanson & Thornton, 2003), and Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-
Revised (MnSOST-R; Epperson et al., 1998) (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009). Little 
variation was also found amongst the mean effect sizes of common actuarial or structured risk 
instruments (i.e., HCR-20, LSI-R, VRAG, SIR, PCL-R) (Campbell et al., 2009). Moreover, 
considerable research on the VRS has shown that changes in risk are associated with changes in 
outcome (Coupland & Olver, 2018; Lewis et al., 2013; Hogan & Olver, 2019). 
However, challenges have arisen regarding the predictive validity of dynamic risk factors 
and the extent to which risk factors are salient across gender, race, and ethnicity (Caudy et al., 
2013). Including dynamic needs in sentencing decisions basically increases the severity of the 
punishment because the individual has unmet social and psychological treatment needs that are 
suited for rehabilitative programming (Caudy et al., 2013). The added effort and loss of 
parsimony associated with including dynamic items that are not associated with recidivism (also 
known as non-criminogenic needs) is inefficient and may reduce the overall accuracy of the 
assessment (Caudy et al., 2013). Moreover, issues have been raised with respect to the use of 
actuarial risk assessments in Indigenous populations as they were not originally normed with that 
population; however, it has been found that most instruments have retained their validity and 
reliability even in the context of differing racial ancestry (see Ewert v. Canada, 2015, 2018 for 
additional details). 
Elsewhere, Taxman (2006) says it may be essential to address these in order to make 
treatment of criminogenic needs effective. That being said, existing data suggest that most risk 
assessment tools have weak to moderate accuracy in most applications and that typically more 
than half of individuals judged by tools as high risk are incorrectly classified as they will not go 
on to offend (Douglas et al., 2017). False-positives may be especially prevalent in minority 
ethnic groups and, thus limitations of risk assessment tools should be well understood and 
factored into clinical and criminal justice responses (Douglas et al., 2017). Ultimately, measures 
derived from criminological-related theories or research produced larger effect sizes than did 
those of less content relevance (Campbell et al., 2009). Therefore, uncertainty remains 
concerning the most appropriate instruments for the prediction of violence given variations in 
item content, purpose and format, and administration method (Campbell et al., 2009). Moderate 
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ability to predict risk outcomes was consistent with estimates reported in other risk prediction 
meta-analyses (Campbell et al., 2009). 
1.8.5 Indigenous Correctional Clients 
According to Gutierrez et al. (2017), it is essential that risk assessments be structured, 
objective, reliable, and transparent. Further, they state that it is imperative that these risk 
assessments be empirically validated in order to defend their use with a diverse offender 
population. To date, meta-analyses and large-sample studies have demonstrated that the major 
risk factors and commonly used risk assessment scales predict recidivism for justice involved 
Indigenous individuals, but the predictive accuracy is somewhat lower for Indigenous compared 
to non-Indigenous individuals. Acknowledging the diversity of the Indigenous individuals and 
cultures within the overall population and the varied histories for each group (that is, First 
Nations, Métis, and Inuit), is critical when completing a risk assessment (Gutierrez et al., 2017). 
For example, in Canada, there are approximately 617 First Nations communities, representing 50 
distinct nations and over 50 Indigenous languages (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 
2015). One of the most consistent findings on Indigenous correctional clients is that, as a group, 
on most risk factors, they tend to score significantly higher than non-Indigenous individuals 
(Gutierrez et al., 2017). 
Indigenous social history factors are consistently documented in security classification 
and discretionary release recommendations, and there is no evidence that they are being 
misperceived as risk factors (Keown et al., 2015). All of the Central Eight risk/need factors 
predicted general recidivism and seven of the eight predicted violent recidivism for Indigenous 
individuals (Keown et al., 2015). Further, it has been found that the best predictors of general 
recidivism for Indigenous individuals were three of the Big Four risk/need factors (that is, 
criminal history, pro-criminal associates, and antisocial personality pattern) (Keown et al., 2015). 
Yessine and Bonta (2009) found that while criminal history, substance abuse, and 
antisocial personality pattern were predictive of general recidivism for Indigenous individuals, 
they demonstrated significantly lower predictive validity estimates than for non-Indigenous 
individuals. For the prediction of violent recidivism, there were no differences between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals on these variables. Critics assert that risk 
assessments often place the Indigenous individual in an unfavorable light, as they tend to score 
higher on most risk instruments than non-Indigenous individuals (Gutierrez et al., 2013). 
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 As recent as 2018, questions have been raised regarding the appropriate use of actuarial 
risk assessment instruments in Canadian courtrooms. The case of Ewert v. Canada (2018) raises 
pertinent questions about the accuracy of the actuarial risk assessment instruments for 
Indigenous individuals within the broader Canadian criminal justice system, even though it was 
focused on the use of actuarial risk assessment instruments in the context of Parole Board of 
Canada hearings (Thompson, 2016). Ewert raises concerns of cross-cultural bias that may be 
implicitly built into actuarial risk assessment instruments, which then translate into inaccurate 
scores for Indigenous individuals (Thompson, 2016). However, a recent SCC decision in the 
matter has noted that further research is required when utilizing standard risk assessment 
measures on Indigenous individuals to ensure that the outcome is valid. 
Directly related to the issue of assessing static factors is that of cross-cultural bias. 
Actuarial tests are susceptible to cultural differences and researchers have questioned their 
applicability to minority populations including Indigenous individuals in Canada as they were 
developed on non-Indigenous populations. However, it is important to note that it does not 
necessarily follow that because Indigenous individuals are higher risk than non-Indigenous 
offenders, risk factors (or scales) will predict recidivism differently for Indigenous individuals 
(Gutierrez et al., 2017). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis of 49 independent samples (n = 57,315 
Indigenous and 204,977 non-Indigenous individuals) by Gutierrez et al. (2013) found that all 
Central Eight risk factors predicted general and violent recidivism significantly for Indigenous 
individuals. However, the predictive accuracy for all but two of the domains was lower for 
Indigenous individuals compared to non-Indigenous individuals. 
In another meta-analysis, Wilson and Gutierrez (2014) examined different versions of the 
Level of Service Inventory risk scales in 15 samples (n = 21,807 Indigenous and 42,515 non-
Indigenous individuals). The researchers found that the LSI total scores significantly predicted 
general recidivism for Indigenous individuals with moderate accuracy, and all subscales also 
predicted recidivism. Similar to Gutierrez et al. (2013), five of the eight subscales had lower 
predictive accuracy for Indigenous individuals compared to non-Indigenous individuals. Further, 
in a meta-analysis of the Level of Service (LS) measures examining 128 studies across 151 
samples and 137,931 justice involved individuals, Olver et al. (2014) found the LS measures 
demonstrated generally identical effects in the prediction of general recidivism between 
Indigenous (r = .30. k = 13, n = 5,354) and non-Indigenous (r = .29, k = 24, n = 40.989) groups.  
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Regarding sex offenders, there is one meta-analysis (albeit small) available, examining 
the Static-99R and Static-2002R with Indigenous individuals (Babchishin et al., 2012). The 
Babchishin et al. (2012) study found that the Static-99R predicted sexual recidivism with 
similarly high levels of predictive accuracy for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals. 
However, the Static-2002R predicted sexual recidivism for Indigenous individuals, but the effect 
size was small and was lower than the accuracy found for non-Indigenous individuals. 
An additional study by Olver et al. (2018) examined the predictive properties of the 
Violence Risk Scale-Sexual Offender version (VRS-SO; Wong et al., 2003-2009) risk and 
change scores among Indigenous and non-Indigenous sexual offenders in a combined sample of 
1,063 Canadian federally incarcerated men. The findings showed that Indigenous male offenders 
scored significantly higher on the Static-99R and VRS-SO, as well as had higher rates of sexual 
and violent recidivism; however, there were no significant differences found between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous groups on treatment change. In addition, ancestral group differences in base 
rates of sexual recidivism was explained by individual differences on static and dynamic risk 
factors, although this was not the case for violent recidivism. The results also supported the 
predictive properties of VRS-SO risk and change scores with treated Canadian Indigenous sex 
offenders (Olver et al., 2018). 
1.8.6 Dynamic Factors 
Advances in risk assessment over the past 15 years have involved incorporating dynamic 
risk variables. Wong and Gordon (2006) defined dynamic variables as “changeable or potentially 
changeable factors (such as substance abuse, impulsivity, and criminal attitudes) that can be 
influenced or changed by psychological, social, or physiological means such as treatment 
interventions” (Wong & Gordon, 2006, p. 283). Thus, links to changes in the dynamic factors 
and changes in recidivism exist. Some example of prominent measures that use dynamic risk 
factors include, but are not limited to, the VRS, HCR-20, LSI-R, and LS/CMI. In contrast to 
purely static tools, the basis of measures incorporating dynamic variables is on the assumption 
that risk of violent reoffending can change and that dynamic variables can provide useful 
information about the treatment goals and needs of the individual. Research on dynamic 
variables has shown that they predict future recidivism equally as well as static variables but also 
allow for detection of changes in an individual’s risk profile (Gendreau, Little et al., 1996; Olver 
et al., 2007). 
27 
 
Douglas and Skeem (2005) have argued that differentiation between risk status and risk 
state lacks in the understanding of risk. Most of the focus of previous research is on risk status—
“interindividual risk level based largely on static factors” (Douglas & Skeem, 2005, p. 347). In 
other words, research has focused on the identification of individuals at high risk for violent 
behavior relative to other people and leaves little room for change over time. Although risk status 
is an important consideration, a high-risk status individual’s actual level of risk “ebbs and flows 
over time within each” (Douglas & Skeem, 2005, p. 348). Thus, risk state is a measure of 
“intraindividual risk level determined largely by current status on dynamic risk factors” (Douglas 
& Skeem, 2005, p. 347). Risk state describes an individual’s “propensity to become involved in 
violence at a given time, based on particular biological, psychological, and social variables in his 
or her life” (Douglas & Skeem, 2005, p. 349). Overall, the authors argued that it is better to 
examine the dynamic entity of risk through the empirical identification of dynamic factors and 
the broadening of our conceptualization of risk. 
Brown and Rakow (2016) found that dynamic cues that can vary over time (e.g., level of 
violence) more strongly influenced clinicians’ risk assessments than fixed static cues for a given 
individual (e.g., a diagnosis of psychopathy). Variation in factors affecting risk assessments for 
different settings was greater than the variability between clinicians for such judgments (Brown 
& Rakow, 2016). Research findings suggest an intriguing possibility that clinicians’ violence risk 
assessments focus on incorrect data (Elbogen et al., 2002). For example, it is not uncommon for 
clinicians to focus on recent behaviours at the expense of past behaviours, even though recent 
behaviours and factors are not predictive of violence (e.g., Loeber et al., 2005) (Brown & 
Rakow, 2016). A fundamental error in risk assessment is to score seriousness of the current 
offence as a risk factor as it is not a major risk factor; however, it is an aggravating factor in 
sentencing (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Just punishment and risk of reoffending are reflections of 
different concerns (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). 
1.8.7 Protective Factors 
Research on the clinical application of dynamic factors in risk assessment has been 
widely positive (see Ryba, 2008; Hanson, 2009); however, their use is not without limitations. 
One such limitation is that this field tends to focus on dynamic “risk” factors (Sheldrick, 1999) 
meanwhile neglecting possible dynamic “protective” factors (Tweed et al., 2011), which may 
have useful benefits and contribute to positive outcomes. Miller (2006) argued that the narrow 
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focus on risk factors in violence risk assessment may generate pessimism among clinicians and 
feeds an attitude toward the over-prediction of recidivism rather than other potentially positive 
outcomes. As such, Miller (2006), as well as other authors (e.g., Rogers, 2000; Laub & 
Lauritsen, 1994), argued that risk assessments using only risk factors could have a negative bias, 
generate unbalanced reports, and lead to lengthier periods of detention. The result would be 
costly to all parties involved. 
There is a growing appreciation for the potential use of dynamic protective factors (such 
as a stable prosocial support network, religious beliefs, and healthy coping styles) in the 
assessment of risk to improve and balance risk assessments (Rogers, 2000; Hanson, 2009; de 
Ruiter & Nicholls, 2011). Unlike risk factors (which have links to an increase in an individual’s 
likelihood of reoffending), protective factors are hypothesized to have a buffering effect on risk; 
however, it is as yet unclear whether protective factors have a mediating or moderating role in 
the relationship of violence risk to recidivism (Rogers, 2000). True to this hypothesis, protective 
factors have long been included as an under-addressed component of the RNR model of effective 
correctional treatment as seen in Andrews et al. (2004) and Wormith et al. (2012). 
Protective factors perform equivalently to risk factors for prediction of a range of adverse 
outcomes (O’Shea & Dickens, 2015). Current risk assessment tools for sexual offending focus 
almost exclusively on assessing factors that raise the risk of offending, however, the inclusion of 
notions of desistance and strengths may provide additional guidance to the assessment and 
treatment of those who sexually offend (de Vries Robbé et al., 2015). Hanson’s (2009) review of 
risk assessment for crime and violence notes that one of the most significant additions for the 
next generation of risk assessment tools is the incorporation of protective factors as well as risk 
factors. Although the adoption of protective factors into risk assessment has been slow, the 
identification of a variety of promising protective factors continues. The Structured Assessment 
of Protective Factors (SAPROF; de Vogel et al., 2007) for violence risk defines protective 
factors as “any characteristic of a person, his/her environment or situation which reduces the risk 
of future violent behavior” (p. 25). 
A select few protective factors with the most significant empirical and conceptual support 
include: a) social support (Lodewijks et al., 2010; Hoge et al., 1996; Ullrich & Coid, 2011); b) 
emotional support (Lodewijks et al., 2010; Rennie & Dolan, 2010; Ullrich & Coid, 2011); c) 
leisure time (Hoge et al., 1996; Rae-Grant et al., 1989; Bouman et al., 2010; Ullrich & Coid, 
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2011); d) religious activity (Baier & Wright, 2001; Plutchik, 1995; Pearce et al., 2003; Rogers, 
2000; Ullrich & Coid, 2011; Duwe & King, 2012); e) attitude toward intervention (Lodewijks et 
al., 2010; Rennie & Dolan, 2010); f) accommodation/housing upon release (Ullrich & Coid, 
2011); and g) adaptive coping/prosocial problem solving (see Lodewijks et al., 2010; Rennie & 
Dolan, 2010). 
1.8.8 Communicating Risk 
 Many individuals have voiced concerns regarding matters of risk communication. There 
appears to be a consensus that not only is clarity required in what we say, but we also need to 
understand how it will be perceived and employed by those who hear that message (Mills, 2017). 
For example, expert testimony of the diagnosis of psychopathy is becoming increasingly 
common in Canadian criminal Courts and may be used as support to justify more severe 
sanctions (Zinger & Forth, 1998). More concerns that expert testimony provided in a Court trial, 
especially testimony in regards to psychopathy, may promote unfounded prejudice or inflate 
weakly supported research findings to bias criminal justice decision makers (DeMatteo & Edens, 
2006; Edens, 2001; Zinger, 1995; Zinger & Forth, 1998). 
In many cases, substantial gaps exist between the testimony given by some mental health 
professionals and current empirical research (Zinger & Forth, 1998). Substandard testimony has 
the potential of unduly influencing judicial decision makers and resulting in unjustifiably harsher 
judicial dispositions, and such potential could result in abuses of human rights (Zinger & Forth, 
1998). Further concerns surrounding dimensional versus discrete entities are noted (Zinger & 
Forth, 1998). Dimensional measures provide more precision and testimony should be in 
dimensional terms to avoid possible judicial misunderstandings (Zinger & Forth, 1998). 
Experts are poised to assist the Courts by providing relevant information about legal 
issues, but expert witnesses should still provide testimony in an unbiased way that allows the 
judicial decision maker or jury to make the final decision (Campbell, 2000; Mercado & Ogloff, 
2007; Shuman & Greenberg, 2003). Like all professionals in the field, expert witnesses have a 
professional responsibility to promote the well-being of their clients; arguably, confining 
testimony to an impartial description of the facts works best, focusing primarily on an 
individual’s risk factors and needs (Ewing, 1983; Shuman & Greenberg, 2003). That being said, 
research shows that experts tend to show partisan allegiance in the way they scored individuals 
on the PCL-R and there is a disproportionate influence of partisianship on structured assessments 
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(Lloyd et al., 2010). Whether partisan allegiance is a matter of mistaken public perception 
(Mossman, 1994), group socialization processes (Saks, 1990), or purposeful fact-filtering for 
monetary gain, the reputation of the experts are contaminated by examples of substantial 
discrepancies between experts’ diagnoses and interpretation of diagnostic criteria. 
Many studies have found that there is a preference among experts to use categorical 
statements of risk (e.g., low, moderate, high; Heilbrun et al., 2004; Heilbrun, Philipson et al., 
1999; Viljoen et al., 2010). Despite this preference, research has also consistently shown that 
experts are not fully aware of all the different ways that risk information can be presented and 
how that may influence how the information is received (Hilton et al., 2008; Scurich & John, 
2011; Slovic et al., 2000). A study by Scurich and John (2011) showed that final decisions were 
affected by the manner in which the risk information was presented resulting in mock judicial 
decision makers rendering more lenient outcomes when a probability of violence not occurring 
(e.g., 80% chance) rather than a probability of violence occurring (20% chance). The impact of 
this risk communication style has also been found with potential jurors (Varela et al., 2013). 
Moreover, beyond how risk is communicated, there is a paucity of research on the 
contents of risk assessment reports, particularly in preventative detention hearings. Viljoen et al. 
(2010) surveyed practicing forensic clinicians and they reported that their risk assessment reports 
were, on average, 12 to 13 pages and always or almost always contained descriptions of past 
violent offending, risk factors, rationales for risk judgments, and protective factors. The 
researchers noted that the forensic clinicians were less likely to report timelines for violent 
reoffending, the possible seriousness of future offending, the confidence in risk judgments, or 
mention relevant research in their reports. As well, the researchers found that the risk assessment 
reports concerning adult individuals who engage in criminal behavior were less likely to discuss 
protective factors, treatment considerations, and judgments regarding risk level, compared to 
juvenile offenders. 
With regard to preventative detention hearings, it would be expected that the experts’ risk 
assessments contained information regarding protective factors, treatment considerations, and 
judgments of risk level as these areas would be required for making treatment amenability and 
risk management decisions. Besides the actual contents of risk assessments, it is crucial to assess 
the potential biases and limitations associated with the experts completing the assessments. For 
example, it has not been unheard of to have experts provide a risk assessment and testimony that 
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is clearly biased. To that end, recent research has highlighted the importance of considering the 
adversarial nature of the proceedings and the party that requested the assessment. 
1.8.9 Use of Risk Information 
What does the Court do with the risk-assessment information? (Bloomenfeld, 2007). 
There is extensive variation in the language of risk assessment, including its references to risk, 
recidivism, and criminogenic need (Bloomenfeld, 2007), which are at times potentially 
misinterpreted by criminal justice professionals. There seems to be a general failure to recognize 
the urgency of the need to thoroughly evaluate risk-assessment instruments and their proper role 
in the sentencing process (Bloomenfeld, 2007). Zinger and Forth (1998) reported that harsher 
dispositions usually follow when an expert testifies to an individual having traits associated with 
psychopathy. A review of judgment discourse found that judicial decision makers “tend to 
dedicate a large portion of their deliberations to the evaluation of expert testimony” (Zinger & 
Forth, 1998, p. 21). Others have suggested that expert testimony around an individual’s actuarial 
risk assessment appears to form part of the decision-making process for the judicial decision 
maker (Zinger & Forth, 1998). A study that focused specifically on the PCL-R, psychopathy, and 
its implications in the courtroom found that “psychopaths will receive longer sentences 
compared to their non-psychopathic counterparts” (Davey, 2013, p. 41). 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) cautioned judicial decision makers from 
handing over their decision-making power to the control of experts (R. v. Lyons, 1987), there is 
evidence to suggest that expert testimony is very influential in the designation of risk and 
declaration of dangerousness. Expert testimony also factors into an individual’s potential for 
rehabilitation, which is a critical aspect of sentencing once provided a special sentencing 
designation. One basis for an indeterminate sentence is the evaluation of little to no prospect of 
rehabilitation or management in the community. Therefore, the importance of appropriately 
conducted risk assessments in preventative detention hearings is critical. If the assessment 
identifies an individual as high-risk, then the sentence imposed may be disproportionate to the 
gravity of the offence (Bonta, 2007). Judicial decision makers are not required to follow the 
recommendations of a pre-sentence report that may or may not be grounded on a risk/need 
assessment (Bonta, 2007). The risk level is but one factor, and sometimes the circumstances and 
nature of the offence can outweigh any risk/need assessment findings (Bonta, 2007). 
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 Judicial decision makers have joined academic commentators in expressing concerns that 
over-reliance on risk assessment may trump proportionality (Cole, 2007). Research disclosed 
that the objections of many of those judicial decision makers were based on concerns about 
instrument validity and reliability, rather than on opposition to risk-assessment instruments 
entirely (Cole, 2007). Generally, they would like to be factoring in risk-assessment information 
into their sentencing decision-making processes (Cole, 2007). However, there is the considerable 
use of judicial reflection on the admissibility and adequacy of risk-assessment instruments in 
Canadian Courts (Cole, 2007). Judicial decision makers have found, in several cases, that the 
assessment tool may be an appropriate diagnostic instrument if it was used as a file organizer in 
concert with other verified file information and completed by someone properly trained. 
However, there is an ongoing problem that various instruments are being completed by 
insufficiently trained persons and without complete and accurate background documentation that 
can locate results in a broader context (Cole, 2007; Storey et al., 2013). 
Several Canadian commentators have drawn attention to the possibility that a judicial 
decision maker may provide a sentence “[dis]proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the 
degree of responsibility of the offender” (Cole, 2007, p. 506), based on the risk assessment. Such 
commentators usually express concerns that the judicial decision maker: a) may impose a type of 
penalty harsher than that merited by the offence, b) may impose a longer punishment than that 
merited by the offence or the individual, or c) may impose conditions in the context of a 
community sentence more onerous than those merited by the individual and the offence (Cole, 
2007). 
Judicial decision makers will learn to view the outcomes of risk assessments simply as 
one more piece of evidence to be considered in the sentencing “mix.” For example, despite what 
the risk assessment says if the judicial decision maker is behaving according to the sentencing 
rules, a potentially very dangerous individual who commits a relatively minor offence must have 
the benefit of a sentence which is proportionate to that particular offence. Thus, an individual 
who has repeatedly committed sexual offences who commits a minor theft is to be sentenced as a 
thief, not as a sex offender (Cole, 2007). That is, sentencing should reflect what the person has 
done rather than for who he/she is (Cole, 2007). The judicial decision maker should substantially 
discount, if not ignore, previous offences, particularly if there has been a substantial “gap” in the 
record (Cole, 2007). The ultimate danger with risk assessment is that, consciously or otherwise, 
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judicial decision makers may overemphasize considerations of risk at the expense of 
proportionality (Cole, 2007). Judicial decision makers are capable of weighing the evidence for 
its reliability, ignoring evidence that they have obliged to rule inadmissible, and, in a more 
general sense, are already in the business of attempting to determine the potential risk posed by 
an individual (Quigley, 2007), as per section 718(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code (1985). 
 While there is a concern that experts may misapply research findings, a more disquieting 
possibility is that some testifying professionals are ignorant of key aspects of risk assessment 
(Archer et al., 2006; Grann & Pallvik, 2002; Tolman & Mullendore, 2003) or misuse risk 
instruments (Cunningham & Reidy, 2002; Tolman & Rotzien, 2007). However, despite the 
problematic issue of some professionals’ and lay persons’ disregard for accurate actuarial risk 
assessment (Berlin et al., 2003; Freedman, 2001), valid concerns can be raised about expert 
testimony that uses risk instruments legitimately. Risk instruments have the potential to suggest a 
person exists in an enduring state of dangerousness rather than providing a probability range of 
future acts (Cunningham, 2006; McGuire, 2004; Mercado & Ogloff, 2007). 
Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat (2007) express a great deal of concern about the way in 
which risk assessments are being used across the country (particularly in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan). There is a contention that violence risk assessments are less accurate at 
predicting future violence than at predicting other types of criminality, leading to a danger that 
an individual may be punished on the basis of a misguided perception that there is a risk of future 
violence, rather than for what he/she actually did (Quigley, 2007). The individual who commits a 
less serious offence but who has known risk factors will undoubtedly score high and may attract 
a longer or more onerous sentence than is appropriate (Quigley, 2007). Cole (2007) laments the 
lack of reported cases in which judicial decision makers critically assess the use of these 
instruments. 
1.9 Risk Assessment and Dangerous Offender Hearings 
Historically, the federal government has demonstrated a long-standing interest in 
individuals who commit repeated violent offences (Lyon et al., 2004). Once the Crown starts an 
application, there must be an assessment performed by an “expert” to evaluate if the individual 
poses a threat to the community (Lyon et al., 2004). How the expert is chosen has been the 
contention of many legal challenges and it has generally been found that the Court must 
designate the expert to perform the assessment under s. 752.1 and the Crown’s choice is not 
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entitled to deference (R. v. A.H., 2017). Moreover, it has been noted that there is nothing in the 
legislation that supports a presumption in favour of the Crown’s proposed expert and where the 
defence and Crown do not agree on who should be designated, they should have an equal role in 
assisting the Court in designating the assessor (R. v. A.H., 2017).  
Expert predictions often play a pivotal role in removing (or securing) an individual’s 
liberty and protecting (or exposing) the public to possible violence (Lyon et al., 2004). Although 
research speaks to the importance of expert opinions and assessments in final decisions within 
the criminal justice system, the format and content of risk assessments can dramatically differ as 
there are no definitive guidelines for risk assessments specifically with respect to DO hearings. 
The literature for risk assessments supports four separately, but equally important, areas: a) an 
estimation of an individual’s risk level, b) identification of the risk factors that contribute to that 
risk level, c) identification of potential risk management strategies to mitigate the individual’s 
risk in the community, and d) appropriate communication of this information to the judicial 
decision maker (Conroy & Murrie, 2007; Heilbrun, Ogloff et al., 1999; Jackson & Guyton, 2008; 
Mills et al., 2010). 
In DO cases, judicial decision makers are also required to consider the possibility of 
eventual release into the community and thus experts are required to provide an assessment of 
the individual’s treatment amenability (i.e., potential for change). Further, although the 
legislation does not explicitly state the need for mental abnormality to be present, the majority of 
preventative detention hearings include a section on psychopathy. Given that a large proportion 
of DOs are individuals with sexual offences (e.g., Bonta et al., 1998) an assessment of sexual 
deviance would also be warranted as applicable. 
Over time, the enormous social ramifications bearing on expert assessments attracted 
queries regarding their accuracy (Lyon et al., 2004). According to Hart (1998), violence risk 
assessment involves a process of evaluation that characterizes the probability that an individual 
will commit an act of violence, and also to develop strategies and interventions that will likely 
reduce or manage the likelihood of violence occurring. Judicial decision makers and experts rely 
heavily on risk assessment instruments that focus on static factors and instruments that can be 
subjective in their application (Milward, 2014). In particular, experts in preventative detention 




Experts often divide sharply over, and end in a deadlock between experts, about whether 
the risk can be managed safely under an LTSO instead of an indeterminate sentence (Milward, 
2014). Such cases are often resolved through specific factors that tip the analysis in favor of 
granting an indeterminate sentence, including the individual’s history of not complying with 
prior Court orders or supervisory programs, lack of demonstrable remorse or acceptance of 
responsibility, and credibility problems with the expert witness whom favors an LTSO (Milward, 
2014). In other cases, establishing a clear basis on which to prefer the evidence of the expert 
calling for an indeterminate sentence over the evidence of the expert calling for a lesser sentence 
is not achieved (Milward, 2014). Such cases have frequently seen judicial decision makers 
exercise caution with a preference for assuring public safety, perhaps to the point of raising 
questions about whether the burden of proof is partially on the defence instead of the Crown 
(Milward, 2014), even though the SCC has expressed otherwise (R. v. Boutilier, 2017). 
Blais (2015) examined judicial sentencing decisions in preventative detention hearings, 
as well as the expert risk assessment reports that were utilized to determine the level of reliance 
placed on expert risk assessment reports and to examine the presence of partisan allegiance. 
Blais (2015) found that judicial decision makers comments were consistent with expert 
assessments regarding risk, treatment amenability, and risk management. Further, she found that 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability and risk management were also significant predictors of 
the designation outcome, indicating that judicial decision makers rely on this information in 
making their final decision. Another finding showed evidence of partisan allegiance, with 
prosecution-retained PCL-R scores being significantly higher than defence-retained experts’ 
scores. Blais (2015) stated the implications for the development of consistent guidelines for the 
communication of risk, treatment amenability, and management information were at a critical 
point. 
Regarding the content of risk assessment reports, several sources have advocated for the 
inclusion of an actuarial assessment (i.e., statistical only) of recidivism risk, a list of relevant risk 
factors (both static and dynamic), and a discussion of treatment amenability and risk 
management (Blais, 2015). Furthermore, regarding developing reliable ways to communicate 
risk information (e.g., reliance on categorical risk levels), research has demonstrated that the 
perceived numerical risk estimates associated with categorical risk levels significantly differ 
across professionals (Blais, 2015). Despite limitations with current risk communication practice, 
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there is growing evidence that this information influences various decisions within the criminal 
justice system (Blais, 2015). 
Changes have done little to address concerns as the majority of assessments are still 
completed by psychiatrists, and 50% still contain reports from competing sides (Blais, 2015). 
Preventative detention represents a significant shift within the criminal justice system from 
punishing the individual for a crime that has already been committed to punishing the individual 
based on the presumed high likelihood that a crime will occur in the future. Moreover, it has 
been found that judicial decision makers appear to be stating the information and evidence that 
supports their ultimate decision, which results in an almost perfect prediction of the outcome 
(Blais, 2015). In other words, the judicial decision makers appear to be making a decision and 
then utilizing the portions of evidence that support their decision (i.e., confirmation bias). The 
possibility that judicial decision makers are merely choosing the expert information that already 
confirms their pre-existing beliefs about the case is something that should be considered (Blais, 
2015). 
 Lloyd et al. (2010) conducted research using judicial decision makers’ written decisions 
from preventative detention hearings to examine whether judicial decision makers have been 
given a well-informed understanding of risk and whether the hearing outcomes are related to 
expert testimony regarding mental health diagnoses and risk estimates. Their main findings were 
that there was a trend for PCL-R scores to be related to hearing outcomes and that experts tended 
to show a partisan allegiance in the way they scored individuals on the PCL-R. Moreover, Lloyd 
et al. (2010) examined whether individuals with Indigenous heritage facing preventative 
detention hearings are more likely to be sentenced to indeterminate terms as compared to non-
Indigenous individuals and whether there are mean differences in PCL-R scores between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals. They concluded that there were no differences 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals in their sample on any of the researched 
variables (Lloyd et al., 2010). However, they also noted that more than 65% of the sample did 
not identify the ethnicity of the individual in the written or oral decision. 
Blais and Forth (2014) reviewed expert reports from preventative detention hearings 
between 2006 and 2008 from Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta. Their primary conclusions 
were that risk assessment scores across all of the cases did not differ between prosecution-
retained and Court-appointed experts for any of the risk assessment scales. Second, similarities 
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outweighed the differences in the experts’ reporting practices, wherein Court-appointed experts 
were more likely to provide further information beyond communicating the results of the risk 
assessment scales. Third, Court-appointed experts were more likely to list the actual risk factors 
present in the case and more likely to discuss the possibility of risk management in the future, 
both of which are essential considerations in preventative detention hearings. The study did not 
investigate Defence-retained experts. 
Further, Blais and Forth (2014) found that the scales that were chosen by the experts were 
consistent with the scales that are usually used in forensic risk assessment (Lally, 2003; Viljoen 
et al., 2010). The most commonly used scales were the PCL-R, VRAG, and the STATIC-99. 
Moreover, both prosecution-retained and Court-appointed experts were equally likely to utilize 
either actuarial scales or SPJ scales. As well, there was a significant difference in terms of the 
number of scales chosen by the experts, wherein the prosecution-retained experts were more 
likely to utilize more scales compared with Court-appointed experts (the use of multiple risk 
assessment scales has been advocated by experts, especially within the context of preventative 
detention hearings) (Jackson & Hess, 2007). 
Regarding communicating the risk assessment results, as previous studies have 
demonstrated (e.g., Heilbrun et al., 1999; Viljoen et al., 2010), both types of experts utilized 
categorical risk judgments (e.g., low, moderate, or high) when communicating the results of 
actuarial scales, SPJ scales, and the final risk judgment. If an actuarial scale was used, both 
experts were equally likely to provide the absolute recidivism rates associated with the scale 
score. Court-appointed experts provided more detailed information on the individual’s 
correctional history and were more likely to discuss risk factors and risk management (Blais & 
Forth, 2014). 
Based on Blais and Forth’s (2014) sample of reports, assessments provided by Court-
appointed experts could be seen as being more appropriate for preventative detention hearings 
then prosecution-retained experts, given the higher likelihood that the information contained in 
those reports was provided as part of the sentencing decisions. Half of the reports also failed to 
discuss an individual’s ability to change – dynamic risk factors were only discussed in cases in 
which assessors chose to use a SPJ scale; none of the actuarial scales contained dynamic items 
(Blais & Forth, 2014). Moreover, less than one-quarter of assessments mentioned protective 
factors, and there was an overall failure to include literature or descriptions of the risk 
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instruments being utilized (particularly concerning psychopathy) (Blais & Forth, 2014). It was 
also found that total scores for the VRAG, STATIC-99, and the SORAG were not predictive of 
the final designation (i.e., DO or LTO) (Blais & Forth, 2014). Information from risk scales is 
often emphasized in assessment reports; however, it is still unclear how this information impacts 
judicial decision makers. Further research into the specific effect of risk assessment scores on 
ultimate decisions is needed. To date, findings indicate that judicial decision makers put more 
weight on the PCL-R score of Court-appointed experts compared with prosecution-retained 
experts when making their final decision (Blais & Forth, 2014). 
Cook et al. (2020) examined 214 preventative detention hearings for factors related to 
expert evidence on violence risk assessment. They found that judicial decision makers tended to 
make generally positive comments about expert witnesses and covered basic qualifications of the 
experts. Cook et al. (2020) also found that judicial decision makers tended to focus on the overall 
quality of the expert assessments, as well how they wished the data was communicated within 
the assessment. Moreover, they found that there was a paucity of discussion by judicial decision 
makers on Indigenous social history given the high proportion of Indigenous individuals facing 
preventative detention applications. Finally, the researchers found that judges provided both 
positive and negative comments on the risk assessments, as well as providing agreement or 
disagreement with the experts’ positions. Overall, Cook et al., (2020) found there was 
considerable variation in how judicial decision makers interpreted and comment on the experts 
and their risk assessments. 
Another research study by Almond et al. (2021) investigated how judicial decision 
makers are considering Indigenous individuals within the context of preventative detention 
hearings. In part, their findings highlighted the how little emphasis judicial decision makers are 
placing on specific factors influencing Indigenous individuals, wherein approximately 64% of 
cases involving Indigenous culture were meaningfully discussed. Moreover, Almond et al. 
(2021) found that Indigenous culture was found to be related to risk outcomes wherein 
Indigenous individuals were significantly more likely to be considered higher risk for 
reoffending by experts. However, these higher risk ratings did not correspond to more severe 
sanctions, indicating in the researchers’ view that judicial decision makers are considering 





 In summary, the PCC framework and RNR model attempt to explain why individuals 
commit crime and identify the risk factors involved with recidivism. The PCC framework and 
RNR model have become core components to risk assessment, particularly within the justice 
system. Specifically, preventative detention hearings require the use of expert testimony 
regarding risk assessment, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community. 
However, little is no known about the use of expert testimony, risk assessment, and judicial 
decision making, even though the outcomes can be extreme (i.e., indefinite incarceration). This 
study seeks to investigate and clarify the role of experts, risk assessment communication, and 
their influence on judicial decision making in preventative detention hearings. 
Furthermore, research has demonstrated the sentencing of individuals involved in the 
criminal justice system in Canada is varied, jurisdictionally different and, at times, potentially 
disproportionate. As a part of preventative detention hearings, expert testimony regarding risk 
assessment is required by law. It is now widely recognized that risk assessment instruments are 
essential tools for predicting recidivism and identifying targets for treatment and intervention. 
Research evidence demonstrates the effectiveness of existing tools for predicting a variety of 
outcomes across different correctional populations. However, there remains several issues with 
risk assessment within the judicial system, including but not limited to, the selection of risk 
measures, inclusion of dynamic and protective factors, use of risk information, and 
communication of risk. Given the potential severity of the sentence length in preventative 
detention hearings, it is important for these and other issues to be considered and explored 
through research. 
 Although the label “dangerous offender” would suggest a high propensity for violence, 
the possibility exists that the DOs being targeted by the Criminal Code (1985) provisions may 
not be as a high-risk for future violence as once thought. Research findings raise the possibility 
that DOs may not be significantly more dangerous than some other individuals in the criminal 
justice system (Bonta et al., 1998; Koopman, 1985; Langevin & Curnoe, 2014 Nicholaichuk, 
2013 Trevethan et al., 2002). Although the Crown is applying the DO provisions of the Criminal 
Code (1985) to a group of potentially high-risk, violent individuals, the question remains 
whether the Part XXIV provisions are vital for dealing with individuals who are high-risk and 
commit violent offences. It has been said that DO provisions could be eliminated as there already 
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exist provisions in the Criminal Code (1985) that allow for lengthy imprisonment of convicted 
high-risk violent individuals. It has been found that at least half of DOs were eligible for life 
imprisonment, and the remainder would have received a minimum of 10 years based on their 




CHAPTER 2: THE CURRENT STUDY  
2.1 Rationale 
This study investigated DO sentencing decisions to determine the role of risk assessments 
and the judicial system’s use of them. Risk assessments serve an important function in the 
criminal justice system in that they assist judicial decision makers in making decisions about 
sentencing, supervision, and treatment. Although the risk assessment process has undergone a 
considerable amount of modification over the past 50 years, completion of research on their 
influence on preventative detention hearings is limited. Therefore, this study provided a look at 
the components of risk assessments, as interpreted by judicial decision makers, in the context of 
preventative detention applications. It assessed how risk assessments are being utilized in 
judicial sentencing decisions, as well as identified the most significant predictors tied to the 
judicial sentencing decisions, and the influence of expert opinion (if any). Specifically, there is 
an interest in the specific designation (i.e., DO versus LTO), the penalty ordered (i.e., 
indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO), and how judicial decision makers are 
interpeting judgments of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community, as 
well as other factors (i.e., dynamic, static, and protective factors) in the judicial decision making 
process. 
This study is significant as there is a continual rise in the number of individuals involved 
in preventative detention hearings and being designated as DOs and, in most cases, serving 
indeterminate sentences. It is unknown how many of the decisions are focusing on static factors 
rather than considering dynamic and protective factors when levying their decisions. However, 
there has been a surge in research and evidence to support the use of dynamic and protective 
factors in the assessment of risk to recidivate, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community (as seen in the PCC framework and RNR model). Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate 
whether or not experts and judicial decision makers are considering various factors when coming 
to a final decision. This study contributes to the growing literature regarding DOs in Canada and 
how risk assessments within preventative detention hearings are not only conducted, but 
communicated and interpreted by both the experts and judicial decision makers. 
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2.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In light of the paucity of research in the areas of risk assessment and the judicial system, 
much of this research was exploratory; however, the following questions and hypotheses were 
developed: 
2.2.1 Expert Rating and Outcome (Hypothesis 1) 
It was hypothesized that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of 
risk will correspond with designation outcome (i.e., DO versus LTO) and penalty outcome (i.e., 
indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO). Specifically, more severe sanctions (i.e., DO 
versus LTO and indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO) will result if judicial decision 
makers interpreted higher risk judgment ratings, lower treatment amenability ratings, and less 
favorable chances of managing risk in the community ratings. Previous research partially 
supports this hypothesis (Blais, 2015). 
2.2.2 Presence of Partisanship (Hypothesis 2) 
The 1997 legislation change continued to address partisanship when it required only one 
risk assessment (ordered by the Court for the Court). However, previous research continues to 
support multiple risk assessments being presented in preventative detention hearings (Blais, 
2015). Therefore, it is of interest to know if, in the cases of multiple risk assessments being 
presented (specifically a Court-appointed expert and Defence expert), partisanship exists, 
particularly in light of the fact that Court-appointed experts are meant to be neutral parties. 
Previous research seems to suggest that experts can generally agree that an individual is high risk 
overall, but vary in their agreement on treatment amenability and risk management in the 
community (likely as they are more subjective ratings) (Blais, 2015). Thus, it is hypothesized 
that in hearings that contain multiple risk assessments, the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the overall risk rating between experts will not differ significantly; however, the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ ratings of treatment amenability and risk 
management in the community will significantly differ between experts, with Defence experts 
being more encouraging than Court-appointed experts. 
2.2.3 Presence of Static, Dynamic, and Protective Factors (Hypothesis 3) 
 Research supports dynamic and protective factors as being influential in assessing an 
individual’s risk level, as well as treatment amenability and risk management in the community 
(e.g., Bonta & Andrews, 2017). However, research has also found that less than half of all 
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assessments in preventative detention hearings contained information on dynamic or protective 
factors (Blais & Forth, 2014). Are either experts and/or judicial decision makers addressing 
dynamic and protective factors and, if so, is it leading to lower ratings of risk and thus less severe 
sanctions? It is hypothesized that, if addressed, judicial decision makers’ interpretation of 
dynamic and protective factors will not be related to less severe sanctions as the dynamic and 
protective factors will be deemed insufficient to change the static factors that are focused on 
during risk assessments. 
2.2.4 Effect of 2008 Legislation Change (Hypothesis 4) 
 The 2008 legislation change provided the judicial decision maker with less discretion in 
assigning the designation (i.e., DO or LTO); however, it provided the judicial decision maker 
with more discretion as to what penalty to levy (i.e., indeterminate, determinate with an LTSO, 
or determinate only). It is hypothesized that the majority of DOs will continue to receive 
indeterminate sentences rather than determinate sentences with an LTSO. It is also hypothesized 
that the less severe sanctions (i.e., determinate with an LTSO), have become more common in 
the last several years than in the first several years since the 2008 legislation change due, in part, 
to the law being referenced having to coincide with the year of the index offence. For example, 
due to the length of time that it takes to apply for and complete a preventative detention hearing, 
many hearings were conducted after the legislation change but reference the law that was in 
effect at the time of the index offence. Further, have DO indeterminate designations decreased 
(as a ratio to the overall special sentencing designations) with the variations in legislation? It is 
hypothesized that DO indeterminate designations have not decreased as a ratio to the overall 
special sentencing designations since the 2008 legislation change. 
2.2.5 Ethnicity (Hypothesis 5) 
 Given that 35.5% of Dos have Indigenous heritage (Public Safety Canada, 2020), 
analyses will be completed on each variable to determine if Indigenous heritage is associated 
with DO sentencing decisions. No specific hypotheses will be put forth as previous research has 
shown that there were no differences when racial ancestry of DOs was examined (Lloyd et al., 







The present research was archival and utilized publicly accessible information and active 
participation of the individuals involved in the preventative detention hearings was not required. 
As such, an ethical exemption for this study was obtained from the University of Saskatchewan’s 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BEH ID 912). 
2.3.2 Sample 
The sample consisted of 140 federally incarcerated adult males who had undergone a 
preventative detention hearing to designate them a DO under Section 753 of the Criminal Code 
(1985) between July 2, 2008 and July 2, 2018 in four Canadian provinces (i.e., British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba). Table 2 presents the important sample characteristics. 
The mean age of the sample at the index offence was 37.1 years (SD = 9.2) and the mean age at 
the preventative detention hearing was 41.1 (SD = 9.1). Over half of the men (n = 82, 58.6%) 
were of Indigenous descent and 41.4% (n = 58) were non-Indigenous. Approximately 41% (n = 
58) had at least a grade 10 level of education and 32.9% (n = 46) had a grade 9 education or less. 
The vast majority of the individuals had documented substance use issues (n = 121, 87.1%), 
adverse childhood experiences (n = 116, 82.9%), mental health diagnoses (i.e., primary 
substance use disorder) (n = 118, 84.3%), and personality diagnoses (i.e., primarily antisocial 
personality disorder) (n = 118, 84.3%). Only 17.1% (n = 24) had noted cognitive diagnoses and 
17.5% (n = 24) had gang involvement (whether in prison or in the community). 
In terms of criminal history, 68.6% (n = 96) had a noted youth record and the mean age 
of first offence was 16.3 years (SD = 4.7). The mean number of prior convictions was 37.4 (SD = 
27.4) which may be an underestimate due to reporting methods. Approximately half (n = 78, 
55.7%) of the individuals had a prior sexual conviction and the mean number of prior sexual 
offences was 1.8 (SD = 2.9). Approximately 93.6% (n = 131) of the individuals had at least one 
prior failure on community supervision. It was not uncommon for the index offences to include 
both sexual (n = 72, 51.4%) and violent (n = 91, 65.0%) offences. Most of the decisions coded 





Table 2  
Defendant Characteristics 
Measure n Mean (SD) Frequency (%) 
Demographics    
   Age at hearing  41.1 (9.1) - 
   Indigenous descent 82 - 58.6 
   Grade 9 education or less 46 - 32.9 
   Grade 10 education or higher 58 - 41.4 
   Gang affiliation 24 - 17.5 
   Substance use issues 121 - 87.1 
   Adverse childhood experiences 116 - 87.2 
   Mental health diagnoses 118 - 84.3 
   Cognitive diagnoses 24 - 17.1 
   Personality disorder diagnoses 118 - 84.3 
Criminal History    
   Youth record 96 - 68.6 
   Age at first offence (years)  16.3 (4.7) - 
   Prior convictions  37.4 (27.4) - 
   Prior sexual conviction 78 - 55.7 
   Prior sexual offences  1.8 (2.9) - 
   Prior failure on community supervision 131 - 94.9 
Index Offence    
   Age at index  37.1 (9.2) - 
   Index sexual 72 - 51.4 
   Index violent 91 - 65.0 
   Index post-legislation 91 - 65.0 
Note: N = 140. SD = standard deviation. 
 The judicial sentencing decisions included the individuals found to be DOs (with varying 
penalties levied), as well as individuals not found to be DOs but received an LTO designation. 
The July 2, 2008 date is relevant as it marks the date of the enactment of Bill C-27, which 
amended the Criminal Code (1985) concerning preventative detention hearings. A series of 
hearings (n = 49, 35%) occurred after July 2, 2008 but the index offence occurred prior to the 
enactment of Bill C-27 and thus the law applied was in accordance with the index offence date. 
Appeal decisions were coded with respect to the final outcome only if there is an original 
sentencing decision available to code. Therefore, the participants consisted of original whole DO 
hearings where experts provided testimony and a sentencing decision was rendered, along with 
any relevant appeal information. 
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 The cases were pulled from four jurisdictions including British Columbia (n = 49, 35%), 
Alberta (n = 23, 16.4%), Saskatchewan (n = 50, 35.7%), and Manitoba (n = 18, 12.9%). The 
majority took place at the Queen’s Bench/Superior Court level (n = 92, 65.7%) and referenced 
the new legislation (n = 96, 68.6%). Psychiatrists made up 65.0% (n = 91) of the Court-
appointed affiliation and 29.1% (n = 16) of the Defence affiliation. Less than one-half of the 
cases obtained a Defence expert (n = 55, 39.3%). There were 38 different experts that testified on 
behalf of the Court with the most frequent expert (a psychiatrist) testifying 29 times (20.7%) and 
the next frequent 16 times (11.4%). The remaining experts testified seven times or less. There 
were 22 different experts that testified on behalf of the Defence with the most frequent expert (a 
psychologist) testifying 21 times (15%). The remaining experts testified four times or less. 
Thirteen experts were noted to have testified for both the Court and the Defence depending on 
the individual case. 
The majority of the time the outcome resulted in a designation of a DO (n = 114, 81.4%) 
and an indeterminate sentence (n = 88, 62.9%). No decisions resulted in a determinate sentence 
only and 37.1% (n = 52) received a determinate sentence with an LTSO. The mean length of the 
determinate sentence in months was 108.6 (SD = 47.1), with mean credit for time served of 46.5 
(SD = 25.6) months, and a mean LTSO of 109.4 (SD = 20.9) months. An appeal was filed in half 
the cases (n = 71, 50.7%) and three-quarters of the appeals were upheld (n = 53, 74.6%). Table 3 
presents the important expert, hearing, and outcome characteristics. The cases were heard by 114 
different judicial decision makers with two judicial decision makers each hearing three cases, 22 
judicial decision makers hearing two cases, and the remainder only presiding over one case. The 
mean length of the judicial sentencing decision was 50.66 (SD = 32.0) pages and ranged from 11 






Expert, Hearing, and Outcome Characteristics 
Measure n Mean (SD) Frequency (%) 
Expert Characteristics    
   Court affiliation – Psychiatrist 91 - 65.0 
   Defence affiliation – Psychiatrist 55 - 29.1 
   Defence expert obtained 55 - 39.3 
Hearing and Decision Characteristics    
   Jurisdiction – British Columbia 49 - 35.0 
   Jurisdiction – Alberta 23 - 16.4 
   Jurisdiction – Saskatchewan 50 - 35.7 
   Jurisdiction – Manitoba 18 - 12.9 
   Level of court – Queen’s Bench/Superior 92 - 65.7 
   Law referenced – post-legislation change 96 - 68.6 
   Designation outcome – DO 114 - 81.4 
   Penalty outcome – indeterminate 88 - 62.9 
   Length of determinate sentence (months)  108.6 (47.1) - 
   Credit for time served (months)  46.5 (25.6) - 
   Length of LTSO (months)  109.4 (20.9) - 
   Length of sentencing decision (pages)  50.7 (32.0) - 
Appeal    
   Appeal filed 71 - 50.7 
   Appeal outcome – upheld 53 - 74.6 
Note: N = 140. SD = standard deviation. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order 
 
 In terms of risk assessment instruments noted, the judicial decision makers noted risk-
relevant instruments by the Court-appointed expert 71.4% (n = 100) of the time; whereas, they 
only noted risk-relevant instruments by the Defence expert 58.2% (n = 32) of the time. Of the 
Court-appointed experts’ risk-relevant instruments noted, there were 14 different instruments 
utilized with the most common being the PCL-R (n = 73, 73.0%), followed by the HCR-20 (n = 
45, 45.0%), VRAG (n = 43, 43.0%), and an instrument in the STATIC family (i.e., STATIC-99, 
STATIC 99R, STATIC 2002, or STATIC 2002R) (n = 41, 41.0%). Of the Defence experts’ risk-
relevant instruments noted, there were 11 different instruments utilized with the most common 
being the PCL-R (n = 17, 53.1%), an instrument from the STATIC family (i.e., STATIC-99, 
STATIC-99R, STATIC 2002, or STATIC 2002R) (n = 14, 43.8%), the VRS (n = 9, 28.1%), and 










(n = 100) 
Defence Expert 
(n = 32) 
 n % n % 
HCR-20 45 45.0 5 15.6 
LS/CMI 4 4.0 1 3.1 
LSI-R 1 1.0 9 28.1 
PCL-R 73 73.0 17 53.1 
RSVP 11 11.0 2 6.3 
SARA 9 9.0 1 3.1 
SIR 1 1.0 - - 
SORAG 20 20.0 - - 
STABLE 3 3.0 1 3.1 
Static family 41 41.0 14 43.8 
SVR-20 12 12.0 - - 
VRAG 43 43.0 7 21.9 
VRS 2 2.0 9 28.1 
VRS-SO 2 2.0 7 21.9 
Note: HCR-20 = Historical Clinical Risk-20. LS/CMI = Level of Service/Case Management 
Inventory. LSI-R = Level of Service Inventory-Revised. PCL-R = Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised. RSVP = Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol. SARA = Spousal Assault Risk Assessment 
(Kropp & Gibas, 2010). SIR = Statistical Information on Recidivism. SORAG = Sex Offender 
Risk Appraisal Guide. SVR-20 = Sexual Violence Risk-20 (Hart & Boer, 2010). VRAG = 
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide. VRS = Violence Risk Scale. VRS-SO = Violence Risk Scale-
Sex Offender (Wong et al., 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Data Collection and Protocol 
The source of information for gathering judicial decision makers’ written and oral 
judgments was the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII). CanLII is an online database 
that offers free public access to over 2.4 million documents across more than 300 case law and 
legislative databases, including historic cases to enrich existing databases. It is used by lawyers, 
legal professionals, and the general public. CanLII provides judicial decision makers’ written 
reasons for judgment or transcripts of judicial decision makers’ oral conclusions from all 
Canadian provincial, territorial, and national jurisdictions. CanLII indicates that the database 
does not contain a percentage of the lower courts that provide judgments; however, this did not 
significantly impact this study as DO hearings typically take place at the higher court level. The 
search term, “dangerous offender,” along with a filter for the date was used to find all DO 
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hearings from July 2, 2008 to July 2, 2018. As noted previously, the written decisions were only 
obtained if they were original whole DO hearings, including cases that may be overturned later 
by appeal or hearings as a result of previous successful appeals. The written decisions varied 
widely in length and detail; situational factors and the personal preferences of the individual 
judicial decision makers (i.e., judicial decision makers have their own style in terms of how they 
write and what they focus on in their decisions, as well as whether there was an agreement by the 
parties prior to the commencement of the hearing) affected what information was available. 
A data collection protocol (see Appendix A) was developed for the collection of 
information regarding several key variables required for exploring the proposed areas of 
examination of this study. Key variables included defendant characteristics, expert characteristics 
and content of experts’ testimony noted, and hearing and written sentencing decision 
characteristics. The first section of the data collection protocol contained items pertaining to the 
individual undergoing the preventative detention hearing and included such variables as their 
age, ethnicity, information about the index offence, their prior convictions, history of a youth 
record, history of sexual offences, any prior failures on community supervision, their education 
level, any gang affiliation, substance use issues, as well as adverse childhood experiences and 
other mental health, cognitive, or personality diagnoses. 
The second section of the data collection protocol contained items pertaining to the 
expert and the content of their testimony (as noted by the judicial decision maker). Key variables 
included their affilation, credentials, the actual risk scales utilized, the style of their risk 
communication, as well as their ratings of risk judgment, treatment amenability, and 
manageability of their risk in the community. Moreover, this section also included the whether or 
not the judicial decision maker noted the expert spoke about static, dynamic, and protective 
factors. In the cases where multiple experts were presented, the Court-appointed expert was 
selected as the first expert and the Defence expert, if present, was selected as the second expert. 
At times, there may be a second expert for the prosecution, that was included but not specifically 
analyzed. It is important to highlight that the information gathered under this section in particular 
may not represent what the expert actually said or wrote but an interpretation and selection of it 
by the judicial decision maker. 
The third section of the data collection protocol contained characteristics of the judicial 
decision maker’s perceptions and ultimate outcome. Key variables included the judicial decision 
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maker presiding over the matter, the jurisdiction, year of decision, level of Court, designation 
outcome, penalty outcome (along with details of any determinate and LTSO lengths), the judicial 
decision makers’ perceptions of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community. Further, it also included the judicial decision makers’ overall reliance on the 
experts’ evidence, if one expert was preferred, and basic details about whether an appeal was 
filed and the outcome of same (if known). Appeal outcomes were coded up to July 2021 in an 
attempt to gather as much data as possible. 
2.3.4 Procedure 
The researcher accessed the free online database and entered the search term and date 
filter to narrow the results. A total of 612 legal cases were identified. At that point, each decision 
was briefly opened and reviewed to see if it met the criteria for inclusion. If the decision met the 
inclusion criteria, the .pdf (if available) was downloaded, saved, and printed for review. 
Inclusion criteria were as follows: adult, male, decision written in English, original preventative 
sentencing decision, and the decision rendered between July 2, 2008 and July 2, 2018. Moreover, 
only decisions from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were obtained. 
Once the inclusion criteria were applied, a total of 140 cases remained for analysis. If the 
decision did not meet the criteria for inclusion, it was not downloaded. Reasons for exclusion 
included: female, written in French, the decision pertained to a preliminary hearing, and/or the 
decision was not a preventative detention sentencing decision (e.g., it mentioned the terms 
“dangerous offender” but was not in the context of a preventative detention hearing). The free 
online database was searched for appeal decisions up to and including July 26, 2021. 
After collection of all available decisions from July 2, 2008 to July 2, 2018 in the four 
Canadian provinces, the researcher enlisted the assistance of two trained independent coders to 
complete the inter-rater reliability (10 cases; 7.1%). Ten cases were randomly selected and 
shared with the two independent coders. Training was completed and the results of the inter-rater 
reliability were analyzed. The researcher then coded the entire dataset. All data was stored in and 




2.3.5 Data Preparation and Planned Analyses 
After all the data was collected and entered into SPSS some variables were collapsed into 
either dichotomous or trichotomous variables due to small cell counts and to make the resulting 
analyses more informative. For example, the year of index offence variable was collapsed into a 
dichotomous variable (pre-legislation change, post-legislation change) in order to capture the 
effect (if any) of the legislation change. Ethnicity was collapsed into a dichotomous variable 
(Indigenous, Non-Indigenous) in order to capture the effect (if any) of ethnicity in its association 
with any of the risk and sentencing variables. Further, the risk judgment variables were collapsed 
into both dichotomous variables (very high/high, moderate or lower) and trichotomous variables 
(very high, high, moderate or lower). Finally, the treatment amenability variables were collapsed 
into dichotomous variables (not low, low) and the risk management variables were collapsed into 
dichotomous variables (can be managed, cannot be managed). 
Data analysis entailed the used of descriptive statistics, chi-squared analyses, 
crosstabulations, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and binary logistic regressions. Descriptive 
analyses were conducted on the individual, expert, hearing, and outcome characteristics, as well 
as the risk assessment instruments noted. Chi-squared analyses and crosstabulations were utilized 
to examine bivariate associations among sentencing, legislation, risk, treatment, and ethnicity 
variables. For all analyses, a measure of the magnitude of the effect was calculated along with 
the 95% confidence interval. If the 95% confidence intervals for the odds ratios does not include 
one, the comparison is statistically significant at the .05 level. Cramer’s V was utilized as the 
effect size indicator (values under .20 are small, those between .20 and .30 are moderate, and 
those over .30 are strong; Field, 2010). For odds ratios, 0.5 was added to each cell to avoid 
empty cells (Fleiss, 1994). 
Hypothesis 1 was tested by using a series of crosstabulations to determine if the judicial 
decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community are related to designation and penalty outcomes. Hierarchical 
logistic regressions were also conducted in an effort to see if the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community contribute to designation and penalty outcomes. Hypotheses 2 was tested by using a 
series of crosstabulations to determinate if partisanship exists between the Court-appointed and 
Defence experts (according to the judicial decision makers’ interpretations). Moreover, binary 
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logistic regressions were completed to determine if the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of 
one experts’ ratings were favored over other ratings with respect to designation and penalty 
outcomes. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested by using a series of crosstabulations to determine if 
the judicial decision makers’ interpretion of the experts’ discussion of static, dynamic, and 
protective factors are related to designation and penalty outcomes (Hypothesis 3), as well as to 
examine the potential effect of the 2008 legislation change on designation and penalty outcomes 
(Hypothesis 4). Hypothesis 5 was tested by using crosstabulations to determine if ethnicity is 
related to any other key outcome variable. In this case, the data was stratified by ethnicity 
(Indigenous, Non-Indigenous) and then a series of key variables investigated. An ANOVA was 
also conducted for Hypothesis 5 in an effort to see if ethnicity was related to designation and 
penalty outcomes. 
Additional ancillary analyses were conducted with regard to jurisdictional biases and 
other variables including ethnicity, designation, and penalty outcomes. The analyses were 
stratified by jurisdiction, which included descriptive statistics as well as crosstabulations to 
examine possible relationships. There were no hypotheses with respect to these ancillary 
analyses and they were conducted primarily for interest and relevance to the overall study. 
2.3.6 Inter-Rater Reliability 
 To examine the integrity of data collection, reliability analyses were conducted. As noted, 
10 randomly selected cases were independently coded by two raters to establish inter-rater 
reliability. The inter-rater reliability of the continuous/count variables were evaluated using 
absolute agreement intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs). Using the well-established 
magnitude criteria of Cicchetti et al. (2006) in which values equal to or greater than .60 are 
considered acceptable, the ICC values for the continuous/count variables were strong and ranged 
from .674 to 1.00. The categorical variables were evaluated using Cohen’s kappa (κ). Using the 
well-established magnitude criteria of McHugh (2012) in which values equal to or greater than 
.60 are considered acceptable. However, Landis & Koch (1977) indicate that values equal to or 
greater than .41 are considered acceptable. The kappa values for the categorical variables were 
generally strong and ranged from .211 to 1.00. Two kappa values were considered unacceptable, 
Risk Judgement of Expert 2 (κ = .211) and judicial decision maker’s Perception of Risk (κ = 
.348). It is believed that these two variables had lower than expected inter-rater reliability due to 
this subsample containing shorter than the average page count and few defence expert details 
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resulting in fewer details to rate. Table 5 presents the interrater reliability statistics for 




Interrater Reliability Statistics for Continuous/Count Variables: Absolute Agreement Single 
Measure Intraclass Correlation Coefficients 
Variable Cronbach’s Alpha ICC (Kappa) 
Year of Birth .983 0.966 
Age at Hearing 1.00 1.00 
Age at Index 1.00 1.00 
Ethnicity - 1.00 
Year of Index - (.886) 
Sexual Index Offence - (1.00) 
Number of Sexual Index Offences 1.00 1.00 
Violent Index Offence - (1.00) 
Number of Violent Index Offences .674 .459 
Number of Prior Convictions 1.00 1.00 
Youth Record - (.412) 
Age at First Offence 1.00 1.00 
Prior Sexual Offences - (1.00) 
Number of Prior Sexual Convictions .941 .896 
Prior Failure on Community Supervision - (1.00) 
Highest Level of Supervision - (1.00) 
Gang Affiliation - (1.00) 
Substance Use Issues - (1.00) 
Adverse Childhood Experiences - (1.00) 
Other Experiences - (1.00) 
Number of Experts 1.00 - 
Expert 1 Affiliation - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Credential - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Affiliation - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Credential - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Categorical - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Narrative - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Percentiles/Percentages - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Range - (1.00) 
Expert 1 Raw Score - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Categorical - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Narrative - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Percentiles/Percentages - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Range - (1.00) 
Expert 2 Raw Score - (1.00) 
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Risk Judgment Expert 1 - (.559) 
Risk Judgment Expert 2 - (.211) 
Treatment Amenability Expert 1 - (1.00) 
Treatment Amenability Expert 2 - (.545) 
Risk Management Expert 1 - (.692) 
Risk Management Expert 2 - (.667) 
Static vs. Dynamic Expert 1 - (.600) 
Static vs. Dynamic Expert 2 - (.000) 
Dynamic Factors Expert 1 - (1.00) 
Dynamic Factors Expert 2 - (1.00) 
Protective Factors Expert 1 - (.200) 
Protective Factors Expert 2 - (.000) 
Jurisdiction - (1.00) 
Year of Decision - (1.00) 
Level of Court - (1.00) 
Law Referenced - (1.00) 
Designation Outcome - (1.00) 
Penalty Outcome - (1.00) 
Length of Determinate Sentence 1.00 1.00 
Credit for Time Served 1.00 1.00 
Length of Long-Term Supervision Order 1.00 1.00 
Length of Sentencing Decision 1.00 1.00 
Judge’s Perceptions of Risk - (.348) 
Judge’s Perceptions of Treatment Amenability - (.811) 
Judge’s Perceptions of Risk Management - (1.00) 
Judge’s Overall Reliability on Experts - (.615) 
Judge’s Expert Preference - (1.00) 
Which Expert was Preferred - (1.00) 
Appeal Filed - (1.00) 
Year of Appeal - (.800) 
Appeal Outcome - (1.00) 




CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
3.1 Expert Ratings and Final Outcomes 
3.1.1 Court-Appointed Expert and Designation Outcome 
 The judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of 
risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community were examined with respect 
to designation outcome (i.e., DO or LTO). As noted previously, low cell counts required some 
variables to be collapsed into dichotomous and trichotomous variables in an effort to find the 
most informative trends. A series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine the relationship 
between the designation outcome and the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings on the three assessment areas; that is, risk judgment, treatment 
amenability, and risk management in the community. 
First, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of risk were analyzed and it was found that the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk were not 
significantly related to, and had a small association with, designation outcome, χ2 (2, 140) = 
4.377, p = .112, Cramer’s V = .177. However, a clear pattern appeared in which higher ratings of 
risk were more likely to receive a DO designation compared to lower ratings of risk. The data 
show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of 
an individual’s risk as “very high,” 93% of the time that individual was designated a DO rather 
than an LTO. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower,” only 67% of the time that individual was 
designated a DO. Table 6 presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Judgment with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ risk judgment Very High 13 92.9 1 7.1 
 High 87 82.9 18 17.1 
 Moderate or lower 14 66.7 7 33.3 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ 2 (2, 140) = 4.377a, p = .112, Cramer’s V = .177. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = 
Long-Term Offender. 
a 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60.  
 
Second, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings of treatment amenability were analyzed and it was found that the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability were not significantly related to, and had a small 
association with, designation outcome, χ 2 (2, 140) = 4.000, p = .135, Cramer’s V = .169. 
However, a clear pattern appeared wherein when judicial decision makers interpreted higher 
ratings of treatment amenability, the individuals were less likely to receive a DO designation 
compared to when lower ratings of treatment amenability were interpreted. The data show that 
when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an 
individual’s treatment amenability as “high,” 67% of the time they received a DO designation 
compared to 86% of the time when the individual’s treatment amenability is rated as “low.” 
Table 7 presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Treatment Amenability with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ treatment amenability High 4 66.7 2 33.3 
 Moderate 34 73.9 12 26.1 
 Low 76 86.4 12 13.6 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ 2 (2, 140) = 4.000a, p = .135, Cramer’s V = .169. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = 
Long-Term Offender. 
a 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.11. 
 
 Third, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of risk management in the community were analyzed and it was found that the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of risk management in the community were significantly related to, and had a 
moderate association with, designation outcome, χ 2 (1, 140) = 7.421, p = .006, Cramer’s V = 
.230. The data show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk management in the community as manageable, 73% of the 
time the individual received a DO designation compared to receiving a DO designation 91% of 
the time when the individual’s risk management in the community is rated as not manageable. It 
is noted that there tended to be considerable evidence presented in the sentencing hearings from 
other “experts” regarding program options and community supports that may have also 
influenced judicial decision makers’ decisions in this particular regard. Table 8 presents the 
results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Management in the Community with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ risk management Can be managed 54 73.0 20 27.0 
 Cannot be managed 60 90.9 6 9.1 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ 2 (1, 140) = 7.421a, p = .006, Cramer’s V = .230. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = 
Long-Term Offender. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.26. 
 
 
3.1.2 Court-Appointed Expert and Penalty Outcome 
The judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk, treatment 
amenability, and risk management in the community were also examined with respect to penalty 
outcome (i.e., indeterminate or determinate with an LTSO). The penalty variable was thought to 
be a more informative outcome measure as there is more discretion in the law at this stage of the 
sentencing process, particularly since the 2008 legislation change. As noted previously, low cell 
counts required some variables to be collapsed into dichotomous and trichotomous variables in 
an effort to find the most informative trends. A series of crosstabulations were conducted to 
examine the relationship between penalty outcome and the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings on the three assessment areas; that is, risk 
judgment, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community.  
First, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of risk are significantly related to, and moderately associated with, penalty outcome, χ 2 (2, 140) 
= 9.974, p = .007, Cramer’s V = .267. Generally, the higher the risk rating by the Court-
appointed expert (as interpreted by the judicial decision maker), the higher the likelihood of an 
individual receiving an indeterminate sentence and the lower the risk rating, the higher the 
likelihood of the individual receiving a determinate sentence with an LTSO. The data show that 
when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an 
individual’s risk as “very high,” that individual received an indeterminate sentence 79% of the 
time. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an 
individual’s risk as “moderate or lower,” that individual received an indeterminate sentence only 
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33% of the time. Table 9 presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ risk judgment and penalty outcome. 
 
Table 9 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Judgment with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointment experts’ risk judgment Very High 11 78.6 3 21.4 
 High 70 66.7 35 33.3 
 Moderate or lower 7 33.3 14 66.7 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ 2 (2, 140) = 9.974a, p = .007, Cramer’s V = .267. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count in 5.20. 
 
Second, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings of treatment amenability were analyzed and it was found that the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability were significantly related to, and strongly associated 
with, penalty outcome, χ 2 (2, 140) = 37.062, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .515. Generally, the higher 
the treatment amenability rating (according to the judicial decision maker), the lower the 
likelihood that the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence and the lower the rating of 
treatment amenability, the more likely the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence. The 
data show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of an individual’s treatment amenability as “high,” the individual received an indeterminate 
sentence only 17% of the time compared to 82% of the time when the individual’s treatment 
amenability was rated as “low.” Table 10 presents the results regarding the judicial decision 







Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Treatment Amenability with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ treatment amenability High 1 16.7 5 83.3 
 Moderate 15 32.6 31 67.4 
 Low 72 81.8 16 18.2 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ 2 (2, 140) = 37.062a, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .515. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision 
Order. 




Third, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings 
of risk management in the community were analyzed and it was found that the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of risk management in the community were significantly related to, and strongly 
associated with, penalty outcome, χ 2 (1, 140) = 37.662, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .519. Generally, 
when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of the 
individual’s risk as manageable in the community, the individual was more likely to receive a 
determinate sentence with an LTSO than when the Court-appointed expert rated the individual’s 
risk as not manageable in the community. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the 
Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as manageable in the community, the 
individual was given an indeterminate sentence 39% of the time whereas when the Court-
appointed expert rated the individual as not manageable in the community, the individual 
received an indeterminate sentence 89% of the time. Table 11 presents the results regarding the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Management in the Community with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ risk 
management 
Can be managed 29 39.2 45 60.8 
 Cannot be managed 59 89.4 7 10.6 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ 2 (1, 140) = 37.662a, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .519. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision 
Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.51. 
 
To further clarify and refine the results, a binary logistic regression was completed to 
investigate which Court-appointed expert rating (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), 
if any, has more influence on penalty outcome. The predictor variables, the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk judgment, treatment 
amenability, and risk management in the community, were tested a priori to verify there was no 
violation of the assumption of the linearity of the logit. The predictor variable, the judicial 
decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk judgment, 
treatment amenability, and risk management in the community, in the binary logistic regression 
analysis were all found to contribute to the model, χ 2 (3, 140) = 54.740, p < .001. The data show 
that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ risk judgment 
rating does not attain significance with respect to penalty outcome but the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability and risk management in the community are both 
significant with respect to penalty outcome.  
Overall, when the judicial decision makers interpreted higher risk judgments, the more 
likely the individual received an indeterminate sentence compared to a lower risk judgment. 
Further, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of 
treatment amenability and risk management in the community contribute incrementally above 
the Court-appointed experts’ risk judgment but not the other way around. It was found that when 
the judicial decision makers interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of treatment 
amenability and risk management in the community are controlled for, individuals who are rated 
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moderate risk or lower are less likely to get an indeterminate sentence than if they were rated 
high or very high risk. If the judicial decision makers interpretation of the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk is high or very high there is a 323% increase in the odds 
the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence. However, if an individual is considered 
treatment amenable, there is a 74% decrease in odds that they will be given an indeterminate 
sentence. Further, when the individual’s risk is deemed manageable in the community, there is 
an 84% decrease in odds that they will be provided an indeterminate sentence. Table 12 presents 
the results regarding which Court-appointed experts’ ratings (as interpreted by the judicial 
decision makers), if any, has more influence on penalty outcome. 
 
Table 12 
Binary Logistic Regression of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-
Appointed Experts’ Ratings of Risk Judgment, Treatment Amenability, and Risk Management in 
the Community with Penalty Outcome 
 
 Regression model by penalty outcome 
Regression model outcome β SE Wald p Exp(B) 95% CL [LL, UL] 
Constant 
 








-1.362 .476 8.198 .004 .256 [.101, .651] 
Court-appointed experts’ 
risk management 
-1.861 .525 12.578 < .001 .156 [.056, .435] 
       
Note: χ 2 (3, 140) = 54.740, p < .001. CI = confidence interval. LL = lower limit. UL = upper 
limit. 
 
3.1.3 Defence Expert and Designation Outcome 
Given that Defence experts are hired specifically by the Defendant and are not Court-
appointed, their ratings of overall risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) were also examined with respect to 
designation outcome (i.e., DO or LTO). As noted previously, low cell counts required some 
variables to be collapsed into dichotomous and trichotomous variables in an effort to find the 
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most informative trends. A series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine the relationship 
between designation outcome and the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ ratings on the three assessment areas; that is, risk judgment, treatment amenability, and 
risk management in the community. 
First, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk 
were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings of risk are not significantly 
related to, although had a moderate association with, designation outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = 3.769, p 
= .052, Cramer’s V = .262. The general trend appearing is similar to the Court-appointed expert 
in that the higher the rating of risk (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), the more 
likely the individual will be designated a DO and the lower the rating of risk the less likely that 
the individual will be designated a DO. The data show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpreted the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high or high,” that 
individual is designated a DO 92% of the time and when the Defence experts rate an individual’s 
risk as “moderate or lower,” 72% of the time the individual is designated a DO. Table 13 
presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 
risk judgment and designation outcome. 
 
Table 13 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Risk 
Judgment with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ risk judgment Very High/High 34 91.9 3 8.1 
 Moderate or lower 13 72.2 5 27.8 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 3.769a, p = .052, Cramer’s V = .262. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = Long-
Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.62. 
 
Second, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of 
treatment amenability were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings of 
treatment amenability are significantly related to, and moderately associated with, designation 
outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = 4.188, p = .041, Cramer’s V = .276. Generally, the higher the rating of 
treatment amenability by the Defence expert (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), the 
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less likely the individual will receive a DO designation. The data show that when the judicial 
decision makers interpret the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as 
“not low” 79% of the time the individual received a DO designation compared to 100% of the 
time when the Defence experts’ rate the individual’s treatment amenability as “low.” This result 
speaks to the importance of the Defence experts’ opinions (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers) in the sense that if they also feel the individual is low in treatment amenability then the 
likelihood of the individual’s success in terms of change is not hopeful and the judicial decision 
maker is more likely to designate them as a DO. Table 14 presents the results regarding the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability 
and designation outcome. 
 
Table 14 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Treatment Amenability with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ treatment amenability Not low 30 78.9 8 21.1 
 Low 17 100.0 0 0.0 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 4.188a, p = .041, Cramer’s V = .276. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = Long-
Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.47. 
 
Third, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk 
management in the community were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings 
of risk management in the community are not significantly related to, nor associated with, 
designation outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = .056, p = .814, Cramer’s V = .032. No trend appeared with 
respect to this analysis and the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 
ratings of risk management in the community were not meaningful in terms of designation 
outcome. The data show that when the Defence expert rates an individual’s risk management in 
the community as manageable (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), 86% of 
individuals received a DO designation compared to 83% when the Defence experts rate the 
individual’s risk management in the community as not manageable. Table 15 presents the results 
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regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ rating of risk 
management in the community and designation outcome. 
 
Table 15 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Risk 
Management in the Community with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ risk management Can be managed 37 86.0 6 14.0 
 Cannot be managed 10 83.3 2 16.7 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = .056a, p = .814, Cramer’s V = .032. DO = Dangerous Offender. LTO = Long-
Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.75. 
 
 
3.1.4 Defence Expert and Penalty Outcome 
Judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk, treatment 
amenability, and risk management in the community were also examined with respect to penalty 
outcome (i.e., indeterminate or determinate with an LTSO). The penalty variable was thought to 
be a more informative outcome measure as there is more discretion in the law at this stage of the 
sentencing process, particularly since the 2008 legislation change. As noted previously, low cell 
counts required some variables to be collapsed into dichotomous and trichotomous variables in 
an effort to find the most informative trends. A series of crosstabulations were conducted to 
examine the relationship between penalty outcome and the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings on the three assessment areas; that is, risk 
judgment, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community. 
First, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk 
were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings of risk are significantly related 
to, and strongly associated with, penalty outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = 8.351, p = .004, Cramer’s V = 
.390. Generally, the higher the rating of risk by the Defence expert (as interpreted by the judicial 
decision makers), the more likely the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence compared 
to a determinate sentence with an LTSO. The data show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpret the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high or high,” 78% of the 
time the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence compared to 39% of the time when the 
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Defence expert rates an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower.” Table 16 presents the results 




Crosstabulation of Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Risk 
Judgment with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ risk judgment Very High/High 29 78.4 8 21.6 
 Moderate or lower 7 38.9 11 61.1 
Total  36 65.5 19 34 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 8.351a, p = .004, Cramer’s V = .390. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.22. 
 
 
Second, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of 
treatment amenability were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings of 
treatment amenability were significantly related to, and strongly associated with, penalty 
outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = 12.986, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .486. As seen with the designation 
outcome, the general trend is that the higher the Defence experts’ rating of treatment amenability 
(as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), the less likely the individual will receive an 
indeterminate sentence. However, if the judicial decision makers interpret the Defence experts’ 
ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as low, then the chances of an indeterminate 
sentence being ordered is extremely likely. 
The data show that when the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as “not low,” 50% of the time the 
individual received an indeterminate sentence compared to an 100% of the time receiving an 
indeterminate sentence when the individual’s treatment amenability is rated as “low.” This result 
speaks to the importance of the Defence expert’s opinion (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers) in the sense that if they also feel the individual is low in treatment amenability then the 
likelihood of the individual’s success in terms of change is not hopeful and the judicial decision 
maker is more likely to give them to an indeterminate sentence. Table 17 presents the results 
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regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ rating of treatment 
amenability and penalty outcome. 
 
Table 17 
Crosstabulation of Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Treatment 
Amenability with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ treatment amenability Not low 19 50.0 19 50.0 
 Low 17 100.0 0 0.0 
Total  36 65.5 19 34.5 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 12.986a, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .486. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.87. 
 
Third, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk 
management in the community were analyzed and it was found that the Defence experts’ ratings 
of risk management were not significantly related to, although moderately associated with, 
sentencing outcome, χ 2 (1, 55) = 2.170, p = .141, Cramer’s V = .199. The trend that is noted is 
when the Defence expert rates the individual as manageable in the community (as interpreted by 
the judicial decision makers) there is a higher likelihood that the individual will receive a 
determinate sentence with an LTSO and if the Defence expert rates the individual as not 
manageable in the community than there is a much higher likelihood that the individual will 
receive an indeterminate sentence. The data show that when the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk manageable in the 
community, 61% of the time the individual received an indeterminate sentence compared to 83% 
of the time the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence if the individual’s risk is rated 
as not manageable in the community. Table 18 presents the results regarding the judicial decision 







Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Risk 
Management in the Community with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ risk management Can be managed 26 60.5 17 39.5 
 Cannot be managed 10 83.3 2 16.7 
Total  36 65.5 19 34.5 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 2.170a, p = .141; Cramer’s V = .199. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision Order. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.15. 
 
 To further clarify and refine the results, a binary logistic regression was completed to 
investigate which Defence experts’ ratings (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), if any, 
have more influence on penalty outcome. The predictor variables, the judicial decisions makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk judgment, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community, were tested a priori to verify there was no violation of the 
assumption of the linearity of the logit. The predictor variables, the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk judgment, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community, in the binary logistic regression analysis were all found to 
contribute to the model, χ 2 (3, 55) = 19.507, p < .001. The data show that the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ risk judgment and risk management in the 
community variables are not significant with respect to penalty outcome but the Defence experts’ 
treatment amenability variable is significant with respect to penalty outcome. Table 19 presents 
the results regarding which Defence experts’ ratings (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers), if any, has more influence on penalty outcome. 
 Overall, the higher the Defence experts’ risk judgment (as interpreted by the judicial 
decision makers) the more likely the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence compared 
to a lower risk judgment. It was found that when the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of 
the Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability and risk management in the community are 
controlled for, individuals who are rated moderate risk or lower are less likely to get an 
indeterminate sentence than if they were rated high or very high risk. If the judicial decision 
makers interpreted the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as high or very high there 
is a 247% increase in the odds the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence. However, if 
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an individual is considered treatment amenable, there is an 89% decrease in odds that they will 
be given an indeterminate sentence. Further, when the individual’s risk is deemed manageable in 
the community, there is a 46% decrease in odds that they will be given an indeterminate 
sentence. Table 19 presents the results regarding which Defence experts’ ratings (as interpreted 
by the judicial decision makers), if any, has more influence on penalty outcome. 
 
Table 19 
Binary Logistic Regression of Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Ratings of Risk Judgment, Treatment Amenability, and Risk Management in the Community with 
Penalty Outcome 
 
 Regression model by penalty outcome 
Regression model outcome B SE Wald p Exp(B) 95% CL [LL, UL] 
Constant 
 
1.602 1.656 .935 .334 4.961  
Defence experts’ risk 
judgment 
 
.904 .616 2.157 .142 2.470 [.739, 8.254] 
Defence experts’ treatment 
amenability 
 
-2.177 .844 6.652 .010 .113 [.022, .593] 
Defence experts’ risk 
management 
-.614 .920 .446 .504 .541 [.089, 3.283] 
       
Note: χ 2 (3, 55) = 19.507, p < .001; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper 
limit. 
 
 3.2 Presence of Partisanship 
The 2008 legislation change continued to attempt to address partisanship when it 
continued to require only one expert risk assessment on behalf of the Court. However, it is not 
uncommon to have multiple risk assessments presented in a DO hearing (Blais, 2015). A series 
of crosstabulations were conducted to examine the relationship between the Court-appointed and 
Defence experts (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) with respect to the three primary 
areas of assessment; that is, risk judgment, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community. As noted previously, low cell counts required some variables to be collapsed into 
dichotomous and trichotomous variables in an effort to find the most informative trends. 
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First, it was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of risk judgment were significantly related to, strongly associated with, the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings of risk judgment, χ 2 (1, 
55) = 18.209, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .575. The data show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpret the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high or high,” the 
Defence expert is in agreement 80% of the time. When the Court-appointed expert rates an 
individual’s risk as “moderate or lower” (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers), the 
Defence expert was in agreement 90% of the time. Overall, this speaks to a high level of 
agreement between the Court-appointed and Defence experts on the risk judgment variable (as 
interpreted by the judicial decision maker). This is not surprising as most individuals involved in 
the criminal justice system undergoing a preventative detention hearing are expected to be a 
higher risk (even though they are not any higher risk than other individuals not facing 
preventative detention hearings (e.g., Nicholaichuk et al., 2013)). Moreover, many of the same 
actuarial instruments are utilized which, if completed according to the rating manuals, should 
result in comparable levels of risk judgment. Table 20 presents the results regarding the judicial 
decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ risk judgment rating with the 
Defence experts’ risk judgment rating. 
 
Table 20 
Crosstabulation of Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Judgment with Defence Experts’ Risk Judgment 
  Defence experts’ risk judgment 
  Very High/High Moderate or 
lower 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ risk 
judgment 
Very High/High 36 80.0 9 20.0 
 Moderate or lower 1 10.0 9 90.0 
Total  37 67.3 18 32.7 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 18.209a, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .575. κ = .534, p < .001. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.27. 
 
 
Second, it was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings of treatment amenability were significantly related to, and strongly 
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associated with, Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability, χ 2 (1, 55) = 16.404, p < .001, 
Cramer’s V = .546. The data show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as “not low,” the Defence 
experts are in agreement 100% of the time. When the Court-appointed experts rate an 
individual’s treatment amenability as “low,” the Defence experts were in agreement 52% of the 
time (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). This result appears to speak to some 
partisanship with respect to treatment amenability in that the Defence experts tend to feel there is 
overall a higher level of treatment amenability than Court-appointed experts. Moreover, 
treatment amenability is more subjective and there are no risk assessment instruments that 
specifically address it, and thus there is a higher likelihood of discordance to arise. Table 21 
presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed 




Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Treatment Amenability with Defence Experts’ Treatment Amenability 
  Defence expert treatment 
amenability 
  Not low Low 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed expert treatment amenability Not low 22 100.0 0 0.0 
 Low 16 48.5 17 51.5 
Total  38 69.1 17 30.9 
Note: χ 2 (1, 55) = 16.404a, p < .001; Cramer’s V = .546. κ = .459, p < .001. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.80. 
 
Third, it was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings of risk management in the community were significantly related to, 
and strongly associated with, Defence experts’ ratings of risk management in the community, χ 2 
(1, 55) = 12.136, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .461. The data show that when the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as 
manageable in the community, the Defence experts are in agreement 97% of the time. When the 
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Court-appointed experts rate an individual’s risk as not manageable in the community (as 
interpreted by judicial decision makers), the Defence experts were in agreement only 42% of the 
time. This result also appears to speak to some partisanship with respect to risk management in 
the community in that the Defence experts tend to feel the individual is likely to be managed in 
the community more than Court-appointed experts. Further, risk management in the community, 
as with treatment amenability, is more subjective and not directly measured by risk assessment 
instruments, and thus there is a higher likelihood of discordance to arise. Table 22 presents the 
results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings of risk management in the community with the Defence experts’ ratings of risk 
management in the community. 
 
Table 22 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Risk Management with Defence Experts’ Risk Management in the Community 
  Defence experts’ risk 
management 




  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ risk management Can be managed 28 96.6 1 3.4 
 Cannot be managed 15 57.7 11 42.3 
Total  43 78.2 12 21.8 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = 12.136a, p < .001; Cramer’s V = .470; κ = .461, p < .001. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is. 5.67. 
 
To further clarify and refine the results, a binary logistic regression analysis to investigate 
which, if either, expert has more influence on penalty outcome in terms of their assessment of 
risk judgment was conducted (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). The predictor variable, 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of risk judgment, was tested a priori to 
verify there was no violation of the assumption of the linearity of the logit. The predictor 
variable, judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of risk judgment, in the 
binary logistic regression analysis was found to significantly contribute to the model, χ 2 (2, 55) = 
11.152, p = .004.  
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It was found that both the Court-appointed and Defence experts’ ratings of risk judgment 
(as interpreted by judicial decision makers) are generally predictive of penalty outcome. 
However, the data do not support that either expert (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) 
uniquely predicts penalty outcome. The pattern that appears seems to provide support that the 
Court-appointed expert has slightly more influence than the Defence expert, given that the odds 
ratio is nearly double (i.e., 4.095 vs. 2.671). This result is not surprising given the fact that risk 
judgment is not significantly related to penalty outcome and the fact that the two experts tend to 
have a high degree of concordance when assessing risk (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers). Moreover, risk judgments are less subjective and thus there is a lower likelihood of 
discordance to arise. Table 23 presents the results regarding which experts’ risk judgment 




Binary Logistic Regression of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-
Appointed and Defence Experts’ Ratings of Risk Judgment with Penalty Outcome 
 
 Regression model by penalty outcome 
Regression model outcome β SE Wald p Exp(B) 95% CL [LL, UL] 
Constant 
 




1.410 .747 3.563 .059 4.095 [.947, 17.705] 
Defence experts’ risk 
judgment 
.982 .632 2.416 .120 2.671 [.774, 9.216] 
       
Note: χ 2 (2, 55) = 11.152, p = .004; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper 
limit. 
 
To further clarify and refine the results, a further binary logistic regression analysis to 
investigate which, if either, expert has more influence on sentencing outcome in terms of their 
assessment of treatment amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) was conducted. 
The predictor variable, judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of treatment 
amenability, was tested a priori to verify there was no violation of the assumption of the linearity 
of the logit. The predictor variable, judicial decision makers’ interpretation of experts’ ratings of 
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treatment amenability, in the binary logistic regression analysis was found to significantly 
contribute to the model, χ2 (2, 55) = 25.207, p < .001. 
It was found that both the Court-appointed and Defence experts’ ratings of treatment 
amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) are generally predictive of penalty 
outcome. However, the data only support that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the 
Court-appointed experts’ ratings of treatment amenability uniquely predicted penalty outcome. 
The effect with respect to the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 
ratings of treatment amenability had very similar odds ratio and approached significance. A 
positive rating of treatment amenability by the Court-appointed expert (as interpreted by judicial 
decision makers) was uniquely associated with an 85% decrease in the odds of receiving an 
indeterminate sentence, while concordant ratings of positive treatment amenability by the 
Defence expert was associated with an 80% decrease in the odds of such an outcome. Overall, 
the data support that both experts (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) appear to 
contribute uniquely to the prediction of penalty outcome; however, it appears as though the 
Court-appointed expert is incrementally predictive but the Defence expert is not incrementally 
predictive of penalty outcome. That is, it appears that the Court-appointed expert is being given 
more weight than the Defence expert, but the Defence expert does still get some weight by 
judicial decision makers. Table 24 presents the results regarding which experts’ rating of 
treatment amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), if either, has more influence 






Binary Logistic Regression of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-
Appointed and Defence Experts’ Ratings of Treatment Amenability with Penalty Outcome 
 
 Regression model by penalty outcome 
Regression model outcome B SE Wald p Exp(B) 95% CL [LL, UL] 
Constant 
 




-1.906 .681 7.838 .005 .149 [.039, .565] 
Defence experts’ treatment 
amenability 
-1.626 .888 3.351 .067 .197 [.034, 1.122] 
       
Note: χ2 (2, 55) = 25.207, p < .001; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
To further clarify and refine the results, a binary logistic regression analysis to investigate 
which, if either, expert has more influence on penalty outcome in terms of their assessment of 
risk management in the community (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) was conducted. 
The predictor variable, judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk 
management in the community, was tested a priori to verify there was no violation of the 
assumption of the linearity of the logit. The predictor variable, judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the experts’ rating of risk management in the community, in the binary logistic 
regression analysis was found to significantly contribute to the model, χ 2 (2, 55) = 19.496, p < 
.001. 
It was found that only the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of risk management in the community were uniquely predictive of penalty 
outcome. When risk was assessed as manageable by the Court-appointed experts (as interpreted 
by judicial decision makers), this was uniquely associated with a 93% decrease in the odds of an 
indeterminate sentence in contrast to 1.4% for the Defence experts’ rating of risk management. 
That is, the data support that the Court-appointed expert’s conclusion on risk management in the 
community would appear to overrule the Defence expert’s conclusion (as interpreted by judicial 
decision makers). Table 25 presents the results regarding which experts’ rating of risk 
management in the community (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), if either, has more 





Binary Logistic Regression of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-
Appointed and Defence Experts’ Ratings of Risk Management in the Community with Penalty 
Outcome 
 
 Regression model by penalty outcome 
Regression model outcome β SE Wald p Exp(B) 95% CL [LL, UL] 
Constant 
 




-2.584 .837 9.527 .002 .075 [.015, .389] 
Defence experts’ risk 
management 
-.014 1.040 .000 .989 .986 [.129, 7.567] 
       




3.3 Presence of Static, Dynamic, and Protective Factors 
3.3.1 Court-appointed Expert and Designation Outcome 
 Research supports dynamic and protective factors as being influential in assessing an 
individual’s risk level, as well as treatment amenability and risk management in the community 
(Bonta & Andrews, 2017). However, it has also been found that less than half of all assessments 
in preventative detention hearings contained information on dynamic or protective factors (Blais 
& Forth, 2014). As noted previously, it is important to remember that the data collected was 
what was contained in the written judicial sentencing decision and at the discretion of the 
individual judicial decision maker and not necessarily what was contained in the expert’s report. 
A series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine the relationship, if any, between the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ distinction between static 
and dynamic factors. 
First, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ distinction between static and dynamic factors and designation outcome was 
conducted. It was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed 
experts’ distinction between static and dynamic factors were not significantly related to, and are 
only weakly associated with, designation outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = 2.687, p = .101, Cramer’s V = 
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.139. The data show that 78% of the time the Court-appointed experts noted the difference 
between static and dynamic factors (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) the individual 
was designated a DO. Table 26 presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ 




Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Static vs. Dynamic Distinction with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ static vs. dynamic distinction Yes 73 77.7 21 22.3 
 No 41 89.1 5 10.9 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = 2.687a, p = .101, Cramer’s V = .139, κ = -.129, p = .101. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.54. 
 
Second, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ discussion of dynamic factors and designation outcome was conducted. It was 
found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ discussion 
of dynamic factors were not significantly related to, and are only weakly associated with, 
designation outcome, χ 2 (1, 140) = 1.935, p = .164, Cramer’s V = .118. The data show that 80% 
of the time the Court-appointed expert noted dynamic factors (as interpreted by the judicial 
decision maker) the individual was designated a DO and 100% of the time they did not note 
dynamic factors the individual was designated a DO. The discussion around dynamic factors 
tended to focus on personality factors which, in turn, tended to be seen as not dynamic but static 
in nature (e.g., psychopathic and antisocial traits are not treatable). Table 27 presents the results 
regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ notation of 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Dynamic Factors Noted with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ dynamic factors noted Yes 106 80.3 26 19.7 
 No 8 100.0 0 0.0 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = 1.935a, p = .164; Cramer’s V = .118; κ = -.096, p = .164. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.49. 
 
Third, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ discussion of protective factors and designation outcome was conducted. It 
was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 
discussion of protective factors were not significantly related to, nor associated with, designation 
outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = 1.134, p = .287, Cramer’s V = .090. The data show that 90% of the time 
the Court-appointed experts noted protective factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers) the individual was designated a DO and 80% of the time they did not note protective 
factors the individual was designated a DO. It is noted that protective factors were not commonly 
noted in the sentencing decisions and, when they were noted, they were deemed to be 
insufficient to override other risk information. The focus within risk assessments appears to 
continue to be on risk factors and not protective factors. Table 28 presents the results regarding 
the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ notation of protective 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Protective Factors Noted with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ protective factors noted Yes 18 90.0 2 10.0 
 No 96 80.0 24 20.0 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = 1.134a , p = .287; Cramer’s V = .090; κ = .034, p = .101. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.71. 
 
3.3.2 Court-appointed Expert and Penalty Outcome 
When considering penalty outcome with respect to the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ recognition of static, dynamic, and protective 
factors, a series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine if a relationship exists. First, a 
crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ 
discussion of static and dynamic factors was conducted. It was found that the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ distinction between static and dynamic 
factors were not significantly related to, and only weakly associated with, penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 
140) = .603, p = .437, Cramer’s V = .118. The data show that 61% of the time the Court-
appointed experts noted the difference between static and dynamic factors (as interpreted by the 
judicial decision maker) the individual was given an indeterminate sentence and 67% of the time 
the Court-appointed expert did not note the difference between static and dynamic factors the 
individual was given an indeterminate sentence. Table 29 presents the results regarding the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ notation of static versus 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Static vs. Dynamic Distinction with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ static vs. dynamic distinction Yes 57 60.6 36 39.4 
 No 31 67.4 15 32.6 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = .603a, p = .437, Cramer’s V = .118, κ = -.096, p = .437. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.09. 
 
 
Second, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ discussion of dynamic factors and penalty outcome was conducted. It was 
found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ discussion 
of dynamic factors was not significantly related to, and only weakly associated with, penalty 
outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = 2.207, p = .137, Cramer’s V = .126. The data show that 61% of the time 
the Court-appointed expert noted the dynamic factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers) the individual was given an indeterminate sentence and 88% of the time they did not 
note dynamic factors the individual was given an indeterminate sentence. As previously 
mentioned, when dynamic factors were noted by the expert, the focus tended to be on personality 
factors that are believed to be challenging to change. Table 30 presents the results regarding the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ notation of dynamic 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Dynamic Factors Noted with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ dynamic factors noted Yes 81 61.4 51 38.6 
 No 7 87.5 1 12.5 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = 2.207a, p = .137, Cramer’s V = .126; κ = -.073, p = .437. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.97. 
 
 
Third, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ discussion of protective factors and penalty outcome was conducted. It was 
found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ discussion 
of protective factors were not significantly related to, nor associated with, penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 
140) = .046, p = .830, Cramer’s V = .018. The data show that 65% of the time the Court-
appointed experts noted the protective factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision maker) the 
individual was given an indeterminate sentence and 63% of the time they did not note protective 
factors the individual was given an indeterminate sentence. This result appears to speak to the 
potential impact of protective factors on overall risk, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community. Table 31 presents the results regarding the judicial decision 







Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Court-Appointed Experts’ 
Protective Factors Noted with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Court-appointed experts’ protective factors noted Yes 13 65.0 7 35.0 
 No 75 62.5 45 37.5 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = .046a, p = .830, Cramer’s V = .018; κ = .010, p = .437. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.43. 
 
3.3.3 Defence Expert and Designation Outcome 
 When considering the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 
discussion of static, dynamic, and protective factors with respect to designation outcome, a series 
of crosstabulations were conducted to examine if a relationship exists. First, a crosstabulation of 
the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of static and 
dynamic factors was conducted. It was found that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of 
the Defence-appointed experts’ distinction between static and dynamic factors were not 
significantly related to, nor associated with, designation outcome, χ2 (1, 55) = .076, p = .783, 
Cramer’s V = .037. The data show that 85% of the time the Defence experts noted the difference 
between static and dynamic factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) the individual 
was designated a DO and 88% of the time the Defence experts did not note the difference 
between static and dynamic factors the individual was designated a DO. The distinction between 
static and dynamic factors does not influence designation outcome. Table 32 presents the results 
regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ distinction between 






Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Static 
vs. Dynamic Distinction with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % N % 
Defence experts’ static vs. dynamic distinction Yes 33 84.6 6 15.4 
 No 14 87.5 2 12.5 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = .076a, p = .783, Cramer’s V = .037; κ = -.034, p = .783. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.33. 
 
Second, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ discussion of dynamic factors were conducted. It was found that the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of dynamic factors were not 
significantly related to, nor associated with, designation outcome, χ2 (1, 55) = .379, p = .538, 
Cramer’s V = .083. The data show that 86% of the time the Defence expert noted dynamic 
factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) the individual was designated a DO and 
75% of the time they did not note dynamic factors the individual was designated a DO. As noted, 
the discussion of an individual’s dynamic factors tends to focus on the more unchangeable 
aspects (e.g., personality or cognitive capabilities). Table 33 presents the results regarding the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of dynamic factors 
and designation outcome. 
 
Table 33 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Dynamic Factors Noted with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ dynamic factors noted Yes 44 86.3 7 13.7 
 No 3 75.0 1 25.0 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = .379a, p = .538, Cramer’s V = .083; κ = .077, p = .538. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 




Third, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ discussion of protective factors were conducted. It was found that the judicial decision 
makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of protective factors were not 
significantly related to, nor associated with, designation outcome, χ2 (1, 55) = .149, p = .702, 
Cramer’s V = .052. The data show that 82% of the time the Defence experts noted protective 
factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) the individual was designated a DO and 
86% of the time the Defence experts did not note protective factors the individual was designated 
a DO. The discussion of protective factors does not influence designation outcome. Table 34 
presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 
discussion of protective factors and designation outcome. 
 
Table 34 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Protective Factors Noted with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ protective factors noted Yes 9 81.8 2 18.2 
 No 38 86.4 6 13.6 
Total  47 85.5 8 14.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = .146a, p = .702, Cramer’s V = .052; κ = -.020, p = .702. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.60. 
 
 
3.3.4 Defence Expert and Penalty Outcome 
 When considering penalty outcome with respect to the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ recognition of static, dynamic, and protective factors, a 
series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine if a relationship exists. First, a 
crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion 
of static and dynamic factors was conducted. It was found that the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the Defence experts’ distinction between static and dynamic factors are 
significantly related to, and have a moderate association with, penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 55) = 
4.850, p = .028, Cramer’s V = .297. The data show that 56% of the time the Defence experts 
noted the difference between static and dynamic factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
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makers) the individual was given an indeterminate sentence and 88% of the time the Defence 
expert did not note the difference between static and dynamic factors the individual was given an 
indeterminate sentence. Review of the Defence experts’ comments from the judicial sentencing 
decisions suggested that this result may be driven by the differentiation of age as a dynamic 
factor and the concept of “burnout” with respect to recidivism and adverse personality factors. 
The Defence experts appear much more likely to focus on these factors. Table 35 presents the 
results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ distinction 
between static and dynamic factors and penalty outcome. 
 
Table 35 
Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ Static 
vs. Dynamic Distinction with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ static vs. dynamic distinction Yes 22 56.4 17 43.6 
 No 14 87.5 2 12.5 
Total  36 65.5 19 34.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = 4.850a, p = .028, Cramer’s V = .297; κ = -.295, p = .028. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.53. 
 
Second, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ discussion of dynamic factors and penalty outcome was conducted. It was found that the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of dynamic factors 
were not significantly related to, nor associated with, penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 55) = .174, p = 
.677, Cramer’s V = .056. The data show that 65% of the time the Defence experts noted dynamic 
factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) the individual was given an indeterminate 
sentence and 75% of the time they did not note dynamic factors the individual was given an 
indeterminate sentence. A basic discussion of dynamic factors by Defence experts (as interpreted 
by judicial decision makers) was not influential with respect to penalty outcome. Table 36 
presents the results regarding the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ 





Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Dynamic Factors Noted with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ dynamic factors noted Yes 33 64.7 18 35.3 
 No 3 75.0 1 25.0 
Total  36 65.5 19 34.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = .174a, p = .677, Cramer’s V = .056; κ = -.038, p = .677. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.38. 
 
Third, a crosstabulation of the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence 
experts’ discussion of protective factors and penalty outcome was conducted. It was found that 
the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ discussion of protective 
factors were not significantly related to, although moderately associated with, penalty outcome, 
χ2 (1, 55) = 2.432, p = .119, Cramer’s V = .210. The data show that 46% of the time the Defence 
expert noted protective factors (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) the individual was 
given an indeterminate sentence and 71% of the time they did not note protective factors the 
individual was given an indeterminate sentence. This general trend appears to show that the 
discussion of protective factors by the Defence experts (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers) are influencing outcomes. Table 37 presents the results regarding the judicial decision 







Crosstabulation of the Judicial Decision Makers’ Interpretation of the Defence Experts’ 
Protective Factors Noted with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
LTSO 
  n % n % 
Defence experts’ protective factors noted Yes 5 45.5 6 54.5 
 No 31 70.5 13 29.5 
Total  36 65.5 19 34.5 
Note: χ2 (1, 55) = 2.432a, p = .119, Cramer’s V = .210; κ = -.135, p = .119. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.80. 
 
3.4 Effect of 2008 Legislation Change 
The effect of the 2008 legislation change has not yet been evaluated. It is hypothesized 
that the majority of DOs will receive indeterminate sentences rather than determinate sentences 
with LTSOs. In order to examine if a relationship between the 2008 legislation change and both 
designation and penalty outcome exists, a series of crosstabulations were conducted. First, a 
crosstabulation between the year of the index offence (pre- versus post-legislation change) and 
designation outcome was conducted. It was found that the year of the index offence (pre- versus 
post-legislation change) was not significantly related to, nor associated with, designation 
outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = .002, p = .964, Cramer’s V = .004. The data show that the same 
percentage of DO and LTO designations have occurred pre- and post-legislation change. The 
legislation change does not appear to have influenced the designation of a DO being assigned 
and it is postulated that this is due to the way the law is worded. That is, as noted previously, 
there is less discretion on behalf of the judicial decision maker when it comes to the criteria for 
assigning an individual a DO designation. Interestingly, the legislation change was noted by 
many judicial decision makers as creating more DO designations. Table 38 presents the results 






Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- versus Post-Legislation Change) with Designation 
Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 40 81.6 9 18.4 
 Post-legislation change 74 81.3 17 18.7 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = .002a, p = .964, Cramer’s V = .004; κ = .002, p = .964. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.10. 
 
Second, a crosstabulation between the year of the index offence (pre- versus post-
legislation change) and penalty outcome was conducted. It was found that the year of index (pre- 
versus post-legislation change) was significantly related to, and moderately associated with, 
penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = 9.042, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .254 (Table 39). The data show that 
when the index offence was prior to the 2008 legislation change 80% of individuals facing a 
preventative detention hearing received an indeterminate sentence. However, only 54% of 
individuals received an indeterminate sentence when the index was after the 2008 legislation 
change. 
This result is likely due to the 2008 legislation change as prior to the 2008 legislation 
change, once an individual was designated a DO (which is where the discretion was provided to 
the judicial decision maker), the judicial decision maker automatically had to sentence the 
individual to an indeterminate period of incarceration. However, under the new legislation, the 
discretion of the judicial decision maker was shifted to the penalty stage (rather than the 
designation stage) and thus, although judicial decision makers are providing more DO 
designations, they are exercising their discretion of the length of the sentence at penalty stage 
and assigning more determinate sentences with LTSOs. Essentially, DOs with determinate 







Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- versus Post-Legislation Change) with Penalty Outcome 
   Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
   n % n % 
Year of index  Pre-legislation change 39 79.6 10 20.4 
  Post-legislation change 49 53.8 42 46.2 
Total   88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = 9.042a, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .254; κ = .218, p = .003. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.20. 
 
3.5 Ethnicity 
 Given that, as of the end of the fiscal year 2018-2019, 35.5% of DOs in Canada have an 
Indigenous heritage (Public Safety Canada, 2020), analyses were completed on several variables 
to determine if racial ancestry is associated with DO sentencing decisions (Lloyd et al., 2010). A 
series of crosstabulations were conducted to examine the relationship, if any, between ethnicity 
and year of index offence (pre- versus post-legislation change), penalty outcome, and designation 
outcome. The data file was stratified by ethnicity into Indigenous versus Non-Indigenous 
individuals. First, a crosstabulation between year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) 
and penalty outcome was conducted with respect to Non-Indigenous individuals. It was found 
that there is no significant relationship between, nor association with, year of index (pre- versus 
post-legislation change) and penalty outcome for Non-Indigenous individuals, χ2 (1, 58) = 1.119, 
p = .290, Cramer’s V = .139. The results suggest that the 2008 legislation change did not impact 
Non-Indigenous individuals with respect to whether or not they receive an indeterminate 
sentence. Table 40 presents the results regarding the year of index (pre- versus post-legislation 






Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- vs. Post-Legislation Change) with Penalty Outcome for 
Non-Indigenous Individuals 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 18 75.0 6 25.0 
 Post-legislation change 21 61.8 13 38.2 
Total  39 67.2 19 32.8 
Note: χ2 (1, 58) = 1.119a, p = .290, Cramer’s V = .139; κ = .121, p = .290. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Ethnicity collapsed = Non-Indigenous. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.86. 
 
Second, a crosstabulation between year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and 
penalty outcome was conducted with respect to Indigenous individuals. It was found that there is 
a significant relationship between, and a strong association with, year of index (pre- versus post-
legislation change) and penalty outcome for Indigenous individuals, χ2 (1, 82) = 8.790, p = .003, 
Cramer’s V = .327. It appears the 2008 legislation change has impacted Indigenous individuals 
facing a preventative detention hearing as 84% of Indigenous individuals received an 
indeterminate sentence prior to the 2008 legislation change whereas only 49% received an 
indeterminate sentence after the 2008 legislation change. Indigenous individuals now have an 
almost 50% chance of receiving a determinate sentence with an LTSO rather than an 
indeterminate sentence. Table 41 presents the results regarding the year of index (pre- versus 






Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- vs. Post-Legislation Change) with Penalty Outcome for 
Indigenous Individuals 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 21 84.0 4 16.0 
 Post-legislation change 28 49.1 29 50.9 
Total  49 59.8 33 40.2 
Note: χ2 (1, 82) = 8.790a, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .327; κ = .275, p = .003. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Ethnicity collapsed = Indigenous. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.06. 
 
 
Third, a crosstabulation between year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and 
designation outcome was conducted with respect to Non-Indigenous individuals. It was found 
that there is no significant relationship between, and a small association with, year of index (pre- 
and post-legislation change) and designation outcome for Non-Indigenous individuals, χ2 (1, 58) 
= 1.727, p = .189, Cramer’s V = .173. Again, the results suggest that the 2008 legislation change 
did not impact Non-Indigenous individuals with respect to whether or not they are designated a 
DO. Table 42 presents the results regarding the year of index (pre- versus post-legislation 
change) and designation outcome for Non-Indigenous individuals. 
 
Table 42 
Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- vs. Post-Legislation Change) with Designation Outcome 
for Non-Indigenous Individuals 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 18 75.0 6 25.0 
 Post-legislation change 30 88.2 4 11.8 
Total  48 82.8 10 17.2 
Note: χ2 (1, 58) = 1.727a, p = .189, Cramer’s V = .173; κ = -.115, p = .189. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. Ethnicity collapsed = Non-Indigenous. 




Fourth, a crosstabulation between year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and 
designation outcome was conducted with respect to Indigenous individuals. It was found that 
there is no significant relationship between, and a small association with, year of index (pre- 
versus post-legislation change) and designation outcome for Indigenous individuals, χ2 (1, 82) = 
1.292, p = .256, Cramer’s V = .126. This result appears to indicate that the 2008 legislation 
change has not impacted Indigenous individuals with respect to designation outcome as 88% of 
Indigenous individuals facing a preventative detention hearing received a DO designation prior 
to the 2008 legislation change and 77% received a DO designation after the 2008 legislation 
change. As noted, the 2008 legislation change created less discretion for judicial decision makers 
at the designation stage and thus it is not surprising that the change has not influenced the DO 
designations. Table 43 presents the results regarding the year of index (pre- versus post-
legislation change) and designation outcome with respect to Indigenous individuals. 
 
Table 43 
Crosstabulation of Year of Index (Pre- vs. Post-Legislation Change) with Designation Outcome 
for Indigenous Individuals 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 22 88.0 3 12.0 
 Post-legislation change 44 77.2 13 22.8 
Total  66 80.5 16 19.5 
Note: χ2 (1 ,82) = 1.292a, p = .256, Cramer’s V = .126; κ = .074, p = .256. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. Ethnicity collapsed = Indigenous. 
a 1 cell (25.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.88. 
 
Fifth, a crosstabulation between ethnicity and penalty outcome was conducted to identify 
if a relationship exists. It was found that there was no significant relationship between, nor 
association with, penalty outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = .815, p = .367, Cramer’s V = .076. The results 
indicate that Non-Indigenous individuals received an indeterminate sentence 67% of the time and 
Indigenous individuals received indeterminate sentences 60% of the time. This suggests that 
Indigenous heritage on its own does not meaningfully predict whether an individual will receive 





Crosstabulation of Ethnicity with Penalty Outcome 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Ethnicity Non-Indigenous 39 67.2 19 32.8 
 Indigenous 49 59.8 33 40.2 
Total  88 62.9 52 37.1 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = .815a, p = .367, Cramer’s V = .076; κ = .070, p = .367. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.54. 
 
Sixth, a crosstabulation between ethnicity and designation outcome was conducted to 
identify if a relationship exists. It was found that there was no significant relationship between, 
nor association with, ethnicity and designation outcome, χ2 (1, 140) = .116, p = .734, Cramer’s V 
= .029. The results indicate that Non-Indigenous individuals received DO designations 83% of 
the time and Indigenous individuals received DO designations 81% of the time. This suggests 
that Indigenous heritage is unrelated to receiving a DO designation. Table 45 presents the results 
regarding the ethnicity and designation outcome. 
 
Table 45 
Crosstabulation of Ethnicity with Designation Outcome 
  DO LTO 
  n % n % 
Ethnicity Non-Indigenous 48 82.8 10 17.2 
 Indigenous 66 80.5 16 19.5 
Total  114 81.4 26 18.6 
Note: χ2 (1, 140) = .116a, p = .734, Cramer’s V = .029; κ = .020, p = .734. DO = Dangerous 
Offender. LTO = Long-Term Offender. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.77. 
 
A post-hoc analysis, two-way ANOVA, was conducted to examine if the differences 
between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous are significant. Confirming earlier results, the ANOVA 
shows that the differences between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous individuals with respect to 
sentencing outcome were significant only in regards to the year of the index offence (pre- versus 
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post-legislation change), F(1, 140) = 8.122, p = .005. Table 46 presents the results regarding 
ethnicity, year of index, and penalty outcome. 
 
Table 46 
Analysis of Variance: Dependent Variable: Penalty Outcome 





Corrected Model 2.551a 3 .850 3.837 .011 
Intercept 218.484 1 218.484 986.023 .000 
Ethnicity (Indigenous vs. Non-Indigenous) .010 1 .010 .047 .830 
Year of Index (pre- vs. post-legislation change) 1.800 1 1.800 8.122 .005 
Ethnicity * Year of Index .364 1 .364 1.643 .202 
Error 30.135 136 .222   
Total 296.000 140    
Corrected Total 32.686 139    
Note: a. R2 = .078 (Adjusted R2 = .058). 
 
 
3.6 Jurisdictional Differences 
Additional ancillary analyses were conducted to explore whether jurisdiction plays a role 
in judicial sentencing decisions. As noted, there are noted discrepancies of the application of the 
preventative detention legislation throughout its history. In recent times, it is noted that 
Saskatchewan has the highest rates of DOs per 100,000 population and DOs over three times as 
many DOs per 100,000 population than any other province. Saskatchewan also has the highest 
proportion of Indigenous peoples per population alongside Manitoba. However, it is unknown 
what percentage of DOs in these provinces, for example, are Indigenous compared to other 
provinces and whether the ratio of DO applications is commensurate with the percent of 
Indigenous peoples in the population. A series of key variables were investigated with respect to 
jurisdiction, including experts involved, ethnicity, designation outcome, and penalty outcome. 
These analyses include descriptive statistics as well as crosstabulations to examine any such 
associations. There were no hypotheses with respect to these ancillary analyses and they were 
included out of interest and relevance to the overall study. 
First, the data were stratified by jurisdiction and analyses were run for the 10-year period 
July 2, 2008 to July 2, 2018. With respect to ethnicity, it was found that, of the 49 cases from 
British Columbia, 32.7% (n = 16) were Indigenous individuals and 67.3% (n = 33) were on Non-
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Indigenous individuals, while only 5.9% of British Columbia’s population is of Indigenous 
descent. It was found that, of the 23 cases from Alberta, 43.5% (n = 10) were Indigenous 
individuals and 56.5% (n = 13) were Non-Indigenous individuals, while only 6.5% of Alberta’s 
population is of Indigenous descent. Further, it was found that, of the 50 cases from 
Saskatchewan, 84.0% (n = 42) were Indigenous individuals and only 16.0% (n = 8) were Non-
Indigenous individuals, while only 16.3% of Saskatchewan’s population is of Indigenous 
descent. In regards to Manitoba, it was found that, of the 18 cases, 77.8% (n = 14) were 
Indigenous individuals and 22.2% (n = 4) were Non-Indigenous individuals, while only 15.5% of 
Manitoba’s population is of Indigenous descent. These data appear to show not only significant 
discrepancies in which individuals (in terms of ethnicity) are being targeted across jurisdictions 
but also how disproportionate the number of Indigenous DO hearings are to the overall 
Indigenous population of these provinces. Overall, regardless of percentage of overall population 
of Indigenous peoples in these provinces, there is a disproportionate number of Indigenous 




Ethnicity by Jurisdiction 
Province Indigenous Non-Indigenous Indigenous Population (%) 
 n % n %  
British Columbia 16 32.7 33 67.3 5.9 
Alberta 10 43.5 13 56.5 6.5 
Saskatchewan 42 84.0 8 16.0 16.3 
Manitoba 14 77.8 4 22.2 15.5 
Note: N = 140. 
 
 
 Second, with respect to the expert involved in each jurisdiction, it was found that British 
Columbia employed 15 different Court-appointed experts utilized between one and eight times 
and 14 different Defence experts utilized between one and four times. All (n = 15) the Court-
appointed experts in British Columbia were from British Columbia and 85.7% (n = 12) of the 
Defence experts were from British Columbia. Eight (53.3%) experts in British Columbia testified 
for both the Court and Defence. Approximately half (n = 7, 46.7%) of the Court-appointed 
experts in British Columbia were psychiatrists and approximately half (n = 6, 42.9%) of the 
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Defence experts were psychiatrists. It was found that Alberta employed 14 different Court-
appointed experts utilized between one and six times and 11 different Defence experts utilized 
between one and five times. All (n = 14) the Court-appointed experts in Alberta were from 
Alberta and 90.9% (n = 10) of the Defence experts were from Alberta. Three (21.4%) experts in 
Alberta have testified for both the Court and Defence. Approximately three-quarters (n = 10, 
71.4%) of the Court-appointed experts in Alberta were psychiatrists and approximately a fifth (n 
= 2, 18.2%) of the Defence experts were psychiatrists. 
It was found that Saskatchewan employed nine different Court-appointed experts utilized 
between one and 19 times and five different Defence experts utilized between one and 15 times. 
Approximately half (n = 4) of the Court-appointed experts in Saskatchewan were from 
Saskatchewan and 80.0% (n = 4) of the Defence experts were from Saskatchewan. Four (44.4%) 
experts in Saskatchewan have testified for both the Court and Defence. Approximately half (n = 
4, 44.4%) of the Court-appointed experts in Saskatchewan were psychiatrists and approximately 
half (n = 2, 40.0%) of the Defence experts were psychiatrists. It was found that Manitoba 
employed five different Court-appointed experts utilized between one and six times and four 
different Defence experts utilized between one and two times. The minority (n = 1, 20%) of 
Court-appointed experts in Manitoba were from Manitoba and 50.0% (n = 2) of the Defence 
experts were from Manitoba. None of the experts in Manitoba have testified for both the Court 
and Defence. Approximately three-quarters (n = 4, 80.0%) of the Court-appointed experts in 
Manitoba were psychiatrists and one-quarter (n = 1, 75.0%) of the Defence experts were 






Expert Involved by Jurisdiction 
Province  Court-Appointed Defence 
  n % n % 
British Columbia Psychiatrist 7 46.7 6 42.9 
Psychologist 8 53.3 8 57.1 
Home Jurisdiction 15 100.0 12 85.7 
Alberta Psychiatrist 10 71.4 2 18.2 
Psychologist 4 28.6 9 81.8 
Home Jurisdiction 14 100.0 10 90.9 
Saskatchewan Psychiatrist 4 44.4 2 40.0 
Psychologist 5 55.6 3 60.0 
Home Jurisdiction 4 44.4 4 80.0 
Manitoba Psychiatrist 4 80.0 1 25.0 
Psychologist 1 20.0 3 75.0 
Home Jurisdiction 1 20.0 2 50.0 
 
 
With respect to designation outcome (i.e., DO versus LTO), it was found that 
preventative detention hearings in British Columbia (n = 49) resulted in a DO designation 77.6% 
(n = 38) of the time and LTO designations 22.4% (n = 11) of the time. In Alberta (n = 23), it was 
found that preventative detention hearings resulted in DO designations 87.0% (n = 20) of the 
time and LTO designations 13.0% (n = 3) of the time. In Saskatchewan (n = 50), it was found 
that preventative detention hearings resulted in DO designations 82.0% (n = 41) of the time and 
LTO designations 18.0% (n = 9) of the time. And finally, in Manitoba (n = 18), it was found that 
preventative detention hearings resulted in DO designations 83.3% (n = 15) of the time and LTO 
designations 16.7% (n = 3) of the time. As noted in earlier analyses, designation outcome was 
not deemed the prime indicator due to the limitations within the legislation on judicial decision 
makers to use discretion. These jurisdictional analyses regarding designation outcome all appear 
similar with a DO designation being the most common outcome. Table 49 presents the results 






Designation Outcome by Jurisdiction 
Province Dangerous Offender Long-Term Offender 
 n % n % 
British Columbia 38 77.6 11 22.4 
Alberta 20 87.0 3 13.0 
Saskatchewan 41 82.0 9 18.0 
Manitoba 15 83.3 3 16.7 
Note: N = 140. 
 
 With respect to penalty outcome (i.e., indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO), it 
was found that preventative detention hearings in British Columbia (n = 49) resulted in 
indeterminate sentences 61.2% (n = 30) of the time and determinate sentences with LTSOs 
38.8% (n = 19) of the time. In Alberta (n = 23), it was found that preventative detention hearings 
resulted in indeterminate sentences 78.3% (n = 18) of the time and determinate sentences with 
LTSOs 21.7% (n = 5) of the time. In Saskatchewan (n = 50), it was found that preventative 
detention hearings resulted in indeterminate sentences 52.0% (n = 26) of the time and 
determinate sentences with LTSOs 48.0% (n = 24) of the time. And finally, in Manitoba (n = 
18), it was found that preventative detention hearings resulted in indeterminate sentences 77.8% 
(n = 14) of the time and determinate sentences with LTSOs 22.2% (n = 4) of the time. As noted 
in earlier analyses, penalty outcome was deemed to be a more appropriate indicator, particularly 
in regards to the 2008 legislation change, due to the discretion granted to judicial decision 
makers at this stage in the sentencing process. 
These jurisdictional analyses regarding penalty outcome all appear similar except 
Saskatchewan wherein an individual facing a preventative detention hearing has a 50/50 chance 
of receiving an indeterminate sentence. This is a notable finding and a departure from the trend 
seen with respect to other provinces investigated. This result speaks to the impact of the 2008 
legislation change, particularly in Saskatchewan, wherein judicial decision makers appear to be 
taking the opportunity to exercise their discretion in handing down determinate sentences with 
LTSOs as opposed to indeterminate sentences. Given the high proportion of Indigenous 
individuals brought forward for preventative detention applications in Saskatchewan, this trend 
towards determinate sentences with LTSOs should be regarded as the most favorable outcome. 





Penalty Outcome by Jurisdiction 
Province Indeterminate Determinate with LTSO 
 n % n % 
British Columbia 30 61.2 19 38..8 
Alberta 18 78.3 5 21.7 
Saskatchewan 26 52.0 24 48.0 
Manitoba 14 77.8 4 22.2 
Note: N = 140. LTSO = Long-Term Supervision Order. 
 
 
When considering the impact of the 2008 legislation change by jurisdiction; that is, 
exploring whether any of the four Canadian jurisdictions have altered their approach to 
sentencing DOs since the legislation change. A crosstabulation between year of index (pre- 
versus post-legislation change) and penalty outcome was conducted with respect to jurisdiction. 
It was found that there is no significant relationship between, and only a weak association with, 
year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and penalty outcome for British Columbia, χ2 
(1, 49) = .567, p = .452, Cramer’s V = .108. Table 51 presents the results regarding penalty 
outcome for British Columbia pre- versus post-legislation change. 
 
Table 51 
Crosstabulation of Penalty Outcome by Jurisdiction (British Columbia) Pre- versus Post-
Legislation Change 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 11 68.8 5 31.5 
 Post-legislation change 19 57.6 14 42.4 
Total  30 61.2 19 38.8 
Note: χ2 (1, 49) = .567a, p = .452, Cramer’s V = .108; κ = .091, p = .452. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Jurisdiction = British Columbia. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.20. 
 
 
It was found that there is no significant relationship between, but a moderate association 
with, year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and penalty outcome for Alberta, χ2 (1, 
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23) = 2.255, p = .133, Cramer’s V = .313. Table 52 presents the results regarding penalty 
outcome for Alberta pre- versus post-legislation change. 
 
Table 52 
Crosstabulation of Penalty Outcome by Jurisdiction (Alberta) Pre- versus Post-Legislation 
Change 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 6 100.0 0 0.0 
 Post-legislation change 12 70.6 5 29.4 
Total  18 78.3 5 21.7 
Note: χ2 (1, 23) = 2.255a, p = .133, Cramer’s V = .313; κ = .179, p = .133. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Jurisdiction = Alberta. 
a 3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.30. 
 
 
It was found that there is a significant relationship between, and a strong association with, 
year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and penalty outcome for Saskatchewan, χ2 (1, 
50) = 15.333, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .554. Table 53 presents the results regarding penalty 
outcome for Saskatchewan pre- versus post-legislation change. 
 
Table 53 
Crosstabulation of Penalty Outcome by Jurisdiction (Saskatchewan) Pre- versus Post-
Legislation Change 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 16 88.9 2 11.1 
 Post-legislation change 10 31.3 22 68.8 
Total  26 52.0 24 48.0 
Note: χ2 (1, 50) = 15.333a, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .554; κ = .525, p < .001. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Jurisdiction = Saskatchewan. 
a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.64. 
 
 
It was found that there is no significant relationship between, and a weak association 
with, year of index (pre- versus post-legislation change) and penalty outcome for Manitoba, χ2 
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(1, 18) = 1.286, p = .257, Cramer’s V = .267. Table 54 presents the results regarding penalty 
outcome for Manitoba pre- versus post-legislation change. 
 
Table 54 
Crosstabulation of Penalty Outcome by Jurisdiction (Manitoba) Pre- versus Post-Legislation 
Change 
  Indeterminate Determinate 
with LTSO 
  n % n % 
Year of index Pre-legislation change 6 66.7 3 33.3 
 Post-legislation change 8 88.9 1 11.1 
Total  14 77.8 4 22.2 
Note: χ2 (1, 18) = 1.286a, p = .257, Cramer’s V = .267; κ = -.222, p = .257. LTSO = Long-Term 
Supervision Order. Jurisdiction = Manitoba. 
a 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00. 
 
Overall, the results indicate that the 2008 legislation did not appear to influence British 
Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba’s ordering of indeterminate sentences versus determinate 
sentences with an LTSO during the period investigated. However, Saskatchewan appears to have 
adopted the 2008 legislation change to a substantial extent, as prior to the 2008 legislation 
change judicial decision makers were ordering indeterminate sentences 88.9% of the time, 
whereas after the 2008 legislation change judicial decision makers were ordering indeterminate 
sentences only 31.3% of the time. This adoption of the 2008 legislation change is likely what the 
federal government was hoping would occur, which is an opportunity for individuals who are 
“dangerous” under the law, to still have an opportunity to reside in a community setting with 
appropriate supports. 
Whereas Saskatchewan appears to have adopted the 2008 legislation to a large extent, the 
trend appears to show British Columbia and Alberta also starting to adopt the 2008 legislation 
change but at a slower pace. However, Manitoba appears to be moving in the opposite direction 
in that the overall percentage of DOs provided indeterminate sentences has actually increased 
since the 2008 legislation change. That said, it is unclear the reasons for the increase as Manitoba 
clearly brings forward less preventative detention applications overall and it may be that their 
selectiveness of cases may already be those that warrant an indeterminate sentence to be levied. 
This line of reasoning could also apply to British Columbia and Alberta. However, knowing that, 
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as a jurisdiction, Saskatchewan brings forward more than three times as many preventative 
detention applications than any other province per 100,000 population, it may be that 
Saskatchewan prosecutors are not as selective about the cases they present for preventative 
detention hearings and judicial decision makers are recognizing this and making the appropriate 




CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
In Canada, preventative detention legislation has been in place since the 1940s and 
although it has undergone several revisions over the last 70 years, the legislation has always 
allowed for an individual to be incarcerated for an indeterminate period of time based on the 
presumed high likelihood that they may commit crimes in the future (Lippke, 2008). Given the 
seriousness associated with a preventative detention application (i.e., the distinct possibility of 
being sentenced to incarceration for an indeterminate length of time), it is important to 
continually evaluate the validity and reliability of preventative detention legislation (in particular 
any changes to the legislation) to ensure the outcomes remain justified and are serving the 
intended purpose. This present research investigated publically available written DO sentencing 
decisions in four Canadian jurisdictions in order to examine what role expert risk assessments 
were having within preventative detention hearings and the judicial system’s intepretation and 
use of them. 
Hypotheses and research questions were derived for four primary areas: a) whether 
experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the community (as 
interpreted by judicial makers) influence the outcome of the hearing, b) whether partisanship 
continues to exist within preventative detention hearings and how the judicial system appears to 
be interpreting same, c) whether static, dynamic, or protective factors are being discussed (as 
intepretated by the judicial decision makers) and, if so, influencing the outcome, and d) whether 
the 2008 legislation change has had any effect on designation and penalty outcomes. Additional 
areas explored but no particular research questions posed included jurisdictional differences and 
the role of ethnicity, if any. The results are discussed below, in turn, in addition to some 
considerations regarding the clinical and correctional implications of this study, strengths and 
limitations, and future directions. 
4.1 Expert Ratings and Outcome 
 The goal of the first hypothesis was to determinate whether the judicial decision makers’ 
interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk management in the 
community influence the two primary outcomes of preventative detention hearings. Preventative 
detention legislation requires one expert risk assessment to be completed which constitutes the 
Court-appointed expert. The Court-appointed expert is expected to provide a neutral unbiased 
assessment “to the Court, for the Court,” and not for any particular side (i.e., Crown or Defence). 
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That said, there has been a series of legal challenges and subsequent case law generated (see, for 
example, R. v. A.H., 2017) regarding how the expert is to be appointed and challenges to the fact 
that the Crown will typically put forward the name of an expert they feel will provide them with 
an assessment favorable to their position. Overall, the Courts appear to state that if an agreement 
cannot be reached between the Crown and Defence of an appropriate expert, the Court is to 
decide which to choose based on several factors (e.g., availability, expertise, cost, perceived 
conflict of interest, and so forth) after listening to arguments from both sides. 
Previous research supports Court-appointed experts being more moderate compared to 
Crown retained experts (Blais, 2015), but that research did not investigate Defence retained 
experts. However, the basis of the Canadian legal system is an adversarial one and thus it is not 
uncommon, particularly for the Defence, to present evidence on their own behalf regardless of 
the expert selected to provide an assessment on behalf of the Court. It was also seen, from time 
to time in this study, that the Crown would also independently retain their own expert. Thus, two 
sets of analyses were conducted, one for each set of expert witnesses, the Court-appointed expert 
and the Defence expert. 
As well, two primary outcomes were investigated. The first was the designation outcome 
wherein the judicial decision maker decides whether or not to assign a special sentencing 
designation (i.e., DO or LTO) based on the legislated criteria and treatability of “the threat 
posed” (R. v. Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). Here, the judicial decision maker has to be satisfied that 
the individual poses a “high likelihood of harmful recidivism and that his or her conduct is 
intractable,” defining “intractable” as “behaviour that the offender is unable to surmount” (R. v. 
Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). In this respect, the SCC indicates that all evidence (including expert 
evidence) should be used (R. v. Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). Upon reading the DO decisions, it was 
not uncommon for judicial decision makers to include evidence throughout their decision-
making process (i.e., at both the designation and penalty stages). 
The second outcome is the penalty outcome wherein the judicial decision maker, based 
on the outcome of the designation stage, decides what sentence to impose on the individual (i.e., 
indeterminate sentence, determinate sentence with an LTSO, or determinate sentence only). The 
SCC has stated that all evidence (including expert evidence) should be used to help “determine 
the appropriate sentence to manage this threat” (R. v. Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). Not surprisingly, 
the judicial decision makers in this study did not impose any determinate only sentences and thus 
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the results were dichotomized to indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO. It remains 
important to investigate both outcomes as many of the changes to the preventative detention 
legislation over the years have shifted the judicial decision makers’ discretion to different areas.  
Under the old legislation (which includes any index offence that occurred prior to the 
2008 legislation change), judicial decision makers had more discretion at the designation stage 
and very little to no discretion at the penalty stage (e.g., if the individual met the DO criteria, 
they must be a DO and therefore automatically receive an indeterminate sentence). However, the 
2008 legislation change shifted the judicial decision maker’s discretion from the designation 
stage to the penalty stage. This has resulted in the penalty stage becoming the more critical 
outcome measure due to the increased discretion permitted at this stage. 
4.1.1 Designation Outcome 
Overall, designation outcome (i.e., DO or LTO) was found to be less influenced by the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and 
risk management in the community. Specifically, the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of 
the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk and treatment amenability did not significantly 
contribute to designation outcome. This is not surprising as most individuals facing preventative 
detention hearings are already considered high-risk due to their criminal histories, personalities, 
and their substance use issues, and thus an expert’s evaluation of this is not necessarily seen as 
something not already known. That said, there are many high-risk individuals whom never face 
preventative detention hearings as it has been found that DOs are generally no higher risk than 
their incarcerated counterparts (Bonta et al., 1998; Koopman, 1985; Langevin & Curnoe, 2014; 
Nicholaichuk et al., 2013; Thompson, 2016; Trevethan et al., 2002). This brings into question 
why some individuals are selected to face preventative detention hearings and others with similar 
presentations and backgrounds are not? 
Moreover, although the SCC has stated that the decision of whether or not to assign a 
special sentencing designation should be about treatability, the data due not support this 
approach. The data show that treatment amenability is influencing penalty outcomes but not 
designation outcomes. One reason for this may be the lack of another suitable designation if the 
legislated criteria are met; that is, in the past, judicial decision makers could utilize treatability as 
a reason for designating someone an LTO if they felt the individual did not meet the criteria in 
full. However, the 2008 legislation change has made it clear that judicial decision makers no 
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longer have that discretion if the criteria are met and thus, they have shifted the treatability 
evidence to justify the penalty outcome.  
That said, one area that the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-
appointed experts’ influence was seen with respect to designation outcome was their assessment 
of risk management in the community. If the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the 
Court-appointed experts testimony supported the individual’s risk management in the community 
than the individual was less likely to be assigned a DO designation. This also falls in line with 
the designation criteria as the primary difference between an LTO and DO is manageability in 
the community. Thus, it is not surprising that the risk management in the community portion of 
the Court-appointed risk assessment is considered in the designation stage. 
The data show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high,” 93% of the time that individual was 
designated a DO rather than an LTO. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower,” only 67% of the time 
that individual was designated a DO. The data also show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as 
“high,” 67% of the time they received a DO designation compared to 86% of the time when the 
individual’s treatment amenability was rated as “low.” 
Moreover, the data show that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-
appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk management in the community as manageable, 
73% of the time the individual received a DO designation compared to receiving a DO 
designation 91% of the time when the individual’s risk management in the community was rated 
as not manageable. In terms of risk management in the community, it is noted that there tended 
to be considerable evidence presented in the preventative detention hearings from other “experts” 
regarding program options and community supports that may have also influenced judicial 
decision makers’ decisions in this particular regard. Generally, the trend seen with respect to the 
judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings were, lower 
ratings of risk, higher ratings of treatment amenability, and a higher rating of manageability of 




Whereas the most influential area for Court-appointed experts (as interpreted by judicial 
decision makers) with respect to designation outcome was their rating of risk management in the 
community, the Defence experts’ rating of risk management in the community (as interpreted by 
judicial decision makers) was not influential with respect to designation outcome. When the 
Defence expert rates an individual’s risk management in the community as manageable (as 
interpreted by judicial decision makers), 86% of individuals received a DO designation 
compared to 83% when the Defence experts rated the individual’s risk management in the 
community as not manageable. Interestingly, and in contrast with the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings of risk management in the community, judicial decision makers appear influenced by the 
Defence experts’ assessment of treatment amenability (and less so with risk judgment) with 
respect to designation outcome. If the judicial decision makers interpreted the Defence experts’ 
ratings of an individual’s risk as very high or high than 92% of the time the individual was 
designated a DO, whereas if the Defence experts rated an individual’s risk as “moderate or 
lower,” 72% of the time the individual was designated a DO. 
Moreover, if the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts’ ratings 
of an individual’s treatment amenability as “low” than the individual was designated a DO 100% 
of the time, whereas if the Defence experts rated an individual’s treatment amenability as “not 
low” than the individual was designated a DO 79% of the time. These results make sense and 
likely speak to the idea that if the Defence expert, who is by nature meant to be the most 
favorable towards the individual facing preventative detention, agrees that treatment amenability 
is low and risk is high (or very high), then judicial decision makers are seeing no reason to 
support anything except the most extreme designation. Generally, the same trends were seen 
with respect to the judicial decision makers’ interpretation of the Defence experts as with the 
Court-appointed experts wherein lower ratings of risk, higher ratings of treatment amenability, 
and higher ratings of manageability of risk in the community resulted in a lower likelihood of the 
individual receiving a DO designation. 
4.1.2 Penalty Outcome 
Overall, results from both experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) were consistent with 
previous research (Blais, 2015; Lloyd et al., 2010). Specifically, it was found that the judicial 
decision makers’ interpretation of the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk, treatment 
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amenability, and risk management in the community were found to be influential on penalty 
outcomes (i.e., indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO). This is not surprising given that 
preventative detention legislation provides judicial decision makers with the most discretion at 
the penalty stage and thus the experts’ opinions (as interpreted by the judicial decision makers) 
can be more fully integrated into the decision-making process. 
That said, there are less criteria or clear guidelines in respect the penalty stage of the 
preventative detention process and thus more subjectivity applied. The SCC has indicated that 
“…only offenders who pose a tremendous future risk are designated as dangerous and face the 
possibility of being sentenced to an indeterminate detention” (R. v. Boutilier, 2017, p. 938). The 
primary criterion speaks to risk management in the community and thus the related concept of 
treatment amenability (e.g., level of motivation and cognitive capacity). This is a different 
judgment for judicial decision makers and experts alike to make. One cannot predict the future 
with absolute certainty and thus these two areas, treatment amenability and risk management in 
the community, tend to result in less confident appraisals. The result is more severe sanctions as 
judicial decision makers and experts alike err on the side of caution and public safety but that is 
also likely resulting in more individuals being incarcerated indefinitely. 
The data showed that when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high,” that individual received an indeterminate 
sentence 79% of the time. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower,” that individual received an 
indeterminate sentence only 33% of the time. Generally, the higher the risk rating by the Court-
appointed experts (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), the higher the likelihood the 
individual received an indeterminate sentence and the lower the risk rating, the higher the 
likelihood the individual received a determinate sentence with an LTSO. 
When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an 
individual higher in treatment amenability (i.e., more treatment amenable), there was a lower 
likelihood the individual would receive an indeterminate sentence. Moreover, when the judicial 
decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ rating of an individual lower in 
treatment amenability (i.e., less treatment amenable), the more likely the individual would 
receive an indeterminate sentence. The data showed that when the judicial decision makers 
interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as 
109 
 
“high,” the individual received an indeterminate sentence only 17% of the time compared to 82% 
of the time when the individual’s treatment amenability was rated as “low.” 
When the judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ rating of an 
individual as manageable in the community, the individual was more likely to receive a 
determinate sentence with an LTSO than when the Court-appointed experts rated the individual’s 
risk as not manageable in the community. When the judicial decision makers interpreted the 
Court-appointed experts’ rating of an individual’s risk as manageable in the community, the 
individual was given an indeterminate sentence 39% of the time whereas when the Court-
appointed expert rated the individual as not manageable in the community, the individual 
received an indeterminate sentence 89% of the time. Generally, the trend for the Court-appointed 
expert showed that lower risk ratings, higher ratings of treatment amenability, and higher risk 
manageability in the community (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) resulted in a much 
lower likelihood that the individual would receive an indeterminate sentence. 
When looking at what Court-appointed experts’ ratings are most predictive of penalty 
outcome (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of risk 
management in the community and treatment amenability were the most predictive factors, 
followed by the Court-appointed experts’ rating of risk. If the judicial decision maker interpreted 
the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as moderate or 
higher there was a 74% decrease in odds that the individual would be given an indeterminate 
sentence. Moreover, if the judicial decision maker interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings of an individual’s risk management in the community as manageable, there was an 84% 
decrease in the odds that the individual would be given an indeterminate sentence. Overall, the 
Court-appointed experts’ rating of risk management in the community and treatment amenability 
(as interpreted by judicial decision makers) were uniquely predictive over and above their ratings 
of risk judgment. This result supports prior research wherein treatment amenability and risk 
management in the community were the primary predictors of outcome (Blais, 2015; Lloyd et 
al., 2010). 
When considering the Defence experts’ ratings of risk (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers), the higher the rating of risk, the more likely the individual received an indeterminate 
sentence compared to a determinate sentence with an LTSO. The data show that when the 
judicial decision makers interpreted the Defence experts’ rating of an individual’s risk as “very 
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high or high,” 78% of the time the individual received an indeterminate sentence compared to 
39% of the time when the Defence experts rate an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower.” As 
seen with the designation outcome, the general trend is that the higher the Defence experts’ 
ratings of treatment amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), the less likely the 
individual would receive an indeterminate sentence. The data show that when the judicial 
decision makers interpreted the Defence experts’ rating of an individual’s treatment amenability 
as “not low,” 50% of the time the individual will receive an indeterminate sentence compared to 
100% of the time when the individual’s treatment amenability is rated as “low.” This result 
speaks to the importance of the Defence experts’ opinion (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers) in the sense that if they also feel the individual is low in treatment amenability then the 
likelihood of the individual’s success in terms of change is not hopeful and the judicial decision 
maker is almost surely going to sentence the individual to an indeterminate term. 
The general trend that appeared was higher ratings of risk management in the community 
by the Defence experts (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) were associated with a higher 
likelihood that the individual would receive a determinate sentence with an LTSO. However, 
lower ratings of risk management in the community by the Defence experts were associated with 
a higher likelihood the individual would receive an indeterminate sentence. The data show that 
when the judicial decision makers interpreted the Defence experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk 
as manageable in the community, 61% of the time the individual received an indeterminate 
sentence compared to 83% of the time when the individual’s risk was rated as not manageable in 
the community. Overall, the data show that the Defence experts’ risk judgment and risk 
management in the community variables (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) may have 
less influence with respect to penalty outcome but the Defence experts’ treatment amenability 
variable is significant with respect to penalty outcome. 
When looking at what Defence experts’ ratings (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers) are predictive of penalty outcome, all three ratings contributed to penalty outcome; 
however, the Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability was the only predictive factor. 
Overall, the higher the rating of treatment amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers) the less likely an individual will receive an indeterminate sentence. If the judicial 
decision makers interpreted the Defence experts’ ratings of the individual as treatment amenable 
the individual has an 89% decrease in odds of being sentenced to an indeterminate period. 
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However, if an individual’s risk is considered manageable in the community, there is only a 46% 
decrease in odds that they will be given an indeterminate sentence. The other two Defence expert 
rated variables (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), risk judgment and risk management 
in the community, were not predictive of penalty outcome over and above the Defence experts’ 
rating of treatment amenability. 
In conclusion, it appears from these results that experts’ ratings of risk, treatment 
amenability, and risk management in the community are being taken into consideration by 
judicial decision makers. However, it is also noted that many times there are multiple experts 
from various agencies that testify at preventative detention hearings and thus it is unclear what 
influence their testimony is contributing to the outcome. Judicial decision makers are required to 
integrate all the information before them into a final judgment. Moreover, it is not uncommon for 
judicial decision makers to be engaged in confirmation bias and be selective about what facts 
they wish to focus on and include (particularly from expert assessment reports) in order to 
support their own conclusion (Blais, 2015). However, as it is unlikely that human bias will be 
eliminated at this stage, all experts can do is present the information as cohesively and clearly as 
possible both in their written and oral testimony. 
4.2 Presence of Partisanship 
 Prior changes to preventative detention legislation attempted to reduce the amount of 
partisanship between experts by requiring the testimony of only one psychiatrist at the hearing. 
The 2008 legislation change continued to impose a requirement for one Court-appointed expert 
risk assessment to be completed with the likely hope that partisanship would continue to be 
reduced. However, one fundamental aspect of the Canadian legal system is that it is adversarial 
and you have a fundamental right to defend yourself by presenting evidence on your own behalf. 
Given that the Court-appointed experts appear, at times, to be associated with the Crown rather 
than the Court (as seen by individuals refusing to be interviewed by the Court-appointed experts 
but agreeable to be interviewed by their own expert), it is clear that partisanship is unlikely to be 
eliminated in preventative detention hearings. Prior research noted that approximately half of the 
hearings evaluated had adversarial risk assessments and the evidence showed that partisanship 
still existed (Blais, 2015). It was not believed that this research set would fundamentally be 
different in this regard; however, Blais (2015) compared specific instrument scores between 
Court-appointed and Crown retained experts versus general ratings of risk, treatment 
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amenability, and risk management in the community and this research investigated not only the 
overall ratings in each of the three assessment areas: risk judgment, treatment amenability, and 
risk management in the community, but also a comparison of Court-appointed experts with 
Defence retained experts. 
The results of this study found that 55 of the 140 cases (39%) contained a Defence expert 
hired specifically to provide an opinion on the Defendant’s behalf, which once again introduces 
the possibility of partisanship and supports prior research (Blais, 2015). Moreover, there were at 
least 14 additional cases (10%) wherein a Crown expert was hired specifically to provide an 
opinion on the Defendant which were not specifically evaluated in this study. It is not clear why 
the Crown, at times, decides to hire their own expert but it would be possible it is to either 
reinforce their case or because they are unhappy with the assessment of the Court-appointed 
expert. As noted, it is not uncommon for the Crown to “pick and choose” an expert (from 
anywhere within Canada) that will be agreeable to their position and present it to the Court as an 
option. However, it is also not uncommon for judicial decision makers (case law aside) to allow 
the Crown to choose the Court-appointed expert. Whatever the reasons, it again brings into 
question the presence of partisanship. In this study, it was also not uncommon to have more than 
two experts either provide assessments or testimony at the preventative detention hearings. For 
the purposes of this study, the Court-appointed expert was included as the first expert and the 
second expert was the Defence expert. 
When considering the role of the experts by jurisdiction, this study found that 100% of 
the Court-appointed experts in British Columbia and Alberta are from within their own province 
and 85.7% (BC) and 90.9% (AB) of the Defence experts are from within their own province. 
However, only 44.4% of Court-appointed experts in Saskatchewan are from Saskatchewan and 
only 20% of Court-appointed experts in Manitoba are from Manitoba, with 80% (SK) and 50% 
(MB) of the Defence experts from within their own province. It is not directly known why 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba have much lower rates of utilizing Court-appointed experts within 
their own provinces (as it is not likely due to a lack of expertise or availability); however, it is 
postulated that the Crown are seeking the most favorable assessment to support their case and 
thus search outside the province, as necessary to receive that assessment. This is supported by 
the fact that in Saskatchewan one Court-appointed expert has testified 19 times (38%) and 
another has testified 16 times (32%); thus 70% of the Court-appointed expert testimony is 
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coming from two experts who are not from Saskatchewan. Similar results can be seen in 
Manitoba wherein two Court-appointed experts have testified 6 times each for a total of 66.6% of 
the testimony coming from experts not from Manitoba. In contrast, British Columbia and Alberta 
do not utilize any out of province Court-appointed experts and the most any one expert has 
testified in each province is eight times (16.3%) in British Columbia and six times (26.1%) in 
Alberta, showing more diversity in their expert selection criteria. 
Further, when considering type of expert (Court-appointed versus Defence retained) by 
credential (psychiatrist versus psychologist) by jurisdiction, interesting results were found. The 
Court-appointed and Defence experts in British Columbia and Saskatchewan were almost 
equally split between psychologists and psychiatrists. However, the Court-appointed experts in 
Alberta (71.4%) and Manitoba (80%) were primarily psychiatrists and Defence experts in 
Alberta (81.8%) and Manitoba (75%) were psychologists. Again, it is not known why these 
jurisdictional differences in terms of expert credential exists, but it is postulated that it could 
have to do with an experts’ willingness to testify, availability, perceived benefit of one 
qualification over another, and the desire of the either side to receive a favorable report. This 
again speaks to the issue of partisanship and bias within the judicial system within Canada. 
Overall, the results suggest that in cases where there is both a Court-appointed expert and 
Defence expert, judicial decision makers’ report a significant amount of agreement on all three 
assessment areas (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). Again, it is important to note that 
the written decisions are the judicial decision makers’ words and not always the experts’ words. 
Further analyses on whether the experts’ ratings in each assessment area was influential on 
penalty outcome, it was found that neither expert’s ratings (as interpreted by the judicial decision 
makers) with respect to risk judgment uniquely predicted penalty outcome. However, the Court-
appointed expert did appear to have more of an influence over the Defence expert (as interpreted 
by judicial decision makers). 
In terms of percent agreement, the data show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpret the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “very high or high,” the 
Defence expert is in agreement 80% of the time. When the judicial decision makers interpret the 
Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as “moderate or lower,” the Defence 
expert was in agreement 90% of the time. Overall, this speaks to a high level of agreement 
between the Court-appointed and Defence experts on the risk judgment variable (as interpreted 
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by the judicial decision maker). As noted, this is not surprising as most individuals being 
presented for preventative detention are already believed to be a higher risk to recidivate based 
on several factors (e.g., criminal history, personality presentation, substance use issues, past 
breaches). However, if they are not deemed to be a higher risk based on their history, it is likely 
that they are facing preventative detention on one of the criteria that is less common (e.g., sexual 
offence and particularly ‘brutal’). Moreover, many of the same actuarial instruments are utilized 
which, if completed according to administration and scoring criteria, should broadly result in the 
same level of risk judgment, bearing in mind that: 1) a risk judgment is more than the result of a 
single tool, 2) evaluators may use different tools, 3) evaluators may show poor inter-rater 
reliability, even when they rate the same tools, and 4) evaluators may draw different conclusions 
even from the same trends in the assessment data. 
In terms of treatment amenability, the data show that when the judicial decision makers 
interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability as “not 
low,” the Defence experts were in agreement 100% of the time. When the judicial decision 
makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s treatment amenability 
as “low,” the Defence experts were in agreement 52% of the time. This result appears to speak to 
some partisanship with respect to treatment amenability in that it appears the Defence expert 
tends to more consistently feel there is an overall higher level of treatment amenability than 
Court-appointed experts. However, when a case appears clear and possibly unique in the 
treatment amenability factors presented (e.g., clear factors that speak to high treatment 
amenability), the experts appear in agreement 100% of the time. Moreover, treatment 
amenability is more subjective than some other factors and there are no specific risk assessment 
instruments that address it, thus there is a higher likelihood of discordance to arise without 
partisanship being implicated. That said, it would be beneficial to have a measure developed that 
specifically addresses treatment amenability so that clinicians and others can make more 
objective, clear, confident, and comprehensive evaluations. This may reduce the partisanship and 
bias by experts and judicial decision makers alike. 
Further, if the Court-appointed expert is in fact primarily selected by the Crown (and 
agreed to by the Court), and they seek out favorable experts to provide an opinion, then the 
partisanship or bias is actually presented by the Court-appointed expert, not the Defence expert. 
That said, the judicial decision makers appear to favor, at times, the Court-appointed expert 
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which does not bode well for the Defendant. Overall, in terms of treatment amenability, it was 
found that each experts’ ratings contributed unique information and the Court-appointed experts’ 
ratings (as interpreted by the judicial decision maker) were incrementally predictive of penalty 
outcome. Moreover, even though the Defence experts’ ratings (as interpreted by the judicial 
decision maker) were not incrementally predictive, it was shown that their opinion does carry 
some weight. 
In terms of risk management in the community, the data show that when the judicial 
decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk as 
manageable in the community, the Defence expert is in agreement 97% of the time. When the 
judicial decision makers interpreted the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of an individual’s risk 
as not manageable in the community, the Defence expert was in agreement 42% of the time. 
Similar to the results with treatment amenability, this result also appears to speak to some 
partisanship with respect to risk management in the community in that it appears the Defence 
experts tend to feel the individual is likely to be managed in the community more than Court-
appointed experts (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). Further, risk management in the 
community, as with treatment amenability, is more subjective and not directly measured by risk 
assessment instruments, and thus there is a higher likelihood of discordance to arise. Moreover, 
as with the results of treatment amenability, it could be seen that the Court-appointed experts 
(who are hand selected by the Crown) are the experts showing partisanship and bias in this 
regard, or at the very least a more conservative approach. 
When considering which experts’ ratings of risk, treatment amenability, and risk 
management in the community, if any (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), was 
predictive of penalty outcome, it was found that both the Court-appointed and Defence experts’ 
rating of treatment amenability are generally predictive of penalty outcome. However, the data 
only support that the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of treatment amenability (as interpreted by 
judicial decision makers) uniquely predicted penalty outcome. The data with respect to the 
Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) are 
approaching significance and are likely affected by sample size. 
It was found that the judicial decision makers interpretation of the Court-appointed 
experts’ ratings of treatment amenability are predictive of the penalty outcome 85% of the time, 
whereas the Defence experts’ ratings of treatment amenability are predictive of the penalty 
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outcome 80% of the time. Generally, the data support that both experts’ ratings of treatment 
amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) contribute uniquely to the prediction of 
penalty outcome; however, it appears as though the Court-appointed experts’ ratings of treatment 
amenability (as interpreted by judicial decision makers) is incrementally predictive of penalty 
outcome whereas the Defence experts’ ratings is not incrementally predictive of penalty 
outcome. Overall, it appears that the judicial decision makers are giving the Court-appointed 
experts more weight than the Defence experts, but the Defence experts do still get some weight. 
This again could be due to the perception of partisanship on behalf of the judicial decision maker 
and believing the Court-appointed experts are likely providing a less biased opinion when in fact 
they could be providing the more biased opinion, or at least a more conservative opinion that is 
generally in favor of the Crown who selected them. This could also be the result of confirmation 
bias by the judicial decision maker. 
In terms of both the Court-appointed and Defence experts’ rating of risk judgment (as 
interpreted by judicial decision makers), it was found that they are both generally predictive of 
penalty outcome. However, the data do not support that either expert uniquely predicts penalty 
outcome. The trend that appears seems to provide support that the Court-appointed experts have 
slightly more influence than the Defence experts (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). 
This result is not surprising given the fact that risk judgment is not significantly related to 
penalty outcome and the fact that the two experts tend to have a high degree of concordance 
when assessing risk (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). Moreover, risk judgments are 
less subjective and thus there is a lower likelihood of discordance to arise. Risk judgment is also 
largely driven by valid and reliable risk assessment instruments which eliminates a considerable 
amount of variance in the overall ratings. 
Further, in terms of ratings of risk management in the community, it was found that only 
the Court-appointed experts’ rating of risk management in the community (as interpreted by 
judicial decision makers) was uniquely predictive of penalty outcome. When risk was assessed as 
manageable in the community by the Court-appointed experts (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers), this was associated with a 93% decrease in the odds of an indeterminate sentence in 
contrast to 1.4% for the Defence experts’ rating of risk management in the community. That is, 
the data support that the Court-appointed experts’ conclusions on risk management in the 
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community would appear to overrule the Defence experts’ conclusion (as interpreted by judicial 
decision makers). 
This is likely the most prominent example of a judicial decision maker accepting the 
evidence of the Court-appointed experts compared to the evidence of the Defence experts. The 
reason for this almost complete acceptance is not clear but could be due to the judicial decision 
makers’ beliefs that partisanship exists on behalf of the Defence experts instead of the Court-
appointed experts (which is more likely) and thus the Defence experts’ evidence simply cannot 
be believed. However, it could also be a form of confirmation bias on behalf of the judicial 
decision maker wherein they are selecting what supports their personal opinion and ultimately 
the more conservative assessment. This could also be the case because there is fear around 
making the “wrong” decision and having someone in the future get hurt as a result. Overall, 
judicial decision makers do not appear to be considering the Defence experts’ views on risk 
management in the community and are instead choosing to prefer the testimony of the Court-
appointed experts. 
Interestingly, as noted, there is a significant overlap in experts that have testified on 
behalf of both the Court and the Defence at various points in time. For example, Dr. X testifies 
often for the Court but has also, from time to time, testified for the Defence in certain cases. If 
Dr. X is truly biased, this perceived adversarial flip flop would be highly unlikely to occur. That 
said, it is not common to see Dr. X testify more than once for one side but multiple times for the 
other side. For example, Dr. X mostly testifies for the Defence but has on one occasion testified 
as the Court-appointed expert. It could be postulated that if an expert is not used multiple times 
by one particular side, it may be because they did not provide a favorable position to that 
particular side. Saskatchewan is a prime example of this in that they focus their appointments of 
experts to only one or two experts due to favorable outcomes and it is less likely the Defence will 
hire these same experts. Moreover, although the Crown and the Defence are, by law, meant to 
agree on the appointment of the Court-appointed expert, along with the judicial decision maker, 
it is not uncommon for the Crown to get their expert appointed even if the Defence does not 
agree. For this reason alone, if partisanship exists, it is likely to exist with the Court-appointed 
expert. That said, similar to many fields of study and practice, it is not uncommon to have 
varying opinions and that is acceptable as long as each side can justify their position and support 
it with research. 
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 In conclusion, although the 2008 legislation change was, in part, meant to continue to 
eliminate the partisanship that existed within preventative detention hearings, the results show 
that partisanship continues to exist in some areas more than others. The less subjective areas tend 
to have higher levels of agreement and the more subjective areas tend to have lower levels of 
agreement (as interpreted by judicial decision makers). Interestingly, although the legislation 
continues to attempt to eliminate partisanship on behalf of the experts, it has not yet addressed 
potential biases that exist with both the selection of the Court-appointed expert or judicial 
decision makers themselves. Moreover, much of the discordance within the areas of treatment 
amenability and risk management in the community could be reduced by the introduction of 
clear, specific operational definitions and assessment tools. However, given the way our judicial 
system is structured, it is highly unlikely that partisanship will ever be eliminated. 
4.3 Presence of Static, Dynamic, and Protective Factors 
 Research supports dynamic and protective factors as being influential in assessing an 
individual’s risk level, as well as treatment amenability and risk management in the community 
(Bonta & Andrews, 2017). However, it has also been found that less than half of all assessments 
in preventative detention hearings (from 2006 to 2008) contained information on dynamic or 
protective factors (Blais & Forth, 2014). As noted previously, it is important to remember that 
the data collected was what was contained in the written judicial sentencing decision and at the 
discretion of the individual judicial decision maker and not necessarily what was contained in the 
experts’ reports. However, the previous research by Blais and Forth (2014) did review the actual 
risk assessment reports and still noted a low rate of discussion around dynamic and protective 
factors by the experts. 
Overall, there was only one significant finding with respect to a discussion of static, 
dynamic, or protective factors for either the Court-appointed or Defence experts (as interpreted 
by judicial decision makers). It was found that the Defence experts’ discussion of static versus 
dynamic factors showed that 56% of the time the Defence experts noted the difference between 
static and dynamic factors (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), the individual was given 
an indeterminate sentence; however, when the Defence did not note the difference between static 
and dynamic factors, the individual received an indeterminate sentence 88% of the time. The 
reason why the Defence experts’ discussion around static and dynamic factors is significant is 
unknown but review of the decisions indicate that there would be a substantial amount of focus 
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on the differentiation of age as a dynamic factor and the concept of “burnout” with respect to 
recidivism and adverse personality factors. It appears that Defence experts tend to focus on these 
types of dynamic factors more than Court-appointed experts. 
Otherwise, there were no significant findings with respect to a discussion of static, 
dynamic, or protective factors for either the Court-appointed experts or Defence experts (as 
interpreted by judicial decision makers). Perhaps these areas are less well understood by judicial 
decisions makers and thus not focused on in their decision-making process. Or perhaps these 
factors are taken for granted by experts and they are not being well explained in the expert risk 
assessment reports further hindering judicial decision makers’ use of them. Moreover, perhaps 
experts themselves are not well-informed in some of the factors and thus fail to include or speak 
about them in their testimony. For example, protective factors and their role in risk assessment 
and recidivism are only really starting to be explored and thus perhaps experts are not yet 
comfortable with speaking to them in an expert capacity. As well, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether experts and judicial decision makers are operating under the same definitions and 
understanding of static, dynamic, and protective factors. For example, as in previous research, it 
appears that the construct of psychopathy and the use of the PCL-R are still misunderstood and 
misused (e.g., psychopathy (or severe antisocial personality disorder) is not treatable). 
Further, it was noted in the decision documents that personality factors (e.g., antisocial 
personality disorder or psychopathy), as well as substance use issues, were major discussion 
points in the vast majority of cases. However, there was little, if any, discussion around 
successful treatment of these factors. For example, some researchers have found that, despite the 
negative findings regarding psychopathy and treatment amenability, poor methodology may be 
confounding results (D’Silva et al., 2004). Moreover, although individuals high in psychopathy 
may be more likely to be unmotivated, resistant to treatment, and have high attrition rates (Wong 
et al., 2007), positive treatment outcomes have been found when evidence-informed risk-need-
responsivity based approaches are employed to retain these individuals in treatment (e.g., Olver 
& Wong, 2009). 
Instead, much of the discussion typically centered around failures in the past regarding 
treatment and thus little hope for future treatment. Moreover, as many individuals facing 
preventative detention applications are older at sentencing it is not uncommon for a discussion 
around age and burnout to take place. This is another area that appears not well understood and 
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yet is supported by research. Alternatively, it is not uncommon for an expert or a judicial 
decision maker to use the reasoning against the individual in that they will say that they are 
already of an older age and yet not slowing down in their criminal behavior. However, when 
evaluated more closely, it is likely that the individual has reduced not only the frequency but 
severity of their offences, but the difference between past frequency/severity and present 
frequency/severity could be being perceived differently. Some experts and judicial decision 
makers may not see a reduction in the same way. 
Whatever the reasons, judicial decision makers are not necessarily being made aware of 
important dynamic and protective factors that can assist in ameliorating hearing outcomes. 
Overall, it continues to appear that experts, along with judicial decision makers, continue to 
focus on static factors and past behavior in predicting the likelihood of future behavior when 
other factors could be helpful in the final determination. It is noted that protective factors were 
not commonly noted in the sentencing decisions and, when they were noted, they were deemed 
to be insufficient to override other risk information. The focus within risk assessments appears to 
continue to be on risk factors and not dynamic or protective factors. 
4.4 Effect of 2008 Legislation Change 
 The effect of the 2008 legislation change has not yet been evaluated and thus much of the 
analyses were exploratory. That said, it was hypothesized that the majority of DOs will receive 
indeterminate sentences rather than determinate sentences with LTSOs. Both the designation 
outcome and penalty outcome were analyzed to determinate what effect, if any, the 2008 
legislation change has had on the DO population. The 2008 legislation change with respect to 
preventative detention applications appear to contribute little in terms of the overall number of 
individuals designated as DOs. It was unclear how the 2008 legislation change would change 
designation outcomes and judicial decision makers appeared to believe that there would be an 
increase number of DO designations because of the 2008 legislation change as they would no 
longer be able to as easily select a different designation (e.g., LTO) (as noted by their written 
words). However, in this study, there appears to be an equal number of DO designations pre-
legislation (81.8%) and post-legislation (81.3%) change. As well, as noted, due to the 2008 
legislation change reducing the judicial decision maker’s discretion at the designation stage and 
the fact that the criteria for a DO designation did not change, it is not surprising that there are no 
effects of the legislation with regards to this aspect. 
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However, as judicial decision makers are provided considerable discretion at the penalty 
stage of the hearing, it was unknown whether the 2008 legislation change would influence this 
aspect of the outcome. The results indicate that the 2008 legislation change did significantly 
impact penalty outcomes (i.e., indeterminate versus determinate with an LTSO). Specifically, 
prior to the 2008 legislation change 80% of DOs were given indeterminate sentences (as per 
legislative requirements at the time); however, after the 2008 legislation change, only 54% of 
DOs were given indeterminate sentences. The findings in this study appear to show that the 
legislation change did, in part, change the characteristics of the DO population. The DO 
population now essentially includes a subset of individual that are more similar to LTOs than 
indeterminate DOs with respect to their risk manageability in the community. This is due directly 
to the shift in the discretion of judicial decision makers at the designation stage. It is highly likely 
that many of the determinate sentences with LTSOs post-2008 legislation change would have 
been found to be LTOs pre-2008 legislation change. 
It will be interesting to see how the judicial system, Correctional Service Canada, Parole 
Board of Canada, expert witnesses, and others interpret this subset of individuals. Specifically, 
the term “DO” or “Dangerous Offender” has become synonymous with not only an 
indeterminate sentence but also representing individuals who are the highest level of risk, lowest 
level of treatment amenability, and lowest likelihood of successful reintegration into the 
community. With this label comes a significant amount of stigmatism and judgment. It remains 
to be seen if this new subset (i.e., DOs with determinate sentences and LTSOs) will be treated 
any differently in the eyes of those they have to come into contact with. That said, there are now 
likely to be fewer LTOs having been replaced by DOs with determinate sentences and LTSOs. 
The concern here is that the designation of a DO is stigmatizing whether or not it is accompanied 
by an indeterminate sentence. The designation alone will very likely result in increased bias and 
supervision conditions that could lead to issues with compliance based on potential 
unreasonableness. This could result in a very high chance of failure and thus ultimately an 
indeterminate sentence in the end, thus confirming the Crown’s reasons for bringing a 
preventative detention hearing in the first place. Ultimately, it is highly likely judicial decision 
makers are correct in that there will be more DOs with indeterminate sentences. 
In terms of the preventative detention legislation itself, it is believed that it is not 
necessary to manage high risk, high need individuals within community or the criminal justice 
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system. It would be more appropriate to levy appropriate sentences to these individuals based on 
their index offence combined with their history. In many cases, lengthy sentences (e.g., 10 plus 
years) would be warranted and would serve multiple functions. First, a sentence with an end-
point would serve to promote hope and motivation in the individual being sentenced by giving 
them an end point to look forward to which may increase their positive behavior. Second, a 
lengthy but determinate sentence would allow for a more realistic rehabilitation and reintegration 
by providing a statutory release date and community support while on parole and beyond. And 
third, a lengthy determinate sentence would provide sufficient opportunity for aging individuals, 
in particular, to spend the balance of their lives in the community by being repatriated and thus 
increase their likelihood of finding appropriate community supports (e.g., long-term care, group 
home). Indeterminate sentences only serve to cost taxpayers significant amounts of money when 
it comes to housing DOs and reducing an individual’s motivation to change and succeed. That 
said, if the money spent to prosecute and house DOs was put back into the community by way of 
supports, housing, and programming, it is highly likely DOs risk would be able to successfully 
be managed in the community. 
As well, the legislation with regard to preventative detention is currently vague and 
contains multiple subjective terms that are difficult for clinicians to quantify (unlike a risk 
rating). If the assistance of clinicians continues to be requested and required by law, it will be 
necessary to develop more clear operational definitions of terms, such as “dangerousness,” 
“brutal,” “treatment amenability,” “risk management in the community,” and “pattern.” Further, 
perhaps clinicians could work towards developing actuarial instruments that may assist in 
making more clear conclusions regarding concepts such as treatment amenability in order to 
assist not only judicial decision makers but other professionals who work within the criminal 
justice system (e.g., CSC, PBC). These fundamental issues regarding preventative detention 
legislation and how to manage these high risk, high need individuals are not unique to Canada 
and can be seen to varying degrees on a global scale (e.g., United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, 
United States, Denmark, New Zealand). 
4.5 Ethnicity 
 Given that, as at the fiscal year end 2018-2019, 35.5% of DOs are of Indigenous descent 
(Public Safety Canada, 2020), analyses were completed on each variable to determine if racial 
ancestry was associated with DO sentencing decisions (Lloyd et al., 2010). Previous results 
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investigating DO sentencing decisions found no relationship between ethnicity and outcome 
(Blais, 2015; Lloyd et al., 2010). Moreover, it was noted that a large proportion of sentencing 
decisions failed to note any ethnicity. Although it is not uncommon for the judicial decision 
maker to not note ethnicity, it can be widely assumed that if they do not mention ethnicity then it 
is very likely that the individual was Caucasian. This assumption is made in this study as judicial 
decision makers frequently noted ethnicity when it was a potential factor in the individual’s life. 
For example, the law requires Indigenous social history to be considered when sentencing 
Indigenous individuals (as per R. v. Gladue, 1999). Therefore, judicial decision makers are 
required to mention ethnicity during these hearings. Moreover, it was found that when someone 
was, for example, not born in Canada and had early life experiences that were adverse, ethnicity 
was also noted. 
This current research explored ethnicity regarding multiple outcomes as previous 
research generally supported that ethnicity did not play a role in outcomes (Blais, 2015; Lloyd et 
al., 2010). However, the time period that this research was collected over made it possible to 
investigate the role of ethnicity both pre- and post-legislation change. Ethnicity was 
dichotomized into Indigenous versus Non-Indigenous and the data file was stratified by this 
variable for analyses. First, generally, ethnicity was not found to generally play a role when 
considering the entirety of the data. Specifically, 80% of Indigenous individuals had DO 
designations and 83% of Non-Indigenous individuals had DO designations. As well, 67% of 
Non-Indigenous individuals had indeterminate sentences and 60% of Indigenous individuals had 
indeterminate sentences. 
Second, penalty outcome pre-legislation change and post-legislation change and ethnicity 
was investigated and it was found that Indigenous individuals are no longer more likely to 
receive an indeterminate sentence post-2008 legislation change compared to pre-2008 legislation 
change. Only 49% of Indigenous individuals received an indeterminate sentence post-legislation 
change compared to 84% prior to the 2008 legislation change. However, it was found that Non-
Indigenous individuals have not been affected by the 2008 legislation change with respect to 
penalty outcomes. It was found that Non-Indigenous individuals were just about as likely to 
receive an indeterminate sentence pre-legislation change (75%) versus post-legislation change 
(62%). Further investigation (discussed in the following section) into reasons for this significant 
finding were found to be driven by the province of Saskatchewan (whose DO applications are 
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almost entirely against Indigenous individuals) where judicial decision makers have imposed 
more determinate sentences with LTSOs than any other jurisdiction evaluated. 
Third, in terms of designation outcome, the results indicate that neither Indigenous nor 
Non-Indigenous individuals have been impacted by the 2008 legislation change. It was found 
that 88% of Indigenous individuals received a DO designation prior to the legislation change and 
77% received a DO designation after the legislation change. Moreover, 75% of Non-Indigenous 
individuals received DO designation pre-legislation change versus 88% post-legislation change. 
As noted previously, designation outcome is not considered the most informative outcome 
variable due to the 2008 legislation change placing less discretion for judicial decision makers at 
the designation stage. Therefore, the result would not be expected to be significantly different. 
That said, it is still concerning to see so many Indigenous individuals being designated DOs 
when they represent such a small proportion of the Canadian population. 
Overall, ethnicity generally did not play a role in the two primary outcome measures, 
designation outcome and penalty outcome, particularly pre-2008 legislation change. In this 
regard, although there was a higher percentage of Indigenous individuals facing preventative 
detention applications (driven primarily by Saskatchewan), being assigned a DO designation, 
and receiving an indeterminate sentence compared to Non-Indigenous individuals, those overall 
percentages were unchanged post-2008 legislation change. However, one area where there was a 
notable change regarding ethnicity was with respect to the overall percentage of Indigenous 
individuals being sentenced to indeterminate incarceration post-2008 legislation change (driven 
primarily by Saskatchewan). And although it is positive that Indigenous individuals have a better 
chance at receiving a determinate sentence with an LTSO over an indeterminate sentence since 
the 2008 legislation change (as least in Saskatchewan), as noted, it remains concerning that 59% 
of the sample in this research were of Indigenous ancestry. Moreover, it is yet to be seen how 
many of these Indigenous individuals still end up with indeterminate sentences when they 
recidivate due to a lack of supports available in the community and the effects of stigmatization 
on multiple levels. 
 It is unclear if the legislation change was the sole reason for this result as there is likely 
other factors involved. That said, given that the results appear largely driven by Saskatchewan 
and as a province they bring forward considerably more preventative detention applications, not 
only generally, but also against Indigenous individuals per capita than any other province, given 
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the large shift post-legislation change in penalty outcomes, it is likely judicial decision makers 
are utilizing their discretion to the greatest extent possible under the law. Whatever the reason, 
the result is significant and compelling. Further factors that could have influenced the outcome 
include improved programming focused directly on Indigenous populations, considerations of an 
individual’s Indigenous social history, and perhaps simply just a greater level of awareness and 
education within the judicial system regarding Indigenous history and reconciliation. 
4.6 Jurisdictional Differences 
 Given that the current DO population is disproportionately distributed amongst 
jurisdictions, it was important to investigate jurisdictional outcomes. As seen in overall 
distribution of DOs by province, Saskatchewan has not only a disproportionate number of DOs, 
but a disproportionate number of Indigenous DOs, which continues to be represented by this 
research. Specifically, there were 50 cases pulled from Saskatchewan during the 10-year period 
and only 18 pulled from Manitoba in the same period. Given that these two provinces are not 
only similar in overall population (SK = 1.18M; MB = 1.38M) but also the percentage of 
population that is Indigenous (SK = 16.3%; MB = 15.5%), the number of cases presented for 
preventative detention in Saskatchewan very troubling (SK = 50; MB = 18). Moreover, a similar 
contrast can be seen between British Columbia and Alberta were there were 49 cases pulled from 
British Columbia and only 23 pulled from Alberta. Given that these two provinces are also 
similar in overall population (BC = 5.17M; AB = 4.44M) and percentage of population that is 
Indigenous (BC = 5.9%; AB = 6.6%), the number of cases presented for preventative detention is 
in British Columbia also troubling (BC = 49; AB = 23). When considering Saskatchewan brings 
forth the same number of preventative detention applications as British Columbia (who has over 
four times the population), it can be concluded that preventative detention applications are being 
overused in Saskatchewan. 
 Further jurisdictional analyses have also shown that there is a dramatic difference in the 
number of Indigenous individuals brought forward for preventative detention hearings. 
Specifically, even though both Saskatchewan and Manitoba have a greater proportion of 
Indigenous peoples in their populations, they bring a disporportionate number of preventative 
detention hearings against Indigenous individuals (SK = 84.0%; MB = 77.8%). However, a 
similar, but less extreme trend, is seen in Alberta and British Columbia wherein 43.5% and 
32.7%, respectively, of preventative detention applications are brought against Indigenous 
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individuals, when only 6.5% (AB) and 5.9% (BC) of their populations are Indigenous. This 
appears to confirm prior research indicating that the provisions are being applied arbitrarily 
across jurisdictions, and is resulting in discrimination against specific groups of individuals 
(Bonta, Harris, et al., 1996; Grant, 1985). 
 The overuse of preventative detention applications in Saskatchewan has been a long-
standing issue and is well-known amongst those who are involved in the judicial system. When 
the province has been questioned about why their rates of preventative detention applications are 
not only disproportionate in overall quantity but also with respect to Indigenous individuals, their 
response tends to focus on crime rates being higher in Saskatchewan and thus warranted. 
However, Manitoba is very similar to Saskatchewan in terms of population, overall percertage of 
Indigenous peoples, and crime rates, however, they brought 2.8 times fewer applications (18 vs. 
50) in the same 10 year period and yet their crime rates have not increased incrementally as a 
result.  
Moreover, it is also known that Saskatchewan employs a team of Crown prosecutors who 
only pursue cases that may be eligible for preventative detention. This approach appears out of 
the scope and purpose of the legislation as it is difficult to justify that individuals (including 
Indigenous individuals) are more “dangerous” in Saskatchewan than other provinces 
(particularly those with similar characteristics and populations). Moreover, Saskatchewan is 
targeting almost exclusively Indigenous individuals for preventative detention hearings. Finally, 
if the goal (as is noted in Saskatchewan), is to reduce crime, then there should be evidence of a 
decline in violent crime in Saskatchewan in the last decade; however, there is no evidence of 
same and in fact, there appears to be an increase in violent crime (Statistics Canada, 2021). It 
does not appear Saskatchewan has a valid reason for bringing forward so many preventative 
detention applications, particularly against Indigenous individuals. The true reasons will not ever 
likely be known, but the way in which Saskatchewan approaches preventative detention appears 
not just unjust but biased and discriminatory. 
 In regards to both designation outcome and penalty outcome, the 2008 legislation change 
did not influence the number of DO designations handed down by the provinces. All four 
provinces continued to assigned DO designations to between 77.6% and 87.0% of the individuals 
brought forward for preventative detention. Again, not surprising given the shift in discretion to 
judicial decision makers from the designation stage to the penalty stage. It is concerning, 
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however, that the vast majority of individuals brought forward for preventative detention are 
receiving special sentencing designations. One’s odds of not receiving a designation if targeted, 
are low. 
However, there was a significant jurisdictional shift seen with respect to the number of 
indeterminate sentences levied pre- versus post-2008 legislation change. Overall, Saskatchewan 
(52.0%) had the fewest indeterminate sentences levied, followed by British Columbia (61.2%), 
Manitoba (77.8%), and Alberta (78.3%). Moreover, when comparing the number of 
indeterminate sentences pre-legislation change versus post-legislation change, Saskachewan had 
the largest contrast (88.9% (pre) versus 31.3%  (post)) for a difference of 57.0%. This was 
followed by Alberta (100.0% (pre) versus 70.6% (post) (29.4% difference) and British Columbia 
(68.8% (pre) versus 57.6% (post) (11.5% difference). Whereas in Manitoba the trend was in the 
opposite direction (66.7% (pre) versus 88.9% (post) (22.2% increase). Overall, regardless of 
percentage of overall population of Indigenous peoples in these provinces, there is a 
disproportionate number of Indigenous individuals facing preventative detention applications 
regardless of jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the impact of the 2008 legislation change is seen more prominently in 
Saskatchewan, wherein judicial decision makers appear to be taking the opportunity to exercise 
their discretion in handing down determinate sentences with LTSOs as opposed to indeterminate 
sentences. Given the high proportion of Indigenous individuals brought forward for preventative 
detention applications in Saskatchewan, this trend towards determinate sentences with LTSOs 
(50/50 chance) should be regarded as the most favorable outcome without a shift in policy that 
dictates who prosecutors target for preventative detention hearings. That said, it is unknown how 
many of the DO determinate sentences with LTSOs will end up ultimately serving indeterminate 
sentences anyway, particularly in Saskatchewan. 
The results further indicate that the 2008 legislation change does not appear be 
influencing British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba as significantly in terms of levying 
indeterminate sentences versus determinate sentences with an LTSO during the period 
investigated. However, Saskatchewan judicial decision makers appear to have adopted the 2008 
legislation change to a substantial extent and this adoption of the 2008 legislation change is 
potentially what the federal government was hoping would occur, which is an opportunity for 
individuals who are “dangerous” under the law, to still have an opportunity to reside in a 
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community setting with appropriate supports. However, as previously discussed, it is unclear 
how many of these individuals will ultimately be successful in the community and ultimately end 
up with an indeterminate period of incarceration anyway. 
Whereas Saskatchewan judicial decision makers appear to have adopted the 2008 
legislation change to a large extent, the trend appears to show British Columbia and Alberta also 
starting to adopt the 2008 legislation change but at a slower pace. However, Manitoba appears to 
be moving in the opposite direction in that the overall percentage of DOs provided indeterminate 
sentences has actually increased since the 2008 legislation change. That said, it is unclear the 
reasons for the increase as Manitoba clearly brings forward less preventative detention 
applications overall and it may be that their selectiveness of cases may already be those that 
warrant an indeterminate sentence to be levied. This line of reasoning could also apply to British 
Columbia and Alberta. However, knowing that, as a jurisdiction, Saskatchewan has more than 
three times as many DOs than any other province per 100,000 population, it may be that because 
Saskatchewan prosecutors are not as critically selective about the individuals they present for 
preventative detention hearings, judicial decision makers are recognizing this and making the 
appropriate adjustments during the penalty stage (which is where their power lies). 
In conclusion, when the effects of the legislation were investigated further in terms of 
jurisdictional trends, it was found that, of the four provinces explored, only Saskatchewan had a 
large shift in sentencing wherein they had an almost 50/50 split of DO indeterminates and DO 
determinates with LTSOs. The other three provinces further research will be required to 
determine if this is in fact the case as approximately half of the sample collected had index 
offences prior the legislation change and thus fell under the old legislation wording. That said, it 
is likely that there will eventually be an increase in the overall number of DO designations as the 
legislation change decreased judicial decision makers’ discretion at that stage of the sentencing 
which now requires them to designate an individual as a DO (rather than an LTO) if they meet 
the legal criteria of a DO. In terms of the legislation as a whole, it can be said that the criteria are 
overbroad and have not actually decreased the number of individuals likely ultimately facing 
indeterminate incarceration. 
Given that it is unlikely that preventative detention will be repealed or abolished any time 
in the future and these high risk, high need individuals fall under federal jurisdiction, an 
alternative to managing not only the jurisdictional discrepancies but the overrepresentation of 
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Indigenous individuals, would be to create a committee that contains a variety of forensic mental 
health and judicial professionals that would oversee the implementation of preventative detention 
in Canada. This would eliminate the provincial jurisdiction to directly bring forward 
applications, although the provinces could still submit possibilities to the committee for 
consideration. That said, the committee would be able to take a more clinical and evaluative 
approach to determine who should face a preventative detention hearing, thus reducing the 
amount of bias and discrimination that may be present. As well, perhaps the committee could 
work towards locating and building resources in the community for individuals potentially facing 
preventative detention. 
4.7 Strengths and Limitations 
 There are some important strengths, limitations, and possible future directions with the 
present study. This study covered a significant period of time (i.e., 10 years) and also contained 
preventative detention hearings that took place both pre- and post-2008 legislation change in 
order to evaluate the impact, if any, of same. Moreover, although the sample contained 140 
sentencing decisions from four Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Alberta) which allowed for a good representation (45%) of active DO between those four 
jurisdictions and approximately 37.5% of all active DOs in Canada, the overall sample was 
moderate in size and decreasing cell sizes in categorical analyses may have reduced the statistical 
power for some analyses. This could have led the analyses to potentially not be as highly 
informative if the judicial decision makers who take the time to detail the experts’ testimony are 
distinct from other judges in important ways, which is in and of itself an additional limitation. 
There are several limitations and delimitations to the following study, which parallel the 
limitations of similar studies (Blais, 2015; Blais & Forth, 2014; Lloyd et al., 2010). One major 
limitation is the nature of the data source; in particular, the gathering of experts’ testimony is 
from judges’ selective discussion in their judgments. There is recognition that additional expert 
written or oral testimony may have been important to the outcome even though there is no 
reflection in the coding; thus, it is difficult to make definite conclusions about experts’ testimony 
that was misunderstood or consciously disregarded by the judges. Moreover, in most cases, it is 
unknown what was actually presented (in writing or orally) to judicial decision makers and thus 
whether the judicial decision makers made appropriate remarks regarding same. However, part 
of the goal of the study was to gather information about how judicial decision makers are 
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representing or interpreting expert risk assessment information and incorporating it into their 
final decision. Finally, it is unknown how much confirmation bias existed throughout the 
hearings or how much “lip service” was provided to particular areas without actual consideration 
being provided to those aspects. 
Further, gathering judgments from the database which may have excluded cases is 
problematic, mainly because the characteristics of excluded cases are not known. As well, at 
times, it was found that there were a proportion of cases that had recorded appeal decisions but 
no accompanying original sentencing decision. Those cases were not included in this study as 
there was not enough information contained in the appeal decision to code the case. Moreover, 
restricting the analyses to the expert testimony submitted within the hearing leads to the 
possibility that the noted experts may not be representative of all experts that had an opportunity 
to interview the individual facing sentencing. However, if the testimony of the expert was 
persuasive enough, it is assumed inclusion in the written or oral decision will occur. Moreover, 
although all cases included, at a minimum, a Court-appointed expert as required by legislation, 
less than half included Defence expert reports and even fewer contained Crown-appointed 
experts. In some cases, there could be as many as four expert witnesses presenting evidence 
between various parties. This study was focused on the Court-appointed experts and any Defence 
retained experts and thus the other expert testimony was not included for analyses but it is 
acknowledged that expert testimony may have contributed to the ultimate outcomes. 
Interestingly, although DOs have histroically been primarily individuals who commit 
sexual offences, the current sample indicates that half (51.0%) have sexual index offences and 
only approximately 55.7% have prior sexual convictions. Therefore, the results are likely more 
generalizable to other correctional samples (e.g., high need violent offenders) wherein risk 
assessments may be used in judicial or other processes due to more individuals committing 
violent offences now being presented for preventative detention hearings. Moreover, on average, 
this sample only had 1.8 prior sexual convictions. Additionally, this study only provided a legal 
snapshot of hearings wherein expert evidence is presented in regards to already high-risk, high 
need individuals as preventative detention hearings are directed at a very small group of 
individuals whose personal characteristics (e.g., antisocial personality) and particular 
circumstances (e.g., having committed a series of serious personal injury offences) place them in 
favor of preventive incarceration (Thompson, 2016). Moreover, this study is restricted to 
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Canada, as preventative detention legislation varies around the world, thus limiting the 
interpretation of the results globally. That said, the issues with respect to “dangerous offenders” 
in Canada are not unique and are seen globally. 
There is a recognition that prior research has suggested to improve upon the limitations of 
the data source used in this study, including reviewing full transcripts of preventative detention 
hearings so that coding would not be as limited by the information judicial decision makers 
choose to include in their judgments (Lloyd et al., 2010). However, noting the most salient 
pieces of evidence that the judicial decision maker is utilizing in support of their decision are 
typically included in their written or oral submission (Welsh & Ogloff, 2008). Besides, the 
purpose of this study is to identify what is noted and how expert testimony is interpreted in the 
written or oral decisions by judicial decision makers, not the presentation in the written risk 
assessment or testimony during the hearing. 
4.8 Conclusion and Future Directions 
In conclusion, the present study examined the role of expert testimony and risk 
assessment (as interpreted by judicial decision makers), partisanship, ethnicity, jurisdictional 
differences, and the effect of the 2008 legislation change in preventative detention hearings 
between 2008 and 2018 in four Canadian provinces. Support for the role of experts in hearing 
outcomes continues to be supported, particularly in the areas of treatment amenability and risk 
management in the community, but also risk judgment (as interpreted by judicial decision 
makers). That said, the majority of the variance in outcomes stem from the penalty stage and not 
the designation stage; which is largely driven by the legal criteria set out in the Criminal Code. 
However, additional guidelines regarding risk assessments specific to preventative detention 
hearings, as well as operational definitions of inherently legal terms would likely further increase 
the utility and credibility of the experts’ assessments throughout the judicial decision-making 
process. 
Currently, it is difficult for expert witnesses to make the most conclusive statements in 
the areas of treatment amenability and risk management in the community as they remain largely 
subjective and there are no specific valid and reliable assessment instruments that can be used. 
Further, support for the positive impact of the 2008 legislation change was seen, particularly in 
Saskatchewan. It appears that in provinces where high proportions of preventative detention 
applications are brought, judicial decision makers appear to be utilizing the discretion granted to 
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them under the 2008 legislation change. That said, judicial decision makers are not needing to 
utilize the same discretion granted under the 2008 legislation change in jurisdictions who are 
more selective as to who they bring forward for preventative detention in the first place (e.g., the 
‘most dangerous and highest risk’). Indigenous individuals continue to be overrepresented 
(which was not expected to change as the legislation did not address them specifically) and 
Saskatchewan appears to be an outlier when it comes to not only the number of preventative 
detention applications brought forth but also their focus on Indigenous individuals, along with 
their application of the 2008 legislation change. That said, it would be prudent to have more 
prosecutorial oversight when it comes to preventative detention applications in order to combat 
not only the overrepresentation of Indigenous individuals, but the general overuse of the 
legislation in some provinces. 
The knowledge garnered from this program of research helped bridge the gap between 
research evidence and the practice of risk assessment, particularly in preventative detention 
hearings. In order to effectively apply research regarding factors associated with risk assessment 
to sentencing decisions, it is imperative to understand what the judicial system, as judicial 
decision makers, view as important and useful in making sentencing decisions, and which risk 
assessment aspects they have been willing to support. It is hopeful that the information gathered 
will be used to inform policy makers and politicians in regards to preventative detention hearings 
and assist clinicians to write more clear and comprehensive reports. Results of this research may 
have implications for future policies, risk assessment strategies, training clinicians, and may 
encourage collaboration between researchers, the judicial system, and policy makers. Given the 
ongoing increase in DOs across the country, along with the stigmatizing effect of such a 
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APPENDIX A – CODING SHEET 
Section 1 – Individual Characteristics 
 
Case/Individual (LAST Name, First Name)        
Date of Birth (YY-MM-DD):      
Age at sentencing    
      Age at index   
Ethnicity: 
 1 – Caucasian/White 
 2 – Indigenous/Aboriginal/Cree/Metis/Dene/Inuit (or any other classification) 
 3 – Other (any other classification noted) 
 4 – No ethnicity noted 
Year of index: 
 1 – 2004 2 – 2005 3 – 2006 4 – 2007 5 – 2008 6 – 2009 
 7 – 2010 8 – 2011 9 – 2012 10 – 2013 11 – 2014 12 – 2015 
 13 – 2016 14 – 2017 15 – 2018 16 – 2019 17 – Other    
Index offence: 
1 – sexual number   offence(s):        
2 – violent number   offence(s):        
Number of prior convictions (including youth)   
Youth record: 1 – yes  2 – no  3 – not mentioned/unknown 
Age at first offence:    
Prior sexual conviction(s): 
 1 – yes  number   
 2 – no 
Prior failure on community supervision: 
 1 – yes  
 2 – no 
Education obtained (please note highest level achieved): 
 1 – grade 9 or less 
 2 – grade 10 to 12 
 3 – GED or equivalent 
 4 – post-secondary education or trade school 
Gang affiliation: 1 – yes  2 – no  
Substance use issues (any or multiple substances): 1 – yes  2 – no 
Adverse childhood experiences (circle all that apply): 
 1 – abuse (any kind (circle all that apply) – sexual, emotional/psychological, physical) 
 2 – poverty (e.g., low socioeconomic status) 
 3 – witnessing violence (e.g., violence between parents or other adults) 
 4 – parental substance abuse (e.g., one or both parents) 
 5 – neglect (e.g., abandonment, basic needs unmet, lack of parental supervision) 
 6 – foster care (and/or involvement from social services) 
Other experiences (circle all that apply): 
 1 – mental health issues/diagnoses (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar, depression, anxiety, ADHD)  
2 – cognitive issues/diagnoses (e.g., low intelligence, learning disorder, illiterate, FASD) 
3 – personality disorder/diagnoses (e.g., Antisocial, Narcissistic, Borderline, Psychopathy) 
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Section 2 – Expert Characteristics and Content of Experts’ Testimony Noted 
 
Number of experts who completed risk assessments   
Expert affiliation and credential (if more experts – please note): 
 1 – Crown/Court     
  1 – Psychiatrist Name:     
  2 – Psychologist Name:     
 2 – Defence 
  1 – Psychiatrist Name:     
  2 – Psychologist Name:     
Actual risk assessment scales (the presence of an identified scale): 
 1 – Expert 1 (circle all that apply)  
  1 – VRAG  2 – PCL-R  3 – STATIC-99R 
  4 – HCR-20  5 – RSVP  6 – LSI-R 
  7 – SORAG  8 – VRS  9 – VRS-SO 
  10 – LS/CMI  11 – LS/RNR  12 – Other:     
    2 – Expert 2 (circle all that apply) 
  1 – VRAG  2 – PCL-R  3 – STATIC-99R 
  4 – HCR-20  5 – RSVP  6 – LSI-R 
  7 – SORAG  8 – VRS  9 – VRS-SO 
  10 – LS/CMI  11 – LS/RNR  12 – Other:     
Expert and type of risk communication description (circle all that apply): 
 1 – Expert 1 
  1 – categorical  (e.g., low, moderate, high, very high) 
  2 – narrative (e.g., description of instrument and outcome in words) 
  3 – percentiles (e.g., percentile rank) 
  4 – range (e.g., range of any description -   to  ) 
  5 – raw score (e.g., 27/30) 
 2 – Expert 2 
  1 – categorical  (e.g., low, moderate, high, very high) 
  2 – narrative (e.g., description of instrument and outcome in words) 
  3 – percentiles (e.g., percentile rank) 
  4 – range (e.g., range of any description -   to  ) 
  5 – raw score (e.g., 27/30) 
Expert and risk judgment: 
1 – Expert 1 
 1 – very high    2 – high 3 – moderate-high 4 – moderate   5 – low 
2 – Expert 2 
 1 – very high    2 – high 3 – moderate-high 4 – moderate   5 – low 
Expert and treatment amenability judgment (e.g., capacity and/or willingness/motivation to 
engage in treatment/programming AND be successful): 
1 – Expert 1 
 1 – very high (e.g., a very high chance at success and/or capacity or motivation) 
 2 – high (e.g., a high chance at success and/or higher capacity or motivation) 
 3 – moderate (e.g., some chance at success and/or some capacity or motivation) 
 4 – low (e.g., not much chance at success and/or little to no capacity or motivation) 
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2 – Expert 2 
 1 – very high (e.g., a very high chance at success and/or capacity or motivation) 
 2 – high (e.g., a high chance at success and/or higher capacity or motivation) 
 3 – moderate (e.g., some chance at success and/or some capacity or motivation) 
 4 – low (e.g., not much chance at success and/or little to no capacity or motivation) 
Expert and risk management judgment: 
1 – Expert 1 
 1 – can be managed in the community (e.g., enough/available supports) 
 2 – cannot be managed in the community (e.g., not enough/no available supports) 
 3 – could be managed, but no (or not enough) appropriate supports available 
2 – Expert 2 
 1 – can be managed in the community (e.g., enough/available supports) 
 2 – cannot be managed in the community (e.g., not enough/no available supports) 
 3 – could be managed but no (or not enough) appropriate supports available 
Expert and distinction made between static/historical and dynamic risk factors: 
1 – Expert 1 
 1 – yes (e.g., acknowledgement that static/historical factors are unchangeable – except age) 
 2 – no (e.g., no acknowledgement that static/historical factors are unchangeable) 
2 – Expert 2 
 1 – yes (e.g., acknowledgement that static/historical factors are unchangeable – except age) 
 2 – no (e.g., no acknowledgement that static/historical factors are unchangeable) 
Expert and noted presence of dynamic factors (including personality) (e.g., motivation, cognitive 
distortions, insight, empathy, anger, emotion dysregulation): 
1 – Expert 1 
 1 – yes (e.g., a statement regarding dynamic (or changeable) factors) 
 2 – no (e.g., no statement regarding dynamic (or changeable) factors) 
2 – Expert 2 
 1 – yes (e.g., a statement regarding dynamic (or changeable) factors) 
 2 – no (e.g., no statement regarding dynamic (or changeable) factors) 
Expert and noted presence of protective factors (e.g., areas of strength – community supports, no 
substance issues, employment, prosocial friends/associates, prosocial spouse/partner, no antisocial attitudes, no 
issues with emotion regulation, intelligent, insightful): 
 1 – Expert 1 
  1 – yes (e.g., a statement regarding protective factors) 
  2 – no (e.g., no statement regarding protective factors) 
 2 – Expert 2 
  1 – yes (e.g., a statement regarding protective factors) 
  2 – no (e.g., no statement regarding protective factors) 
 
Section 3 - Hearing and Written Sentencing Decision Characteristics 
 
Judge:      
Jurisdiction: 1 – BC    2 – AB  3 – SK    4 – MB 
Year of decision: 
 1 – 2008 2 – 2009 3 – 2010 4 – 2011 5 – 2012 6 – 2013




Level of court: 
 1 – Provincial     2 – Queen’s Bench/Superior 
Law referenced: 
 1 – new law (index post-July 2008)  2 – old law (index pre-July 2008) 
Trial outcome information: 
 1 – DO     2 – LTO 
Sentencing outcome: 
 1 – indeterminate    2 – determinate with a LTSO  
Length of the determinate sentence (entire sentence):    months 
Credit for time served        months 
Length of the long-term supervision order:     months 
Length of sentencing decision:       pages 
Judge’s perceptions of individual’s risk: 
 1 – very high  2 – high   3 – moderate   4 – low 
Judges’ perceptions of treatment amenability: 
 1 – very high  2 – high  3 – moderate   4 – low 
Judges’ perceptions of risk management: 
 1 – can be managed in the community 
2 – cannot be managed in the community 
3 – could be managed in the community, but no appropriate (or not enough) support 
Judges’ overall reliability on experts’ evidence: 
 1 – complete (e.g., the judge did not dispute any evidence presented) 
 2 – somewhat (e.g., the judge accepted some evidence and disputed some) 
 3 – dismissed (e.g., the judge did not agree with the expert evidence) 
Judges’ expression of a preference for one expert testimony over the others in cases with 
multiple experts (if more than two experts or both are psychiatrists and a preference, please note on the 
side): 
 1 – yes   1 – Expert 1   2 – Expert 2 
 2 – no   3 – not applicable as only one expert 
Appeal – any notes regarding an appeal and, in particular, why the appeal was successful can 
be noted at the bottom of the page: 
Appeal: 1 – yes  2 – no 
Year of appeal:   
Appeal Outcome:   1 – upheld 2 – overturned 
    
